A Power Primer, Handbook to Politics, People and Parties in Kosovo

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A POWER PRIMER: A HANDBOOK TO POLITICS, PEOPLE AND PARTIES IN KOSOVO—1 2—A POWER PRIMER: A HANDBOOK TO POLITICS, PEOPLE AND PARTIES IN KOSOVO WWW.IKSWEB.ORG A POWER PRIMER: A HANDBOOK TO POLITICS, PEOPLE AND PARTIES IN KOSOVO—3 This handbook has been produced with the generous support of Balkan Trust for Democracy (BTD), a project of the German Marshall Fund of the United States. 4—A POWER PRIMER: A HANDBOOK TO POLITICS, PEOPLE AND PARTIES IN KOSOVO WWW.IKSWEB.ORG PREFACE LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS INTRODUCTION THE RISE AND DEMISE OF COMMUNISM: 1945 – 1989 Compulsory system The 1981 riots The Return of Repression after 1981 A PARTY OR A MOVEMENT? – LDK The creation of the LDK The LDK as a Mass Movement The LDK’s political hegemony until 1997 The Fragmentation of the LDK The LDK today FROM THE BARREL OF A GUN: PDK AND AAK Illegal Structures and the UÇK A one man show – PDK Ambitious and Crafty - AAK VANITY PROJECTS: ORA AND FER The party that ran out of time - ORA Life is not fair - FER OUTLIERS – AKR AND VETËVENDOSJE! Building Kosovo or itself ? – AKR Vetëvendosje! - Kosovo’s bright future? GEOGRAPHY, POLITICS AND VOTING Regionalisation Rural-Urban split Ethnic parties A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE POLITICAL PARTIES ANNEX I. ELECTORAL RESULTS 2000 to 2010 INDEX 7 8 11 14 14 18 20 23 24 26 28 32 33 35 35 39 43 47 48 49 51 51 53 56 59 62 66 70 86 88 A POWER PRIMER: A HANDBOOK TO POLITICS, PEOPLE AND PARTIES IN KOSOVO—5 6—A POWER PRIMER: A HANDBOOK TO POLITICS, PEOPLE AND PARTIES IN KOSOVO WWW.IKSWEB.ORG No one has a monopoly over knowledge, but in Kosovo no one seems to have a monopoly over the truth either. The “truth” lies firmly in the eye of the beholder and the beholder’s view of the past is influenced by where they stand today. Kosovo is a small country of just under 11,000 square kilometres and has a population of about two million. But, when it comes to its politics, it is an amazingly complicated and tangled web. Embarking on research for the Political Landscape of Kosovo has been a wonderful, but challenging experience. Many events are still shrouded in mystery. For instance we don’t know exactly who founded the Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosovës (the Kosovo Liberation Army – the UÇK,) or who wrote the first ever statute of the Lidhja Demokratike e Kosovës (the Democratic League of Kosovo – the LDK). We often received two or more different accounts of these events from the people who were present at these historic gatherings. Stories are similarly confused even in the written memoirs of key players. Clearly a sense of civic responsibility towards the public does not seem to be high on the agenda of the storytellers, or it could be that personal agendas overrule any responsibility that we as a nation have towards our history and towards future generations. Despite these problems, the research team Brikena Hoxha, Milot Rexhepi, Dren Pozhegu and Arbër Kuçi have carried out an in depth analysis and conducted interviews with many of those who helped to shape today’s political landscape. It was an arduous task that involved burning the midnight oil in order to unravel the conflicting accounts that were set before us. Nonetheless, we are very grateful to all those who were willing to share their knowledge and understanding of how the crucial events unfolded in the constantly changing world of politics in Kosovo. There were also those who were not ready or willing to share their knowledge with us, but we leave it to the reader to judge them. Last but not least, we are extremely grateful to our board members, in particular Eggert Hardten, Tim Judah and Dominik Zaum for their inexhaustible support and the advice that they gave during the editing process. We are also grateful to Rosie Whitehouse for her help during the painful editing process. Engjellushe Morina Executive Director Prishtina December 2011 A POWER PRIMER: A HANDBOOK TO POLITICS, PEOPLE AND PARTIES IN KOSOVO—7 AAK - Aleanca për Ardhmërine e Kosovës (Alliance for the Future of Kosovo) ADK - Alternativa Demokratike e Kosovës (The Kosovo Democratic Alternative) AKR - Aleanca Kosova e Re (New Kosovo Alliance) AQK - Aleanca Qytetare e Kosovës (Civic Alliance of Kosovo) AVNOJ - Antifašističko Vijeće Narodnog Oslobođenja Jugoslavije (Anti-Fascist Council of the People’s Liberation of Yugoslavia) BDA - Bosnjaćka Demokratska Alternativa (Bosniak Democratic Alternative) BK - Balli Kombëtar (National Front) BSDAK - Bosnjaćka Stranka Demokratske Akcije Kosova (Bosniak Party of Democratic Action of Kosovo) BTD - Balkan Trust for Democracy CDS - Crnogorska Demokratska Stranka (Democratic Party of Montenegrins) CLY - Communist League of Yugoslavia CPY - Communist Party of Yugoslavia E15 - Grupi i ekspertëve (Experts’ Group) ESI - European Stability Initiative EU - European Union EULEX - European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo FARK - Forcat e Armatosura të Republikës së Kosovës (Armed Forces of the Republic of Kosovo) FER - Partia Fryma e Re (New Spirit) FES - Friedrich Eber Stiftung GAP - Institute for Advanced Studies GIG - Građanska Inicijativa Gora (Gora Citizens Initiative) GIS - Građanska Inicijativa Srbija (Citizens Initiative Serbia) HRW - Human Rights Watch ICG - International Crisis Group ICTY - International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia IKS - Iniciativa Kosovare për Stabilitet (Kosovar Stability Initiative) INGO - International Nongovernmental Organisation IRDK - Iniciativa e Re Demokratike e Kosovës (New Democratic Initiative of Kosovo) JIAS - Joint Interim Administrative Structure JNA - Jugoslovenska Narodna Armija (Yugoslav People’s Army) JSL - Jedinstvena Srpska Lista (United Serbian List) KACI - Kosovo Action for Civic Initiatives KAN - Kosovo Action Network KDTP - Kosova Democratic Türk Partisi (Turkish Democratic Party of Kosovo) KEK - Koroporata Energjetike e Kosovës (Kosovo Energy Corporation) KFOR - Kosovo Force (NATO peacekeeping force in Kosovo) KIC - Kosovo Information Center KIPRED - Kosovar Institute for Policy Research and Development KKR - Koalicioni për Kosovë të Re (Coalition for New Kosovo) KP - Koalicija za Povratak (Coalition “Return”) KMLDNJ - Këshilli për Mbrojtjen e Lirive dhe të Drejtave të Njeriut (Council for the Defence of Human Rights and Freedoms) KTB - Kosova Turk Birligi (Kosovo Turkish Union) KTV - Kohavision TV KVM - Kosovo Verification Mission LB - Lëvizja për Bashkim (Movement for Unity) LBD - Lëvizja e Bashkuar Demokratike (United Democratic Movement) LCK - League of Communists of Kosovo LDD - Lidhja Demokratike e Dardanisë (Democratic League of Dardania) LDK - Lidhja Demokratike e Kosovës (Democratic League of Kosovo) LDSH - Lëvizja Demokratike Shqiptare (Albanian Democratic Movement) LEK - Lidhja e Egjiptianëve të Kosovës (Egyptian League of Kosova) LIB - Lëvizja për Integrim dhe Bashkim (Movement for Integration and Unity) LKÇK Lëvizja Kombëtare për Çlirimin e Kosovës (National Movement for the Liberation of Kosovo) LPK - Lëvizja Popullore e Kosovës (People’s Movement of Kosovo) LPRK - Lëvizja Popullore për Republikën e Kosovës (People’s Movement for the Republic of Kosovo) LRSSHJ - Lëvizja për Republikën Socialiste të Shqiptarëve në Jugosllavi (Movement for an Albanian Socialist Republic in Yugoslavia) NATO - North Atlantic Treaty Organisation NDS - Nova Demokratska Stranka (New Democracy Party) ND - Nova Demokratija (New Democracy) NGO - Non-governmental OSCE - Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe ORA - Partia Reformiste ORA (Reformist Party ORA) PAI - Partia e Ashkalinjëve për Integrim (Ashkali Party for Integration) PBD - Partia e Bashkimit Demokratik (Democratic Union Party) PD - Partia e Drejtësise (Justice Party) 8—A POWER PRIMER: A HANDBOOK TO POLITICS, PEOPLE AND PARTIES IN KOSOVO WWW.IKSWEB.ORG PDAK - Partia Demokratike e Ashkalinjëve te Kosoves (Ashkali Democratic Party of Kosovo) PDASHK - Partia Demokratike Ashkali Shqiptare e Kosovës (Ashkali Democratic Albanian Party of Kosovo) PDK - Partia Demokratike e Kosovës (Democratic Party of Kosovo) PDKI - Partia Demokristiane për Integrim (Christian Democratic Party for Integration) PFK - Partia Fshatare e Kosovës (Peasant’s Party of Kosovo) PGJK - Partia e të Gjelbërve të Kosovës (Green Party of Kosovo) PK - Policia e Kosovës (Kosovo Police) PLK - Partia Liberale e Kosovës (Liberal Party of Kosovo) PNDSh - Partia Nacionale Demokratike e Shqiptarëve (Albanian National Democratic Party) PPDK - Partia e Progresit Demokratik të Kosovës (Democratic Progress Party of Kosovo) PPI - Partia e Pensionistëve dhe Invalidëve (Pensioners and Invalids Party) PPK - Partia Parlamentare e Kosovës (Parliamentary Party of Kosovo) PQLK - Partia Qendra Liberale e Kosovës (Liberal Centre Party of Kosovo) PREBK - Partia Rome e Bashkuar e Kosovës (United Roma Party of Kosovo) PSDK - Partia Social Demokrate e Kosovës (Social Democratic Party of Kosovo) PSK - Partia Socialiste e Kosovës (Socialist Party of Kosovo) PSHDK - Partia Shqiptare Demokristiance e Kosovës (Albanian Christian Democratic Party of Kosovo) POE - Publicly-owned Enterprise PTK - Posta dhe Telekomi i Kosovës (Post and Telecommunications of Kosovo) QPK - Qeveria e Përkohshme e Kosovës (Provisional Government of Kosovo) RAE - Roma, Ashkali and Egyptians SANU - Srpska Akademija Nauka i Umetnosti (Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts) SAP - Socialist Autonomous Province (Provinca Socialiste Autonome) SAWP - Socialist Alliance of Working People (Aleanca Socialiste për Punëtorët) SDA - Stanka Demokracija Akcije (Party of Democratic Action) SDSKiM - Srpska Demokratska Stranka Kosova i Metohije (Serbian Democratic Party of Kosova and Metohija) SFRJ - Socijalistička Federativna Republika Jugoslavija (Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) SHIK - Shërbimi Informativ i Kosovës (Kosovo Information Service) SKMS - Srpska Kosovsko-Metohijska Stranka (Serbian Party of Kosova and Metohija) SLKM - Srpska Lista za Kosovo i Metohiju (Serbian List for Kosovo and Metohija) SLS - Samostalna Liberalna Stranka (Independent Liberal Party) SNS - Srpska Narodna Stranka (Serbian People’s Party) SNSKiM - Savez Nezavisnih Socijaldemokrata Kosova i Metohije(Union of Independent Social Democrats of Kosovo and Metohija) SOE - Socially-Owned Enterprise (Ndërmarrje Shoqërore) TMK - Trupat Mbrojtëse të Kosovës (Kosovo Protection Corps) UÇK - Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosovës (Kosovo Liberation Army) UD - Unioni Demokratik (Democratic Union) UDBA - Uprava Državne Bezbednosti (Department of State Security) UJDI - Ujedinjena Jugoslovenska Demokratska Inicijativa (United Yugoslav Democratic Initiative) UNIKOMB - Uniteti i Kombit (National Unity) UNMIK - United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo UNSC - United Nations Security Council US - United States (Shtetet e Bashkuara) VATAN - Koalicija VATAN (Coalition VATAN) VV - Lëvizja Vetëvendosje! (SelfDetermination Movement!) A POWER PRIMER: A HANDBOOK TO POLITICS, PEOPLE AND PARTIES IN KOSOVO—9 On 30 March 2011, after just 35 days as president of Kosovo, the Constitutional Court ruled that President Behgjet Pacolli had been appointed unconstitutionally and therefore illegally. Pacolli was forced to resign. However he was also a signatory of the agreement which created the governing coalition along with Hashim Thaçi of the Partia Demokratike e Kosovës (The Democratic Party of Kosovo – the PDK) and Slobodan Petrović of the Samostalna Liberalna Stranka (the Independent Liberal Party – the SLS). But, now, keeping the government together was of paramount importance. How this could be done without having to call for new general elections puzzled many decision makers. A number of names for a new president were circulated but to win the necessary votes of two thirds of the parliamentary deputies meant having the LDK, now in opposition for the first time, also on board. On 6 April Pacolli, Thaçi and Isa Mustafa, the leader of the LDK, were called to the United States Embassy where Pacolli claims they were handed an envelope containing three names. The three party leaders then picked the person they thought was the most suitable candidate for the job. This was how Ahtifete Jahjaga received the phone call that she had never even dreamt of. She was asked whether she was ready to serve the country as a transitional figure. Until then Jahjaga had been the second in command of the Kosovo Police. She was US trained and a non-party figure. She accepted and was elected president by parliament on 7 April, winning 80 votes in the first round. The quick fix saved the government and brought a sigh of relief from all sides. What was significantly different about this new administration was that, for the first time a government had been formed by one of the big three parties, without one of the other two in coalition. This time only a small party and minority parties were all that was needed. Yet, far from being an advance, this situation in fact underscored the fragility of the situation. The ruling PDK has been buffeted by political storms. The Council of Europe’s report by Dick Marty alleging that the prime minister could have been involved in organ trafficking have been coupled with severe internal party disagreements over decision making. To make matter worse the PDK’s vice president Fatmir Limaj has been accused of war crimes and corruption. Widen the scope and the complexity of the political landscape is demonstrated by the fact that Ramush Haradinaj, the former prime minister is for the second time on trial at the International Criminal Tribunal in The Hague (ICTY). Finally the landscape has been unsettled by election to parliament of Vetëvendosje!, an unconventional party openly calling for union with Albania. All this has observers on tenterhooks. What will happen next? But how did we get here? This is what we have attempted to explain in this handbook. This handbook aims both to describe the existing political landscape and to identify the factors and processes that have shaped it. It is designed to give the reader a thorough grounding in the contemporary politics of Kosovo and the historical forces and parties that have created it. One important dimension of any political landscape is the way in which individuals organise to advance their political aims. In the case of modern democracies the main way they do this, though not exclusively, is through the vehicle of political parties. Parties and their development thus provide the primary lens that we can use to examine the political landscape. By analysing parties, their origins, their structure and their performance, we can examine a range of other factors that have shaped the political landscape of Kosovo. For instance, looking at the PDK and the AAK (Aleanca për Ardhmërinë e Kosovës – the Alliance for the Future of Kosovo), we WWW.IKSWEB.ORG 10—A POWER PRIMER: A HANDBOOK TO POLITICS, PEOPLE AND PARTIES IN KOSOVO ATIFETE JAHJAGA 20 APRIL 1975 RASHKOC, GJAKOVA Jahjaga attended secondary school in Prishtina. In 2000 she graduated from the University of Prishtina with a degree in law. Soon after Jahjaga joined Kosovo Police Service where she gradually climbed to the position of Deputy General Director. During her time in the police Jahjaga continued her studies with the University of Leicester in the UK in the field of Police Management and Penal Law, and in Crime Science with the University of Virginia in the US. In April 2011 Jahjaga was elected the first female president after an agreement was reached between the PDK, the AKR and the LDK. understand the legacy of the UÇK and the way it has shaped the politics of today, and the enduring role that it still plays beyond the party system. Geography too plays a key role in framing the way Kosovars think. The political importance of the east-west and north-south divide for Kosovo Albanian and Kosovo Serb politics is crucial. The regional roots of parties are as important as the rural-urban split. Political landscape can be broadly defined to include formal Kosovar and international political institutions and structures, political parties and civil society. Iniciativa Kosovare për Stabilitet (the Kosovar Initiative for Stability – the IKS) has written elsewhere about the key political institutions and structures, including international ones, and therefore these will not be the focus of this handbook.1 We leave aside the fact that many Kosovars doubt the legitimacy of the electoral outcomes of this or that party. Kosovo works with a hopelessly outdated voters’ list which bears little resemblance to reality. Electors often cast their votes in exchange for favours that they receive from parties before or after elections. We take the results as they are, but we also think that such issues do not change our analysis significantly. We take Kosovo’s electorate and examine it. We write about the emergence of parties which voters can chose from and about the choice he or she makes. Why did we not dedicate a chapter to the issue of Serbian parties? Kosovo Serbs have not participated in Kosovo’s democratic development until recently. Except for the elections of 2001, in which Kosovo Serbs in the main cast their vote for only one single movement with a very limited agenda, their 1 See: Iniciativa Kosovare per Stabilitet (IKS), Who’s the Boss?. Prishtine. 2008. participation ceased almost completely until the parliamentary elections of 2010. That Serbian parties have registered and Kosovo Serbs, at least in the centre and south, have returned to the polls can, in part, be attributed to the stubbornness of the SLS under the leadership of Slobodan Petrović. They have thus gone on to pick up most of the Serbian seats in the assembly. However, the bigger picture of Serbian politics and parties in Kosovo, and especially in the north, is beyond the scope of this report and, especially in view of the fast moving changes in the north since July 2011, we have therefore refrained from such an attempt. The history of Kosovo’s democracy cannot be imagined without the influence of the “foreign factor.” Foreigners were present at several key moments, especially from 1997 onwards. In 1998 Kosovo Albanians sought the intervention of the international community and have gradually now come to reject it. From 1999 onwards, during the UNMIK years, every step of Kosovo’s democratic path was documented, commented upon, nurtured and sometimes also obstructed. Kosovars remember how in 2001 United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) head Hans Haekkerup cut Fatmir Limaj’s microphone in the assembly. There is a long story to be written about foreign involvement in Kosovo’s politics, but it is not our subject here. This handbook is an introduction to the political landscape of Kosovo. It does not pretend to be a history of it, in part because of its intricacies but also because of the lack of reliable data. In the midst of Kosovo’s shifting post-conflict political landscape, no systematic analysis of trends and the underlying factors driving them has been carried out. Nor has any prior research examined the impact of these A POWER PRIMER: A HANDBOOK TO POLITICS, PEOPLE AND PARTIES IN KOSOVO—11 trends on political life in Kosovo. The little research that does exist on the political landscape in Kosovo has not been made available to the public in a way that is understandable or useful. However, a clear and concise explanation of the changing political landscape is important for democratic processes. Such information is crucial for citizens to make informed choices regarding who will represent them and their interests in government. An informed citizenry is an important element of democracy. The truth is that Kosovo does not write its own history, or at least not yet. We had to learn this the hard way. After interviews with many of the leading actors of the last two decades we were struck by the lack of objective evidence to confirm what they had told us. It hardly exists. Some striking examples: We could not find the results of the March 1998 elections on any website or in any major Kosovar paper. We have no final list of the deputies elected to parliament in the 1992 elections. The names of the founders of the UÇK, allegedly only four persons, remain in the dark. There is no account of the work of the last socialist assembly of Kosovo, in which Kosovo Albanians participated, in any Kosovar publication. No final judgements can be made about the first decade of Kosovo’s statehood, albeit in phantom form, from 1989 until 1999 because that history is still too raw. But we fear there may never be one if no one tackles the task of recording accounts in the near future. Too few books have been written about the period and even less first-hand evidence has been given by those who participated in making that history. Therefore the truth remains in a haze of scattered journalistic accounts and memoirs. Even worse, what work has been done, has often been done by foreigners. Sometimes as we quarried for the truth we felt that a cloak of collective amnesia had been thrown over the most painful issue in the history of Kosovo, that of the question of collaboration and resistance during the socialist period and afterwards. There are deep wounds that need attending to and that healing process has to start from somewhere. Thus, for obvious reasons, we have chosen to keep to a very general distanced tone. We are aware that we might be accused of superficiality but we know why we did not want to make judgements. We will not tell you the “whole story,” simply because is too big and complex a story to tell in such a handbook. While the paper will touch on the ways that civil society may have impacted on the political scene in Kosovo, our primary focus is on political parties. The party system is crucial for understanding who holds power over decision-making in Kosovo. As parties are comprised of individuals and involve internal power dynamics, studying the party system requires attention to the individuals within parties, their histories and the social relations among party members. Thus, we set out to investigate factors contributing to the formation of parties; the backgrounds of party leaders; the power dynamics influencing internal decision-making processes and party programs. With this research IKS seeks to map Kosovo’s political landscape in the post-conflict period, including how it was shaped during the pre-war period. The political landscape in Kosovo is evolving with Kosovar society, interchangeably one affecting the other. After 1999, political and institutional developments revolved around issues such as the transfer of competencies and the Declaration of Independence. Therefore, the fact that Kosovo gained its independence means that the single most important party political promise of all Albanian parties, i.e., how to gain independence, was no longer the issue. Old political party loyalties now seem to be slowly fading as people look anew for who will represent them and who will address the numerous social issues plaguing Kosovo. Through this handbook IKS aims to give the reader a better understanding of the political landscape in Kosovo, and to explain especially why it has the political leaders that it has. It aims to demonstrate what they bring socially and culturally to the political table due to their backgrounds and the extent to which they represent the interests of their constituents. Therefore this handbook, the results of our research should be an easy-to-read description, accompanied by an analysis of the formations and individuals that have marked the last twenty years. Before we continue, we offer a note on our methodology. Research by IKS involved more than 50 in-depth interviews. They were conducted with current and former prominent political figures and leaders of the local branches of political parties. One aim was to understand the dynamics that affect the strongholds of the main political parties. Primary research was complemented by secondary sources, including a desk review of the laws relevant to elections and political parties, policies, books, publications, media and other documents. Understanding Kosovo’s political landscape today requires going back to the political, legal and security context that triggered the birth of a multiparty system in Kosovo in the early 1990s. The first chapter examines the rise and demise of communism WWW.IKSWEB.ORG 12—A POWER PRIMER: A HANDBOOK TO POLITICS, PEOPLE AND PARTIES IN KOSOVO in Kosovo and its legacy for today’s politics. The handbook continues with the appearance of political parties and their leaders prior to 1999. The third chapter looks at Kosovo’s post-war political landscape and how the UÇK helped shape politics. The emergence of new parties with a civil society background is examined as well as post-war, postindependence parties that do not belong in either main group. All chapters include analyses of key trends during these periods. The handbook is accompanied by short biographies of individuals that have had an influence in shaping the political landscape. In addition there is a brief description of political parties, including the minority parties. Lastly, this handbook is complemented by a thorough online database, easily accessible and user friendly. The research sought to answer a rather straightforward question: How did political leaders get where they are today? A POWER PRIMER: A HANDBOOK TO POLITICS, PEOPLE AND PARTIES IN KOSOVO—13 Compulsory system Unlike in other parts of Yugoslavia, in Kosovo the communist movement did not enjoy any significant support, especially from its Albanian population. Between the wars Kosovo was poor and mainly rural. Towns were small and small-scale artisanal trade dominated commerce. The Yugoslav state administration was centralised, educational and health provision was poor or non-existent. Few were interested in socialist ideas. However some educated Albanians did become members of the Yugoslav communist movement, which was dominated by Serbs, Croats and others. A local Kosovo Albanian party did not exist and those who came into contact with the Yugoslav party often did so as a result of being educated outside Kosovo, especially in Skopje and Belgrade. Even by 1944, when the Kosovo section of the Yugoslav Communist party was already in place, only 30 percent of the party’s 1,238 members in Kosovo were Albanians.2 The party was widely perceived by Albanians as being Serbian dominated and pro-Yugoslav. Since 1941 most of Kosovo had been incorporated into a Greater Albania and most Albanians wanted to retain this status after the war and feared the return of Serbian and Yugoslav rule, which was increasingly seen as incarnated in the communist party of Yugoslavia. Communism was thus seen as an obstacle to addressing the question of self-determination.3 As Ivo Banac, the Croatian historian has observed, the Kosovo Albanians greeted “strictly Albanian” Partisan units with “occasional tolerance,” rather than enthusiasm.4 During the war the communist position on Kosovo’s post-war status evolved. Until 1943, the 2 Lenard J. Cohen. The Socialist Pyramid: Elites and Power in Yugoslavia. Ontario: Mosaic Press, 1989. p.347. Noel Malcolm claims that there were 2,250 member of the communist party in Kosovo, see: Kosovo a Short History. London: Pan Macmillan, 2002. p.315. 3 Stephen Schwartz. “‘Enverists’ and ‘Titoists,’ Communism and Islam in Albania and Kosova, 1941-1999: From the Partisan Movement of the Second World War To the Kosova Liberation War.” The Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics (2009). 4 Ivo Banac cited in Stephen Schwartz. “‘Enverists’ and ‘Titoists,’ Communism and Islam in Albania and Kosova, 1941-1999: From the Partisan Movement of the Second World War To the Kosova Liberation War. ”The Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics (2009). party endorsed the idea of Kosovo joining, or rather staying united with, Albania.5 Then Tito, who in 1940 had explicitly supported this idea, changed the party’s stance, arguing that only by keeping Kosovo within Serbia could he “hope to win the Serbs over to communism.”6 The Anti-Fascist Council of the People’s Liberation of Yugoslavia (AVNOJ), in its second session in November 1943, decided to create a federal Yugoslavia where “southern Slavic peoples” would live in six constituent republics. The resolution did not mention Kosovo. In reaction to this, an attempt was made by Albanians within the Kosovo Committee of the Yugoslav Communist Party to bridge the division between the Partisan movement and Kosovo’s Albanian population. A National Liberation Committee for Kosovo was created.7 Their first conference took place between 31 December 1943 and 2 January 1944 in Bujan, in northern Albania, in the highlands above Gjakova in Kosovo, where 49 communists from Albania, Montenegro, Kosovo and Serbia, of whom 43 were Albanians, adopted a resolution calling for the postwar unification of Kosovo and the Dukagjin plain with Albania. The declaration was seen as “separatist manifesto” by the mainstream of the Yugoslav communist movement.8 The Bujan resolution was clearly anathema as far as Kosovo Serbs and Montenegrins, who dominated the membership of the movement in Kosovo, were concerned. Thus it was almost immediately rejected by Yugoslav communist leaders and it confirmed their distrust of Kosovo Albanians within the party.9 This increased even further, when the 5 Sabrina P. Ramet, The Three Yugoslavias: State Building and Legitimation, 1918 -2005. Washington, DC, and Bloomington: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2006. p.155. See also Paulin Kola. The Search for Greater Albania. New York: New York University Press, 2003. pp. 42-43. 6 Julie A. Mertus. Kosovo: how myths and truths started a war. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999. Chronology, p.287. 7 Among the members of this Committee were Fadil Hoxha, Mehmet Hoxha, Hajdar Dushi, Ali Shukria and Zekirja Rexha. 8 Paulin Kola. The Search for Greater Albania. New York: New York University Press, 2003. p.54. Owen Pearson. Albania in Occupation and War: From fascism to communism, 1940-1945.New York: The Centre for Albanian Studies, 2005. p.318. 9 Stephen Schwartz. “‘Enverists’ and ‘Titoists,’ Communism and Islam in Albania and Kosova, 1941-1999: From the Partisan Movement of the Second World War To the Kosova Liberation War.” The WWW.IKSWEB.ORG 14—A POWER PRIMER: A HANDBOOK TO POLITICS, PEOPLE AND PARTIES IN KOSOVO SHABAN KASTRATI – POLLUZHA 1871, POLLUZHA, DRENICA – 21 FEBRUARY 1945, DRENICA A fighter and a local politician who fought for the Albanian cause. He came from the village of Polluzhë. He had no formal education. As a young man he became involved in political protests and during the First World War he fought against the Austrian and Bulgarian occupation. During the period of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia Polluzha represented the Drenica region as a deputy. During the Second World War he was as a commander of partisan battalions in Kolashin, Montenegro, and in Sandźak, Serbia. Despite his reservations against the predominance of Serbs and Montenegrins in the movement, he temporarily joined forces with the Yugoslav Partisans, whom he also regarded as occupiers. He turned against the movement after he was instructed to order his troops to liberate the northern regions of Serbia. He then created his own unit, with some 15,000 men. He was killed in early 1945 and many of his followers were forced to leave the country. Revered as an Albanian war hero his memory lives on in folklore and songs. He is seen as a symbol of Albanian resistance towards any kind of foreign occupation of Kosovo. Balli Kombëtar (the National Front), the Albanian nationalist movement staged an uprising against the communists in 1944, as they took control of the region.10 On 2 December 1944, Ballistat from the Drenica region attacked the Trepça mining complex and other targets.11 Numbering at most 2,000 men and led by Shaban Polluzha, who had previously fought with the partisans, now he held off their forces for two months. After the war Balli Kombëtar members in both Kosovo and Albania were either imprisoned, executed, or tortured for their wartime role, for collaborating with the Germans and Italians. Although Polluzha’s insurrection was crushed, it was not until the end of 1945 that Kosovo was fully under Yugoslav control.12 This finally destroyed the trust of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY) in the abilities of the Kosovo Albanian communists to control their compatriots, if granted greater rights to rule the province. Many Albanian members Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics (2009). 10 The Balli Komb�tar was an Albanian nationalist, anti-communist and anti-royalist organisation established in October 1939. It was led by Ali Këlcyra and Mit-hat Frashëri. The motto of the Balli Kombëtar was: “Shqipëria Shqiptarëve, Vdekje Tradhëtarëvet” (Albania for the Albanians, Death to the Traitors). 11 Cited in Sabrina P. Ramet, The Three Yugoslavias: State Building and Legitimation, 1918 -2005. Washington, DC, and Bloomington: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2006. p.156. 12 Lenard J. Cohen. The Socialist Pyramid: Elites and Power in Yugoslavia. Ontario: Mosaic Press, 1989. p.348. abandoned the party, angry at the realisation that they had been misled over self-determination. In July 1945, the CPY’s handpicked Regional People’s Council of Kosovo, met in Prizren and voted for Kosovo to become part of Serbia. Of its 142 members, only 33 were Albanians.13 The newly constituted Autonomous Region of Kosovo was then promised the same rights as Vojvodina, Serbia’s other newly formed province.14 But, in contrast to Vojvodina, the 1946 Yugoslav constitution did not give Kosovo control of the courts, publicly owned enterprises and education.15 Control of Kosovo itself was now firmly into the hands of local Serbs and the Serbian and Yugoslav security services. The key figure in this period was Aleksandar Ranković, Yugoslavia’s minister of interior and secret police chief.16 Thus 13 ‘The members of this unelected body which represented only the 2,250 members of the Communist Party in Kosovo, were pointedly reminded that there were more than 50,000 troops in Kosovo who were willing to defend the gains of the war.’ Noel Malcolm. Kosovo a Short History. London: Pan Macmillan, 2002. p.315. 14 Lenard J. Cohen. The Socialist Pyramid: Elites and Power in Yugoslavia. Ontario: Mosaic Press, 1989. p.350. 15 Julie A. Mertus. Kosovo: how myths and truths started a war. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999. Chronology, p.288. Vojvodina was proclaimed an ‘autonomous province’ whereas Kosovo was called an ‘autonomous region.’ 16 �������� ��� minister of interior and vice president of Yugosla�������� �� �������� ��� ���� ��������� �� �������� via from 1945 to 1966. A POWER PRIMER: A HANDBOOK TO POLITICS, PEOPLE AND PARTIES IN KOSOVO—15 FADIL HOXHA 15 MARCH 1916, GJAKOVA – 22 APRIL 2001, PRISHTINA Went to Albania as a teenager so he could attend school, as secondary education in Albanian was then unavailable in Kosovo under Yugoslav rule. It was during this period that he first made contact with, and later joined, Marxist-Leninist groups. Hoxha returned briefly to Gjakova where he worked as a teacher. However, he soon joined the antifascist resistance and became an important figure in the communist movement in Kosovo, where he played a significant role in the adoption of the famous Bujan Conference resolution in 1943-44. He continued to hold high office even during the heyday of Aleksander Ranković in the 1950s and 1960s and was appointed to the Yugoslav Executive Council in 1963. After Ranković’s fall from power in 1966, Hoxha became a member of the Presidency of Yugoslavia. From 1978 to 1979 he held the post of Vice President of the rotating Federal Presidency, which was the highest position in Yugoslavia after that of President Josip Broz Tito. However, after his death and the subsequent demonstrations in 1981, Fadil Hoxha was accused of “separatism” by the Serb politicians and criticised by the Yugoslav leadership for failing to control Albanian nationalism. In 1991, after Milošević had taken control of the party in Kosovo and merged it with the Serbian party, Hoxha was expelled, arrested and put on trial. Fadil Hoxha was the key player in the League of Communists of Kosovo during the struggle for greater Albanian rights in Yugoslavia. He succeeded in making Albanian Kosovo’s principal language, was key in founding Prishtina University and the Kosovo Academy of Sciences and Arts. He also played a major part in significantly expanding federal aid and development programs in Kosovo, which resulted in its rapid industrialisation in the 1970s and the early 1980s. In 1992 he took part in the first democratic election declaring openly that he was voting for the LDK. During the Kosovo war he declared, “if I were young, I’d wear opingas [footwear] again and join the UÇK.” At his death he was buried with the highest honours. the post war years until the mid 1960s were ones of harsh oppression for Kosovo’s Albanians who were regarded as untrustworthy and disloyal. While Serbs and Montenegrins constituted less than a third of Kosovo’s population in 1954, they represented about 67 percent of the security forces, controlled 68 percent of leading positions in the communist party, and made up to 50 percent of party members.17 Formal employment opportunities in Kosovo were scarce and they disproportionately 17 Sabrina P. Ramet, The Three Yugoslavias: State Building and Legitimation, 1918 -2005. Washington, DC, and Bloomington: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2006. p.294. 1,956 Serbs accounted for 23.5 percent of the population and controlled 58.3 percent of the security forces and 60.8 percent of the common police. Montenegrins accounted for 3.9 percent of the population but 28.3 percent of the security forces and 7.9 percent of the regular police were Montenegrins. favoured Serbs and Montenegrins. In 1958 Kosovo, with a similar size of population to Slovenia had 49 publicly owned enterprises, while Slovenia had 465.18 Economic development in Kosovo, compared to other parts of Yugoslavia was disproportionately low, and therefore could not spur the enthusiasm of Kosovo Albanians for “brotherhood and unity” with their fellow Yugoslavs. In the workforce Kosovo Albanians were underrepresented, especially in higher qualified positions. In 1961, the percentage of Serbian workers was 36.5 percent as compared to 47.6 percent of Albanians. By 1971, the number of Serbian workers had decreased only slightly to 32.6 percent while the number of Albanians had increased only to 54.2 percent. Serbian workers 18 Noel Malcolm. Kosovo a Short History. London: Pan Macmillan, 2002. p.323. WWW.IKSWEB.ORG 16—A POWER PRIMER: A HANDBOOK TO POLITICS, PEOPLE AND PARTIES IN KOSOVO ALEKSANDER RANKOVIC 28 NOVEMBER 1909, OBRENOVAC, SERBIA – 19 AUGUST 1983, DUBROVNIK, CROATIA He was born into a poor family. Immediately after he finished secondary school, he went to work in Belgrade. Harsh living conditions prompted him to join the labour movement, and then the underground Communist Party. During this period, he was arrested and sentenced to six years in prison. Ranković was one of the most important personalities in Yugoslavia after the Second World War and the fourth most prominent figure after Tito, Edvard Kardelj and Milovan Djilas. He was the head of the public and secret police forces, commonly known as the UDBA, as well as the organisational secretary of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia. He founded the infamous Department for the Protection of the People (OZNA). Until 1 July1966, Ranković was in charge of the Yugoslav secret service when the leadership decided at the fourth Communist Party Plenum to remove him from all his official posts. Investigations showed that Ranković had systematically spied on leading communists including Tito. Ranković was later labelled a Stalinist, because of his persecution of Yugoslav dissidents. The fervour with which he prosecuted Albanians in Kosovo, as both nationalists and counter-revolutionaries left a deep imprint. For Albanians the period of Ranković’s rule meant constant harassment by the Serbiandominated security services and human rights violations. Kosovo Albanians were denied basic cultural rights such as that to higher education in Albanian and were notoriously underrepresented in the communist apparatus. Ranković’s dismissal brought an end to oppression and opened the way for constitutional reform and the granting of fundamental rights to Kosovo’s Albanian population. held 41.3 percent of positions that required higher education while Albanians held only 38.7 percent of such positions.19 In 1966, Ranković fell from power after it had been discovered that he had been spying on Tito. The next year the Yugoslav leader visited Kosovo for the first time and openly condemned the poor social and economic position of Albanians and criticised Serbian supremacy in the province.20 Reforms were now initiated that saw greater rights granted to Serbia’s two provinces, a move welcomed by Kosovo Albanians. In 1968 however, as in Belgrade, Prague and Paris, students protested in Kosovo. Amongst the slogans they chanted were 19 Lenard J. Cohen. The Socialist Pyramid: Elites and Power in Yugoslavia. Ontario: Mosaic Press, 1989. p.358. 20 Ibid. p.356. the ones challenging the communist authorities and Kosovo’s position in Yugoslavia. Some demanded that Kosovo become a republic like other parts of the country and others demanded that Kosovo open its own university. Until then the only faculties in the province were dependencies of Belgrade University. “Down with colonial policy,” was another slogan as was “Long live Albania.” Alarmed, the authorities reacted by upgrading Kosovo’s position in Serbia’s constitutional framework. Kosovo now received its own constitution instead of a simple statute. Its assembly could now draft and pass laws instead of decrees based on Serbian law. A supreme court was established along with an Albanian-language university in Prishtina. Exchange programs with professors from Albania were initiated, Albanian became an official language and the Albanian flag A POWER PRIMER: A HANDBOOK TO POLITICS, PEOPLE AND PARTIES IN KOSOVO—17 ADEM DEMAÇI 26 FEBRUARY 1936, PRISHTINA He was born into a poor family. His father and older brother died leaving him head of family at a very young age. He went to Belgrade to study international literature but was forced to return home in his final year to take care of his sick mother. Soon after he became an open advocate of the unification of Kosovo with Albania and was sentenced to three years in prison from 1958 to1961. He was gaoled again in 1964 for ten years. Soon after his release he was once again put on trial and imprisoned for 15 years, from 1975 to 1990. After a wave of international protest, he was eventually released after spending a total of 28 years in gaol. Demaçi served as the Chairman of the Council for the Defence of Human Rights and Freedoms (KLMDNJ) from 1991 to 1996. During this time, he was also the editor of the newspaper, Zëri, founded the magazine Forum and was active in many other spheres of public life. In 1996, Demaçi left the KLMDNJ in order to head of the Parliamentary Party of Kosovo. He advocated active resistance against the Serbian government instead of the passive resistance favoured by Ibrahim Rugova. He was a harsh critic of Rugova throughout the second half of the 1990s. When the UÇK went public in 1997, Demaçi left the PPK and became the UÇK’s political representative in Prishtina. He was against the UÇK’s participation in the Rambouillet Conference and duly resigned from his post. Since the war Demaçi has not been formally involved in politics but he does participate in many cultural and academic events and continues to be an influential and often critical voice on political developments. He lives in Prishtina and receives a state pension. was permitted as a national symbol. The name of the province was changed from the Serbian Kosovo i Metohija to Kosovo, and the autonomous province was now represented within federal structures.21 In 1974, the new Yugoslav constitution gave Kosovo almost the same competences as the republics including equal representation within federal institutions. Kosovo Albanian communists like Fadil Hoxha were highly successful in mobilising support for directing Yugoslav development funds from richer parts of the country like Croatia and Slovenia to Kosovo. At the same time however, a few radical underground activists were agitating for unification with Albania. Most notable amongst them was Adem Demaçi and his Lëvizja Revolucionare për Bashkimin e Shqipëtarëve (Revolutionary Movement for the Unification with Albania). Such movements were marginal affairs in terms of Kosovo politics in the 21 Noel Malcolm. Kosovo a Short History. London: Pan Macmillan, 2002. p.324. Sabrina P. Ramet, The Three Yugoslavias: State Building and Legitimation, 1918 -2005. Washington, DC, and Bloomington: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2006. p.297. 1970s, and were mostly nipped in the bud by the secret police and the courts. Between 1974 and 1981, according to Yugoslav reports, at least 618 Albanians were charged with illegal activities in Kosovo.22 At least five Kosovo Albanian underground groups were identified as active in the early 1980s and their role in the 1981 demonstrations is, at best, unclear.23 In the same period Albanians began to join the communist party en masse. By 1978, Albanians represented 78 percent of local membership, up from only 30 percent in 1945. The 1981 riots The lives of Kosovo Albanians improved substantially in the wake of the constitutional reforms. Changes in higher education were particularly dramatic. The number of trained medical doctors compared to 1955 had doubled 22 Julie A. Mertus. Kosovo: how myths and truths started a war. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999. p.20. 23 As Mertus argues, association with these organisations was never taken lightly. Additionally, most Albanians who took part in the demonstrations almost always deny any association with these groups. WWW.IKSWEB.ORG 18—A POWER PRIMER: A HANDBOOK TO POLITICS, PEOPLE AND PARTIES IN KOSOVO AZEM VLLASI 23 DECEMBER 1948, KAMENICA As a young man Azem Vllasi chaired a number of youth organisations, including the student league of Kosovo and that of Yugoslavia. In 1974 he was chairman of the League of Socialist Youth of Yugoslavia (SKOJ), a position which earned him popularity and gained Tito’s favour, all of which greatly assisted him in becoming the first youth leader to be re-elected. After his studies in Belgrade, Vllasi returned home to practice as a lawyer. In 1980, he publicly opposed the Enver Hoxha, Albania’s dictator, and claimed that Albanians in Yugoslavia had better living standards than Albanians in Albania. In 1986, he became the head of the League of Communists of Kosovo and thus a member of the Yugoslav Central Committee and the president of Kosovo. Under Vllasi’s rule, activists in Kosovo became more direct in their opposition to Serbia’s attempts to dominate Kosovo. However, in November 1988 he and his party colleague Kaqusha Jashari were toppled from power when they refused to accept constitutional changes that curtailed the rights of the autonomous province. In February 1989, Vllasi was arrested and charged with “counter-revolutionary activities.” After massive protests and demonstrations and considerable international pressure Vllasi was freed in April 1990. After the war, Vllasi became a member of the Social Democrat Party but was no longer at the forefront of politics. In 2005 he and Mahmut Bakalli were appointed as advisors to the premiers Bajram Kosumi and Agim Çeku. Today, Vllasi works as a lawyer in Prishtina. by 1975 and more than quadrupled by 1985.24 In 1967 around 8,000 students were enrolled in higher education in Kosovo but, by 1979, owing to the foundation of University of Prishtina, this number had ballooned to 47,000.25 As Kosovo Albanians became more educated the political landscape of the province also became increasingly Albanianised with Albanians taking more leading positions. However within this success lay the seeds of unrest. Anaemic economic development meant that the labour market simply could not absorb such large numbers of graduates, whose expectations had risen in line with their education. After protests started on 11 March 1981 over the poor quality of food and accommodation in the university, they quickly escalated into wider social protests. Demonstrators began demanding better living conditions for Albanians in general 24 ����������� ��������� ����������� ������������ �������� �� ����� ����slavia), 1991. 25 Lenard J. Cohen. The Socialist Pyramid: Elites and Power in Yugoslavia. Ontario: Mosaic Press, 1989. Slobodan Stankovic. “Aleksandar Ranković -- Political Profile of a Yugoslav “Stalinist.” 1 Sep 1983: p.361. Open Society Archives. 09 Sep. 2011. and eventually specifically political demands, including the release of political prisoners, the status of a republic for Kosovo and, amongst some, the unification of Kosovo with Albania. As the protests continued they expanded beyond their original student base and, within a month had engulfed the whole province.26 On 2 April 1981, the Yugoslav presidency declared a state of emergency in Kosovo. Azem Vllasi, later a senior Kosovo communist leader recalls that these events resulted in the beginning of a rolling back of Albanian rights. “Serbia began to accuse us of not being able to govern. Events that occurred in that year were a pretext for Serbia to revive its ambitions against Kosovo.”27 26 Even though not explicitly stated, it is safe to assume that the second wave of demonstrations had a considerable vast number �� ������������ ���� �h� fi��� �������, �� �h� ���������� �� ������� calling for a republic and other demands might have been the under����� ������ �h��h ��������� �h� fi��� �������. C���������� ����� �� comparing accounts of the same event by Julie A. Mertus, Kosovo: how myths and truths started a war. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999 and Noel Malcolm. Kosovo a Short History. London: Pan Macmillan, 2002. 27 IKS interview with Azem Vllasi, Prishtina. 26 January 2011. A POWER PRIMER: A HANDBOOK TO POLITICS, PEOPLE AND PARTIES IN KOSOVO—19 Official Yugoslav institutions would now often accuse provincial communist leaders of withholding information from Belgrade and of protecting their compatriots. The actions of Kosovo’s Albanian leaders suggest however that they were keen on defending the pre-1981 status because they believed that demonstrations, and especially demands that the province be upgraded to a Yugoslav republic, at least for the moment, would do more harm than good.28 It is important to note though that the 1981 protests were driven mainly by socio-economic concerns and not Albanian nationalism or a desire to unite Kosovo with Albania, which was the demand of only a minority of protesters. Various illegal nationalist organisations propagating unification seem only to have been tenuously linked with the protests. What the demonstrations did reveal however was a split between the Albanian leadership of what was now a separate Lidhja Komuniste e Kosovës (the League of Communists of Kosovo – the LCK) and much of the Albanian population of the province, who were increasingly disillusioned with their economic situation. Few jobs existed outside of the government sector and unemployment was the highest in Yugoslavia.29 As a majority of funds went to the administrative sector of the bureaucracy and industrial giants, a handful of well-connected people could enjoy the benefits, whereas ordinary people saw little change. In addition, the discontented claimed that jobs were being disproportionately distributed, with Serbs still getting more good ones than their numbers would suggest they should have had. A perception of having been betrayed by historical circumstances was now coupled with resentments due to competition for scarce jobs in a stagnating economy. This helped fuel Albanian nationalism and determined the way in which political demands would now be formulated. Another important factor in determining the nature of the demonstrations was the University of Prishtina. As more and more were enrolling at university, only a few joined the ranks of the unemployed. Being a student postponed unemployment, albeit temporarily. On the other hand, going to university increased expectations and a sense of self. Once out of university, there was no 28 Julie A. Mertus. Kosovo: how myths and truths started a war. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999. Interviews conducted with Mahmut Bakalli and Azem Vllasi. 29 Julie A. Mertus. Kosovo: how myths and truths started a war. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999. p.23. One quarter of all employed Kosovars were government employees and the unemployment rate was at 27.5 percent, compared to a mere 2 percent unemployment in Slovenia, the most prosperous republic, the same year. market waiting for graduates and their newly acquired skills. Moreover, the university specialised in liberal arts, with an emphasis on Albanian language and culture, neglecting technical and scientific programs. It is thus no surprise that on the eve of the 1981 demonstrations, the Albanian nationalist movement found its most vocal supporters and leaders amongst the young, educated and unemployed.30 The top-down driven oppression of Kosovo Albanians from the Ranković era to the late 1980s, excluding the short period of relative improvement in the late 1970s, was to have irreversible consequences for the political realm in Kosovo and the whole of Yugoslavia. From 1981 this meant that Albanians arrested for political reasons came to be seen as martyrs and would take their place, as the American academic Julie Mertus writes, “among real and imagined Kosovo Albanian leaders as the emerging heroes.”31 The Return of Repression after 1981 In the years following Tito’s death in 1980 and the 1981 demonstrations, Kosovo entered a phase of constant political and social instability. Repression was stepped up, as were arrests. Public discourse was now increasingly oriented along ethnic lines and gave rise to heightened debate amongst politicians, intellectuals, local activists and journalists. Albanians and Serbs alike lamented ever more the fate of their nations. The Serbian press was given to increasing hysteria. Stories were spread that Albanian men were raping Serbian women. In 1984 Atanasije Jevtić, a Serbian Orthodox priest complained that such acts were common in Kosovo.32 Most infamous in this context was the Martinović case which in 1985 provoked panic amongst Serbs and Montenegrins.33 A farmer, he claimed to have been raped with a bottle by three Albanians. The situation began to deteriorate. In this climate elements of Serbian society began to react. A petition protesting the alleged mistreatment of Serbs in Kosovo, initiated and signed by 216 prominent Serbian intellectuals, was presented to the Yugoslav parliament in January 1986. This triggered the drafting of a document by the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts (SANU) 30 Julie A. Mertus. Kosovo: how myths and truths started a war. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999. p.29. 31 Ibid. p.21. . 32 Amphilohije Radovic (Bishop). From Kosovo to Jadovno. Bish�� �� Z�h����� ��� H��z������� ����.) A�������� �������). A� Account of the Journey, Belgrade, 1984. 33 ������� ����������, � Serb farmer from Viti near Gjilan, claimed that he had been attacked by two masked Albanians who had tied him up and caused him the injury. WWW.IKSWEB.ORG 20—A POWER PRIMER: A HANDBOOK TO POLITICS, PEOPLE AND PARTIES IN KOSOVO MAHMUT BAKALLI 19 JANUARY 1936, GJAKOVA – 14 APRIL 2006, PRISHTINA Graduated from Belgrade University with a degree in political science in 1967 and with a masters degree in 1970. In the late 1950s Bakalli worked in a textile company in Prizren and then for the Yugoslav airline JAT, but he always harboured political ambitions. He joined the youth organisations of the LCY and became head of Kosovo’s Youth Union in 1961. Ten years later, he took over as President of League of Communists of Kosovo. Bakalli’s rise to the top of the Kosovo establishment was mainly due to his inside knowledge of the communist bureaucracy. Bakalli’s term in office coincided with a period in which the restrictions placed upon Kosovo’s ethnic Albanian majority were relaxed and living conditions improved. Kosovo gained considerable autonomy from its former Serbian rulers in Belgrade. Prishtina began to take on the appearance of a modern city as development funds from the more prosperous parts of Yugoslavia flowed in. However, in June 1981, Bakalli was removed from all positions he held and was accused of having caused the 1981 protests by adopting an incompetent investment strategy and for having failed to see that mass demonstrations were about to erupt. Bakalli reappeared on the public stage during the political events of the 1990s. In 1998, he accompanied Ibrahim Rugova to negotiate a peace settlement with Slobodan Milošević. After the war Bakalli joined the AAK and in 2001 was elected as a parliamentary deputy. In 2002 he was called as a witness in the trial Milošević at the ICTY and accused him deliberately starting the war in 1999. While the AAK was in government, Bakalli was an adviser to its three prime ministers. He died on 14 April 2006 in Prishtina. that was leaked to the press in 1986.34 This talked of the “physical, political, legal and cultural genocide perpetrated against the Serbian population of Kosovo and Metohija.”35 The document, which came to be known as the “Memorandum,” was inspired by Dobrica Ćosić the future Yugoslav president. In 1988 SANU’s Department of Social Studies published the results of a survey which had been conducted in 1985 and 1986. It attempted to demonstrate statistically that Serbs and Montenegrins were being forced to emigrate from Kosovo.36 34 The memorandum offered its most vocal criticism of the Yugoslav constitution of 1974 which it holds accountable for creating the ����������� ������ ��� ���������� ��� ����������� �� fl�����h. Th� call to support and promote “the integrity of the Serbian people” goes in line with the increasing number of voices calling for constitutional amendments. 35 Memorandum, Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts ( (SANU). Belgrade: Making the History of 1989, Item #674. 11 Oct. 2011. http://www.ess.uwe.ac.uk/kosovo/Kosovo-Background17.htm 36 Ruza Petrovic, Marina Blagojevic. The Migration of Serbs and Montenegrin from Kosovo and Metohija: Results of the Survey Conducted in 1985-1986. Belgrade: Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts, Department of Social Sciences, 1992. Web. 14 Oct. 2011. http://balkania.tripod.com/resources/history/migrations/index.html. The situation was to take a severe turn for the worse when, on 3 September 1987, a Kosovo Albanian conscript in the Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA), killed four and wounded five soldiers of different nationalities in his barracks in Paraćin, in Serbia.37 Despite the fact the results of the investigation were never made fully public, this notorious case helped fuel Serbian nationalist grievances and seemed, in their eyes, to prove their point, i.e., that Serbs were threatened by Kosovo’s Albanians. In this propaganda war, Serbs found themselves unchallenged, as Kosovo Albanians had no means to respond. All this was to set the stage for the rise of Slobodan Milošević and his opportunistic move from communism to Serbian nationalism. As Laura Silber and Allan Little, who wrote a history of this period, noted: 37 Aziz Kelmendi, a Kosovar Albanian soldier who at the time of the killing was serving his last month in the Yugoslav army. Following the attacks he ran away from the military barracks where, after being surrounded, he committed suicide. A POWER PRIMER: A HANDBOOK TO POLITICS, PEOPLE AND PARTIES IN KOSOVO—21 There was nothing about the Serbian Communist leader’s visit to Kosovo Polje on April 24, 1987, to suggest it would change the course of history. But for first time Slobodan Milošević donned the mantle of protector of all Serbs. It was a stroke of good fortune for the young party chief. The Serbian President, Stambolić, should have gone to Kosovo himself for talks with local leaders, but casually sent Milošević in his place. It was a careless move which set in motion a train of events that would cost him his career.38 Following a meeting with angry Serbs Milošević famously told the crowd: “No one should dare to beat you.” Yugoslavia’s existence depended on Serbia keeping Kosovo he said.39 This further mobilised the masses and encouraged hatred between Serbs and Albanians.40 Milošević now stepped up the pressure to change Kosovo’s constitution and to bring it under the full control of Serbia again. The period leading up to and after the revocation of autonomy, brought increasing discontent amongst Kosovo Albanians. In November 1988 for example, Trepça miners protested by marching to Prishtina. Being in defence of the existing constitution, the rationale of protesting, in contrast to the image of the 1981 demonstrations, which unfairly had suggested irredentism as the prevailing catalyst, had changed. Besnik Pula, a sociologist, has written that protests now: …appealed to a whole different stratum of Kosovo’s Albanians—not only the radical youth and students who had been at the forefront of the 1981 protests, but the working and professional classes of Albanians who were well-integrated into the Yugoslav socioeconomic system and directly affected by the political changes threatened by Milošević.41 The miners’ protest, being the first mass mobilising event since 1981, helped in uniting Kosovo Albanians. A day after the march the miners were joined by factory workers, students and school children, bringing the numbers now protesting to more than 100,000.42 In the wake of this the 38 Laura Silber and Allan Little. Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation. Penguin Books, 1995. p.37. 39 Miranda Vickers. Between Serb and Albanian: A History of Kosovo. New York: Columbia University Press, 1998. pp. 227-228. 40 ‘Six centuries later again we are in battle and quarrels. They are not armed battles, though such things should not be excluded yet,’ remarked �������� ���������. L���� ������ ��� A���� L�����. Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation. Penguin Books, 1995. p.177. 41 Besnik Pula. The Emergence of the Kosovo “Parallel State,” 1988–1992, Nationalities Papers, Vol 32, No. 4. December 2004. p.803. 42 Howard Clark in his book Civil Resistance in Kosovo, claims the Albanian leaders of the LCK were dismissed, among them Azem Vllasi, its president, who was then arrested in March 1989. Thus, tensions increased dramatically resulting in widespread solidarity within the Albanian community. When the time came in March 1989 Kosovo Albanian assembly members took the attitude, says historian Noel Malcolm, of “inglorious submission under pressure.”43 The autonomy that Kosovo had gained under the Yugoslav constitution of 1974 was given up by its assembly under huge pressure from Belgrade, including threats to deputies.44 Weeks earlier already, in February, special measures had been declared by the Yugoslav Presidency and federal police units were dispatched to Kosovo to secure key buildings, including parliament.45 Ordinary people showed more stamina than their so-called leaders. The change of the constitution was followed by mass demonstrations in February and March. Conflicting accounts exist as to the number of people killed by Yugoslav security forces. The numbers range from between 28 to more than one hundred.46 Some 200 are believed to have been injured and 254 arrested.47 Kosovo was not an island however. With the collapse of the Berlin Wall change was simultaneously engulfing the whole of Europe. Yugoslavia itself was moving rapidly towards its violent disintegration. In Kosovo new challenges led to new mechanisms to respond to the new challenges. number of participants to be “perhaps 300,000” whereas Shkelzen Maliqi in Kosova Separate Worlds claims the number to be about 400,000. 43 Noel Malcolm. Kosovo a Short History. London: Pan Macmillan, 2002. p.346. 44 On 23 March 1989, the Kosovo Assembly passed the amendments in a regular vote, of 190 members of the three-chamberassembly, 187 attended the meeting. Only 10 voted against the amendments and 2 abstained from voting. Over 140 of the delegates of the Assembly were Albanians. 45 On 1 March, 1990 a curfew was introduced, Kosovo workers were ordered back to work. 46 Miranda Vickers. Between Serb and Albanian: A History of Kosovo. New York: Columbia University Press, 1998. Vickers says that 28 Kosovar were killed. Paulin Kola. The Search for Greater Albania. New York: New York University Press, 2003. According to Paulin Kola over 100 people were killed. According to the newspaper the daily Times, 2 June 1989, 900 demonstrators were arrested. 47 Minorities at Risk Project, Chronology for Kosovo Albanians in Yugoslavia, 2004, available at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/ docid/469f38f51e.html [accessed 10 October 2011] WWW.IKSWEB.ORG 22—A POWER PRIMER: A HANDBOOK TO POLITICS, PEOPLE AND PARTIES IN KOSOVO The emergence of the LDK is often seen as a direct consequence of the abolition of autonomy. In fact the process which led to its formation started much earlier and was based on growing discontent with the LCK. The party was founded nine months after the constitutional changes which initiated the abolition of autonomy. Yet it was the consequences of that act which in turn propelled the LDK to become the heart of a parallel state. By the late 1980s discontent with the LCK, which had been simmering since 1981, was growing. In 1988 and 1989 miners from the major Trepça complex went on strike demanding the removal of Milošević’s ‘puppets,’ namely Ali Shukriu, Hysamedin Azemi and Rrahman Morina.48 Frustration with the communist leadership now created space for new players to articulate the grievances of Kosovo Albanians. At first attempts were made to express disapproval with the way that the LCK had tried to defend autonomy. On 22 February 1989, Albanian intellectuals drafted the ‘Appeal 215,’ a letter signed by 215 people, mainly journalists from Rilindja, Kosovo’s leading newspaper and doctors from the Faculty of Medicine.49 This was sent to the Serbian parliament, but fell on deaf ears. Growing numbers of discontented leading people were now leaving the LCK. Thus the space for an alternative movement, that would articulate the demands of Kosovo Albanians, was created. Mehmet Kraja, one of the founders of LDK recalls how he, and his colleagues, observed the unfolding events: Everything started at Rilindja and developed with enormous speed. A few Rilindja 48 Rrahman Morina was leader of the Communist Party in Kosovo, from 27 January 1989 to 12 October 1990 and minister of interior since 1981. Ali Shukriu was member of the Federal Party Central Committee and Hysamedin Azemi, head of the Prishtina Communist party branch. The above-mentioned were supposed to review constitutional amendments proposed by the Serbian Assembly. 49 Howard Clark. Civil Resistance in Kosovo. London: Pluto Press, 2000. p.50. Mehmet Kraja. Vite të humbura. Prishtin�: Rozafa, 2003. journalists from the culture section were talking about events from the night before - miners ending their strike and how they were deceived because the president of the autonomous committee [ed; i.e., the president of Kosovo] did not resign, although this was the main demand of the miners. It was intolerable to be counted as members of the League of Communists after what had happened….A list of those who would renounce their membership…was quickly compiled. At the top we inserted a sentence explaining that our resignation from party membership was a moral act because of the responsibility of the League of Communists for the situation that had been created in Kosovo…. In half an hour forty had signed this list.50 The letter had a snowball effect. People began resigning en masse from the party. They were suddenly able to seek a complete break with the past. On 2 July 1990, 111 Kosovo Albanian deputies, most of whom had earlier voted to revoke autonomy, now declared Kosovo fully-fledged republic within Yugoslavia, in the front of the parliament building. On 7 September they met again in Kaçanik, close to the Macedonian border. Here they voted in favour of a new constitution which, in their eyes, legalised the declaration of independence from Serbia made in July.51 However, the action of these deputies was, in effect, a personal one. It had no support from the LCK, which was already under the full control of the Serbian communist party. With Kosovo’s autonomous institutions dissolved or stripped of any real meaning by Milošević, the political landscape had changed beyond recognition and the LCK had lost all legitimacy. 50 Mehmet Kraja. Vite të humbura. Prishtin�: Rozafa, 2003. pp.183-184. 51 Akademia e Shkencave dhe Arteve t� Kosov�s (ASHAK). Akte të Kuvendit të Republikës së Kosovës: 2 korrik 1990 – 2 maj 1992. Prishtin�: ASHAK, 2005. p.99. (Kosovo Academy of Sciences and Arts Publication, 2005). A POWER PRIMER: A HANDBOOK TO POLITICS, PEOPLE AND PARTIES IN KOSOVO—23 IBRAHIM RUGOVA 2 DECEMBER 1944, CËRRCA, ISTOG – 21 JANUARY 2006, PRISHTINA He was born in a small village to a prominent local family. When he was one year old, both his father and his grandfather were killed by UDBA. He was then raised by his widowed mother. He attended secondary school in Peja and then studied at the Faculty of Philosophy in the Department of Albanian Language and Literature in Prishtina. Rugova spent a year in Paris at the Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes before being awarded his doctorate in Prishtina. While a student Rugova wrote for a wide variety of newspapers. He then joined the Albanological Institute, which was at the time run by Rexhep Qosja. He worked there for two decades. Rugova’s appointment as president of the Writers’ Association in 1988 also marked the beginning of his political career. In 1989 the LDK appointed Ibrahim Rugova as its leader. From that moment onwards Rugova led the biggest political party through the difficult and dynamic times of the 1990s. He was directly elected president of Kosovo in 1992 and 1998, and in 2002 and 2005 he was again re-elected by the parliament of the PISG (Provisional Institutions of Self-Government). Rugova’s political career was characterised by his advocacy of passive resistance, peace and dialogue. He shunned active resistance and the belligerent stance of the UÇK. Rugova took part in many important negotiations, including those in1996 with Milošević for the extension of the educational rights of Albanians, the peace conference in Rambouillet in 1999, and was a founding member of the “Unity Team” which was responsible for the negotiations with Serbia in Vienna in 2006. For his achievements Ibrahim Rugova was awarded multiple honours, among them the Peace Prize of the Paul Litzer Foundation, Denmark (1995), an Honorary Doctorate from the University of Paris VIII: Vincennes - Saint-Denis, (1996) and Honorary Citizenship of the cities of Venice, Milan and Brescia (1999). He was awarded the “European Senator of Honour” prize (2003), and was posthumously granted the Albanian Order of the Flag by the President of Albania, Alfred Moisiu (2006). Ibrahim Rugova was president of Kosovo and of the LDK until his death from lung cancer. The creation of the LDK The dramatic decline of the Communist Party and the abolition of Kosovo’s autonomous institutions meant that political debate was now taken up by people who had not been the leading lights of the LCK. Foremost amongst them were people from the University of Prishtina and especially its Institute of Albanology, members of the Writers’ Association, journalists from Rilindja and activists from the newly emerging political parties which had come about because of the legalisation of a multiparty system in Yugoslavia in 1989. The LDK which rapidly came to dominate the political scene was founded by 23 intellectuals from the Writers’ Association and Rilindja on 23 December 1989. What these people had in common was that they tended to be well educated and former members of the LCK. None however, had ever held a senior position in the party. But, none had either ever voiced opposition to it, or been associated with the events of 1981. None had ever previously fallen foul of the authorities.52 Mehmet Kraja, one of the 23 recalled later: …the Communist League of Kosovo had around 100,000 members while, let’s say in Rilindja alone, over 90 percent of journalist were members…That must have been the percentage in other institutions as well, including the University of Prishtina, the Albanology Institute and the Academy [ed: 52 Mehmet Kraja. Vite të humbura. Prishtin�. Rozafa. 2003. pp. 198-199 WWW.IKSWEB.ORG 24—A POWER PRIMER: A HANDBOOK TO POLITICS, PEOPLE AND PARTIES IN KOSOVO REXHEP QOSJA 25 JUNE 1936, VUTHAJ, MONTENEGRO He moved from Montenegro to Prishtina in order to attend secondary school. He enrolled at the Department of Albanian Language and Literature in the Philosophical Faculty of the University of Pristina. Qosja went on to receive his doctoral degree in Belgrade. Soon afterwards he started work at the Albanological Institute in Prishtina. At the same time Qosja became a full professor at the Faculty of Philosophy at the UP, then the director of the Albanological Institute, and later the Dean of the Albanian Language Faculty. In 1989, Qosja refused to become the leader of the LDK. Nevertheless, he remained active in public life as a respected intellectual figure and wielded considerable influence. Since its foundation and subsequent victory in the 1992 elections, Rexhep Qosja remained highly critical of the LDK, and openly opposed their policy of passive resistance. In 1998 Qosja founded his own political party, the United Albanian Movement (LBSH). He then formed a coalition, which he himself led, the “United Democratic Movement” (LBD). His party gained the support of former political prisoners and other parties that advocated active resistance. The LBD openly supported the activities of the UÇK. The LBD with Qosja as its representative took part in the Rambouillet Conference and participated in the post-war provisional government as well as in the JIAS. After the war the LBD ceased to exist and Qosja abstained from politics. Qosja has published books, numerous reviews, articles and studies in many scientific and literary journals on Albanian literature. To date he has written 16 books. Today Rexhep Qosja is involved in projects at the Academy of Sciences and Arts and in the Writers’ Association but seldom engages in public debates. of Sciences and Arts]. So, according to this logic, we were not open opponents of the previous system and none of us had been either politically persecuted, nor member of any illegal groups in Kosovo.53 During the founding meeting, they elected their presidency and president.54 Choosing a leader had 53 Ibid. p.198 54 Members of the initiating council were: Jusuf Buxhovi, Zekiria Cana, Milazim Krasniqi, Ajri Begu, Ibrahim Rugova, Bujar Bukoshi, Fehmi Agani, Ibrahim Berisha, Mehmet Kraja, Ali Aliu, Zenel Kelmendi, Ramiz Kelmendi, Idriz Ajeti, Dervish Rozhaja, Mark Krasniqi, Anton Çetta, Zenun Çelaj, Mustafa Radoniqi, Basri Çapriqi, Jusuf Bajraktari, Xhemail Mustafa, Hysen Matoshi and Nexhet Nushi. The Presidency of the party had seven members: Those were Ibrahim Rugova (president), Jusuf Buxhovi (secretary of the party), Fehmi Agani, Nekibe Kelmendi, Ali Aliu, Bujar Bukoshi and Mehmet Kraja (members of presidency). not been easy. According to Jusuf Bajraktari, one of the founders, “Ibrahim Rugova, Fehmi Agani and Rexhep Qosja were in the race.” Rugova was initially reluctant to become president, as he was busy as head of the Writers’ Association. Jusuf Buxhovi, another founder, was despatched to ask Rexhep Qosja, a well-known academic and Albanologist to take the job. Qosja had conditions though.55 He recalls: The composition of those people in the leadership of LDK was unacceptable to me and they wanted to register the party with the Ministry of Justice in Belgrade. Also, I did not like their program related to autonomy. 55 IKS telephone interview with Jusuf Buxhovi, Prishtina. 29 April 2011. A POWER PRIMER: A HANDBOOK TO POLITICS, PEOPLE AND PARTIES IN KOSOVO—25 FEHMI AGANI 23 JANUARY 1932, GJAKOVA 6 MAY 1999, PRISHTINA He joined the Communist Youth Movement when he was just 13 years old and became a member of the Communist Party at the age of 15. He finished his studies in Belgrade in 1959 and was awarded a doctorate in sociology from the University of Belgrade in 1973. In 1967 he became the head of the Prishtina Albanological Institute and later Dean of the Faculty of Philosophy at the University of Prishtina. In 1984, he was dismissed, along with many of his colleagues, regarding the student riots, which he continuously refused to condemn. As a result he was also expelled from the League of Communists. Agani returned to politics in 1989, when he was one of the key founding members of the LDK and its vice-president. He was considered to be the mastermind behind Ibrahim Rugova. He was the architect of the selfproclaimed Republic of Kosovo, a “virtual state” with its own political and social institutions. Throughout the 1990s Agani was always at Rugova’s side. However, in the latter part of the decade cracks began to emerge in the relationship, as he believed that the party should become more pro-active. When the war broke out in 1998, Agani resigned from the vice-presidency but continued to advise Rugova. He was a central figure in all negotiating teams, including the one dealing with the education issue in 1996 and Rambouillet in 1999. On 6 May 1999, Agani was killed in suspicious circumstances by Serbian forces while he was trying to flee Kosovo during the NATO bombardment. There, it could be clearly seen that the LDK wanted less autonomy than [Kosovo had had in] 1974.56 With Qosja’s refusal, Kraja thought it was important to convince Rugova to become president. As events would prove, it was this conjunction of circumstances which was to result in Rugova becoming a major figure in Kosovo’s political life and history. He was in the right place, at the right time. The LDK as a Mass Movement The transformation of the LDK from a group of intellectuals into a mass movement owed as much to the reputation of its founders as it did to the dissolution of the LCK. But it also gained from the support given to it by former political prisoners arrested after the 1981 riots. Large numbers of them answered the call of Adem Demaçi, Kosovo’s best known former political prisoner, to join the movement.57 Jusuf Buxhovi, the first secretary of the party, recalls: The transformation of the LDK into a mass organisation occurred within only three 56 IKS interview with Rexhep Qosja, Prishtina. 23 February 2011. 57 Dema�i himself did not join the LDK until much later on. Shkelzen Gashi. Adem Demaçi: biografi e paautorizuar. Prishtin�. Rrokullia, 2010. p.92. months, simultaneous with the dissolution of the LCK. Some 700,000 people joined the LDK and some were surprised by such a rapid growth. For me it was not a surprise. We had a rule of not differentiating people, meaning all were welcome, former police, former military, etc.58 Buxhovi notes that he insisted that records be kept of everyone who participated in party meetings. They included the Jashari family, most notable amongst them Hamëz Jashari, the brother of Adem Jashari, who would later play a key role in the formation of the UÇK. Hamëz Jashari, a lawyer, “was very active.” Hashim Thaçi, today the prime minister, was a member as well. Buxhovi claims, “almost 90 percent” of adult Albanians were members.”59 Kraja by contrast was surprised by the explosion in the LDK’s numbers: We did not have a clear idea of a political party with a huge membership, but the LDK became a movement. In terms of organisational issues it was a confusing organisation, in terms of evolution it was a miracle. Some members were abandoning the Socialist Alliance of Working People to become members of the 58 IKS interview with Jusuf Buxhovi, Prishtina. 29 April 2011 59 Ibid. WWW.IKSWEB.ORG 26—A POWER PRIMER: A HANDBOOK TO POLITICS, PEOPLE AND PARTIES IN KOSOVO LDK.60 Some of them announced publicly that they were joining the LDK but without even meeting us. We were not very knowledgeable about these processes and sometimes the situation was paradoxical, comic and tragic. Members were giving us their trust, but we did not know what to do with it.61 The program of the LDK was vague. It was committed to “democracy and justice.” However, at the beginning, Milazim Krasniqi, a writer and founding member, recalls that the “concept was that Kosovo should have equal status with other Yugoslav republics, and it supported the concept of Slovenia and Croatia for an asymmetric administration that meant more competences for the republics of Yugoslavia.”62 A short time later however, as Yugoslavia collapsed in blood, this position had to change. Although the LDK was joined by former LCK members, none were from the top echelons of the old party.63 Likewise none among the 111 members of the assembly, who had declared the Republic of Kosovo in July 1990, would later take leading positions in the LDK, although they were not excluded from joining. Former political prisoners were courted, as were those, who had been members of illegal organisations throughout the 1980s.64 This contributed to the widening of the LDK’s base. According to Buxhovi, Rugova believed that they “were people of sacrifice” and remarked that “they were very active at the local level.”65 This view was later considered as having been of key significance 60 Socialist Alliance for Working People ( (SAWP) was “an association of associations” which included around 80 percent of country’s total population over the age of 15. “It is largely the result of segments of the SAWP collectively switching their loyalty to the LDK that partly explains the immediate growth of the LDK, �� ���� �� �h� ���� �h�� �� ��� �h� fi��� ����� �� ������� � ������� Albanian-centred political outlook fully opposed to Serbia’s policies in Kosovo.” Besnik Pula. The Emergence of the Kosovo “Parallel State,” 1988–1992. Nationalities Papers, Vol 32, No. 4. December 2004. p.803. 61 IKS interview with Mehmet Kraja, Prishtina. 14 March 2011. 62 IKS interview with Milazim Krasniqi, Prishtina. 2 February 2011. 63 Fadil Hoxha was in charge of the Communist League of Kosovo and the most senior representative of the Socialist Autonomous Province of Kosovo in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. ‘Fadil Hoxha spent years without understanding why Rugova did not want to receive them [former Kosovo Communist Leaders]. When I once asked Rugova, he told me that he is going to meet them, but he formulated this in an unclear manner, so I would understand that he is not willing to meet them……as he told me without elaborating a lot he was under the pressure from internal LDK structures. In discrete manner, Fehmi Agani was meeting with partisans…, the deputy president of the LDK…’ Veton Surroi. Fadil Hoxha in the First Person. Prishtin�. KOHA, 2010. p.51. 64 Some of the ex-prisoners from the 1981 demonstrations that joined the LDK were: Hydajet Hyseni, Mehmet Hajrizi, Berat Luzha, Myrvete Dreshaj, Ali Lajqi, Rame Buja etc. 65 IKS interview with Jusuf Buxhovi, Prishtina. 29 April 2011 in changing the character of the organisation from one initially dominated by former communist party members. The inclusion of these people helped bridge the political divide, which had existed since 1981, between the radicals and those who had remained within the party fold. Another factor that helped propel the LDK into becoming a mass organisation was the campaign to reconcile blood feuds. During the 1980s the practice of blood feuds, many of which had been frozen for decades, still threatened the lives of some 17,000 men.66 An initiative was undertaken by the newly formed Këshilli për Mbrojtjen e të Drejtave dhe Lirive të Njeriut (the Council for the Defence of Human Rights and Freedoms – the KMDLNJ) to overcome this ancient Albanian tradition. The campaign was headed by Anton Çetta, a well-known professor of ethnology.67 It became so massive that on 1 May 1990 in Verrat e Llukës, a plain near Deçan, 100,000 gathered from across Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro and Albania to participate in the reconciliation of families that were involved in blood feuds. This helped in consolidating a sense of national unity. Çetta remarked: “The enthusiasm and sense of fraternity gave courage to the politicians and also encouraged the self-organisation of our population.”68 The LDK associated itself with the new campaign, and hence was well-placed to reap the rewards of this sense of unity and give it political expression. The LDK was not the only party or movement to emerge in 1989-90 as a response to the revocation of the autonomy and collapse of the LCK. Amongst others was the Association for a Yugoslav Democratic Initiative (UJDI) which had actually been founded already in 1988 with the aim of democratising all of Yugoslavia but which established a branch in Kosovo in December 1989. Amongst the UJDI’s founders were Shkelzen Maliqi and Muhamedin Kullashi. Veton Surroi was made president of the Kosovo branch.69 Between December 1989 and February 1990 organisations mushroomed. They included the 66 Mark Thompson, A Paper House: The Ending of Yugoslavia. London: Hutchinson Radius/Vintage, 1992 p.141. 67 The year 1990 was declared the ‘Year of Reconciliation.’ By the end of the campaigns, in 1992, some 1,000 feuds caused by killings, 500 caused by wounding and 700 other disputes were reconciled. 68 Marie Rushani noted “First of all, as an act of self-defence, not a call to unite in arms, as nearly always in the historic campaigns of General Reconciliation [for instance 1444, 1703 and 1878], but to unite in a general resistance without arms, with the awareness that nonviolent resistance could carry enormous suffering and high price,” Marie Rushani. La vendetta e il perdon, nella tradizione consuetudinaria Albanese. Religioni e Societa 29. p.150. 69 IKS interview with Shkelzen Maliqi, Prishtina. 24 March 2011 A POWER PRIMER: A HANDBOOK TO POLITICS, PEOPLE AND PARTIES IN KOSOVO—27 KMLDNJ, led by Idriz Ajeti and later by Adem Demaçi, the Union of Independent Trade Unions of Kosovo (BSPK) led by Hajrullah Gorani, the Mother Teresa Society led by Anton Çetta (and later by his colleague from blood feud campaign Don Lush Gjergji), the Kosovo Helsinki Committee for Human Rights led by Gamzend Pula, and the Womens’ Forum of LDK led by Luljeta Pula. At the same time new parties were being created. A Social Democratic Party established on 10 February 1990 and was led by Muhamedin Kullashi and Shkelzen Maliqi and later by Luljeta Pula. The Youth Parliament of Kosovo was transformed in 1990 into the Parliamentary Party of Kosovo (PPK) led by Veton Surroi and then Bajram Kosumi and Adem Demaçi. A Green Party led by Daut Maloku was also established as well as the Peasants Party of Hivzi Islami. Towards the end of 1990, in a bid to reinforce their commitment to non-violent resistance, the LDK and five other parties formed the Coordinating Council of Political Parties. It was designed to aid coordination and increase their legitimacy.70 The Council also included non-party representatives such as Adem Demaçi and Hajrullah Gorani. Between 26-30 September, 1991 a referendum was held which was organised by the Council. Voters were asked if they wanted the Republic of Kosovo to become an independent state with the option of remaining in association with the other Yugoslav republics. Of a total of 1,051,357 eligible citizens some 87 percent participated and 98.87 percent voted in favour. The referendum fulfilled the legal criteria set by the constitution of Kaçanik.71 On 19 October 1991, the Coordinating Council appointed a provisional government headed by Bujar Bukoshi, a well-known doctor. As Kosovo was, of course, under Serbian control Bukoshi rapidly departed into exile, first to Slovenia and then to Bonn. On 24 May 1992 presidential and parliamentary elections were held. In the presidential election Ibrahim Rugova was the sole candidate. In the parliamentary elections some 490 people from 22 political parties stood plus several independents. 70 Coordinating Council of Political Parties was comprised of six parties: the LDK, the PPK, the PFK, the PSHDK, the PSDK and the PR. 71 1,051,257 was the total number who had the right to vote. 914,802 votes were cast of which 931,705 voted in favor, 164 against, 933 were invalid votes. Akademia e Shkencave dhe Arteve t� Kosov�s, Akte te Kuvendit të Republikës së Kosovës: 2 korrik 1990 – 2 maj 1992, Prishtin�, 2005. The LDK won with a crushing 76.44 percent. Three smaller parties won some 27 seats, two went to independent candidates and 14 remained vacant as Serbs and Montenegrins boycotted the poll.72 Of those LDK members elected, at least 10 were former political prisoners.73 The LDK’s political hegemony until 1997 The LDK now consolidated as the single, overarching political force in Kosovo. As such it was widely considered internationally as the representative of the Kosovo Albanians. But its role was ambiguous. It was both a mass movement and the legitimate political representative of the underground state that it was trying to organise. This helped encourage the belief that the LDK was, in some fashion, running the “country.” The underground state was financed by the socalled “three percent fund.” The tax was collected by LDK officials across the country. Abroad this job was supervised by Bukoshi. According to an official report presented to parliament in 2000, between 1991-99 the government-in-exile collected a total of DM 217.6m (€111.2m), US$ 3.6m, SFr 30.5m and £24,120.74 Apart from being prime minister, Bukoshi was also the foreign minister, complemented by Edita Tahiri on the ground who acted as the LDK representative responsible for foreign affairs. Xhafer Shatri, based in Geneva was the minister of information. The government appointed other ministers as well: Adem Limani, minister of health, Muhamet Bicaj, minister education, Isa Mustafa, minister of finance, Halit Muharremi, minister of justice. There were also two other ministries which remained rather in the shadows. They were minister of interior, Ramush Tahiri and minister of defence Nikë Gjeloshi. A parallel health system was created with the support of the Mother Teresa NGO. The ministry of education was by far the most active, as it organised a complete parallel education system. The LDK and its government dominated several of the other organisations active at the time. This included the KMLDNJ, which recorded cases of human rights abuses against Kosovo Albanians by the Serbian authorities. More than half of its founding members, mainly former political prisoners were also founding members of the LDK. However 72 See Kosovo Information Center ( (KIC), accessed on 6 October 2011 73 Mehmet Hajrizi, Selatin Novosella, Rame Buja, Berat Luzha, Basri Musmurati, Hydajet Hyseni, Ilaz Pireva, Jakup Krasniqi and Ali Lajqi. 74 Jusuf Buxhovi cited in the Report of the Government of the Republic of Kosovo 1991-1999 presented to the Kosovo Assembly in January 2000. p.36. WWW.IKSWEB.ORG 28—A POWER PRIMER: A HANDBOOK TO POLITICS, PEOPLE AND PARTIES IN KOSOVO BUJAR BUKOSHI 13 MAY 1947, SUHAREKA Studied medicine in Belgrade and graduated in 1971. He practiced as an urologist before becoming an important political figure. Bukoshi was one of the founders of the LDK and of the KLMDNJ. He was appointed prime minister of the Kosovo government-in-exile by the Coordinating Council in 1991. The government and its activities were financed by the three percent income tax levy paid by all Kosovars during the 1990s. Some of the money raised was used to set up “The Armed Forces of the Republic of Kosovo” (FARK). In 1997, however, Bukoshi blocked the allocation of funds for the parallel state institutions and took direct control of the fund’s management. After the war, Bukoshi left the LDK and founded the New Party of Kosovo (PReK). At this point Bukoshi openly accused Ibrahim Rugova and his son Ukë of leading a mafia-style LDK, which allegedly functioned like the “Cosa Nostra.” Bukoshi’s party fared badly at the polls in the 2002 local elections and in the 2004 parliamentary elections, after which it disintegrated. In 2007, after Rugova’s death and the defection of Nexhat Daci, Bukoshi re-joined the LDK and became a deputy in parliament. In 2009 he was appointed minister of health. In 2010 Bukoshi announced that he would challenge Fatmir Sejdiu for the presidency of the LDK. Somewhat surprisingly he was supported in this endeavour by Ukë Rugova. In the end, Bukoshi did not stand for election, instead he left LDK to draw up an independent candidate list with Ukë, known as the “Ibrahim Rugova List.” It joined a pre-election coalition with the AAK and Ukë Rugova gained one seat for the list in parliament. Bukoshi and Ukë Rugova formed one of the most surprising friendships in modern Kosovo politics. The two men then abandoned the AAK and went into a coalition with the PDK. In return for the move Bukoshi became deputy prime minister in the current government. its secondary and unofficial function was to monitor political activity and to make sure that nobody dissented from the policy of non-violence set out by the LDK.75 As the rest of Yugoslavia descended into war and Kosovo stayed under strict Serbian police control, it is clear that it was anything but a normal place. Hence understanding the decision making structures of that period is today often harder than it was even for people at the time. Thus, whether education was under the control of the LDK or the government, or what the difference was between the two, and who had their hands on the purse strings remains hazy to this day. Given that the Bukoshi’s government later reported, that between 1991-99 some 81 percent of its funds went into primary education for more than a quarter of a million children at any given time, it is 75 Besnik Pula. The Emergence of the Kosovo “Parallel State,” 1988–1992. Nationalities Papers, Vol 32, No. 4. December 2004. p.808. also not inconceivable that not every penny collected, reached its intended destination. The only Albanian language newspaper which was still allowed to publish was Bujku. It was firmly under LDK control, as was the daily Kosovo news insert on Albanian television broadcast from Tirana, which was widely watched, and the Kosova Information Centre, which operated like a news agency, but acted more like an LDK mouthpiece.76 Media independent of the LDK, only came to be established later with the support of the Open Society Foundation in Belgrade. Papers included Zëri and Koha which still exist, as well as Forum, a shortlived magazine run by Adem Demaçi. In this way the LDK, for Kosovo’s Albanians, had unwittingly, and in many respects, simply 76 Sabrina P. Ramet, Serbia since 1989: Politics and society under Milošević and after. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2005. p.324. Tim Judah, Kosovo: War and Revenge. Yale University Press, 2002. A POWER PRIMER: A HANDBOOK TO POLITICS, PEOPLE AND PARTIES IN KOSOVO—29 EDITA TAHIRI 27 JULY 1956, PRIZREN Studied electronics and telecommunications at University of Prishtina, and holds a master’s degree in Public Administration from the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. Tahiri recently completed her PhD studies at the University of Prishtina. Her political life began in 1991, when she joined the presidency of the LDK. From the beginning she specialised in international relations and was appointed LDK representative for foreign affairs from 1991 to 1999. Tahiri was a leader of the Women’s Forum of the LDK and an elected member of parliament between 1992 and 2000. As a member of the LDK she was also a representative at the Rambouillet Conference. After the war Tahiri remained in the LDK and was a parliamentary deputy from 2001 to 2004. In 2005 she left the LDK and founded her party, the Kosovo Democratic Alternative (ADK). In 2007 she took it into a pre-election agreement with the PDK and received one seat in parliament. During the general elections of 2010, her party again ran in a pre-election coalition with the PDK, but this time the ADK did not gain any seats. Tahiri was however appointed deputy prime minister and is currently Kosovo’s chief negotiator in the EU sponsored dialogue with Serbia. replaced the political power of the LCK. However it is important to remember that power at this stage was split. While the LDK held moral sway over Albanians, who in great measure rallied around it thus conferring upon it some measure of coercive power – woe betide anyone who balked at paying the three per cent tax - the Serbian authorities and police were also very much in day-to-day control. The LDK’s authority was also bolstered by the carefully constructed image of Ibrahim Rugova as a kind of leader who must not be questioned and as Kosovo’s very own Mahatma Gandhi. If an order went out it was, until his power began to fray in 1995, almost always obeyed. Rugova, it was widely believed, also had an open channel to the US administration and thus it was inferred he must know what he was doing. This hegemony meant that from the end of 1992 until after the Dayton Accords which ended the war in Bosnia in November 1995, Kosovo settled into a strange, but very quiet stalemate with the Serbian authorities. Rugova avoided giving the Serbs any excuse for violence fearing that war would provoke the ethnic cleansing of Albanians. In return the Serbs let him exercise power and run schools and drive around in a presidential Audi and hold press conferences every Friday thanking friends and well wishers. They too did not want a conflict. Fighting first in Croatia and then in Bosnia, the last thing Milošević wanted was the opening of a southern front which would divide and hence weaken Serbian forces. Thus, with LDK power established after the elections, other institutions such as the Coordinating Council withered. It was only in 1995 that things began to change. In the meantime the parliament elected in 1992 never convened and hence never passed any laws. A single attempt to meet was dispersed by the Serbian police. The president of Kosovo was thus the only legitimate figure. On one side Kosovo was run by the Serbian state while on another it existed as a democracy, at least on paper. In fact the power not held by the Serbs was in the hands of a strong president who exercised it via a formidable and extensive party machine. As Shkelzen Maliqi, the sociologist, journalist and activist wrote in 1998: It is impossible to talk about either government or opposition in the Kosovo parliament in WWW.IKSWEB.ORG 30—A POWER PRIMER: A HANDBOOK TO POLITICS, PEOPLE AND PARTIES IN KOSOVO NEXHAT DACI 26 JULY 1944, TERNOC, PRESHEVA, SERBIA He was born in a village now in south Serbia. He studied chemistry in Belgrade obtaining a master’s degree, before gaining a doctorate from Zagreb University in 1973. He worked as a scientist in the United Kingdom, Belgium and Czechoslovakia. Since 1970 Daci has been a professor of chemistry at the University of Prishtina. He has been a member of the Kosovo Academy of Sciences and Arts since 1994 and was its president from 1998 until 2002. During the local elections of 2000 Daci, a leading member of the LDK, led and won the elections in Prishtina. However, he did not take up the post of the mayor of Prishtina but demanded the LDK elect Sali Gashi takes it instead. In the first parliamentary elections of 2001 Daci was elected as a deputy to the PISG Kosovo Assembly and was duly made its president. In 2004 Daci was re-elected president of the assembly. He was however unable to complete a second full term in office after he lost the support of his own party in the wake of Rugova’s death. During the LDK party elections in 2006 he unsuccessfully challenged Fatmir Sejdiu for the leadership of the party. After this setback Daci broke away from the LDK and created his own party, the Democratic League of Dardania (LDD). He then went into a pre-election coalition with the Albanian Christian Democratic Party of Kosovo (PSHDK) and won 10 percent of the votes in the 2007 parliamentary elections. In the 2010 parliamentary election Daci’s party did not pass the five percent threshold, after which many of its members deserted the party. Immediately before the election Daci was found guilty of the misuse of funds whilst president of the assembly. formal terms. There is no clearly articulated parliamentary opposition to the LDK which exercises comprehensive political control. More genuine opposition is offered by some non-parliamentary groups like the “Forum of Albanian Intellectuals” and the “Party of National Unity” which are committed to immediate unity with Albania. Even this however, is a variant of the national program rather than a real opposition.77 The first challenges to the LDK began to emerge in the wake of Dayton. Firstly there had been anger that, for all of Rugova’s much vaunted international connections, Kosovo had not been discussed there. This meant that rump Yugoslavia, made up of Serbia and Montenegro, was now internationally recognised and that Kosovo remained locked inside that state. The first real signs of trouble came when an agreement negotiated with the help of a Vatican organisation resulted in an agreement that Albanian students and faculties could again use the buildings of the University of Prishtina from which they 77 Shkelzen Maliqi. Kosova: Separate worlds; Reflections and Analyses 1989-1998. Prishtina. Dukagjin, 1998. pp. 39-40. had been excluded since September 1991. It was not implemented and hence on 1 October 1997 demonstrations were organised by the Unioni i Pavarur i Studentëve të Universitetit të Prishtinës (the University of Prishtina Independent Students Union – the UPSUP). This showed that divisions were opening between Kosovars. The students demanded that the agreement be implemented. By lobbying abroad the students also made a serious contribution to ending the widespread foreign consensus of lining up behind the LDK’s policy of passive resistance.78 That alone might not have been enough; however this was to happen simultaneously with the rise of the Kosovo Liberation Army or the UÇK, which in turn was only made possible by events in Albania in 1997. The real beginning of the end of this pre-war hegemony therefore began, when neighbouring Albania collapsed into anarchy. For the first time ever large supplies of cheap weaponry were at hand. In November 1997 the UÇK made its first public appearance and several clashes ensued in the following months. In March 1998 Serbian special 78 Howard Clark, Civil Resistance in Kosovo. London: Pluto Press, 2000. pp. 145 – 157. A POWER PRIMER: A HANDBOOK TO POLITICS, PEOPLE AND PARTIES IN KOSOVO—31 FATMIR SEJDIU 23 OCTOBER 1951, PAKASHTICË, PODUJEVË Went to school in Podujevë and then studied law in Prishtina, where he eventually received a doctorate. While a student, Sejdiu spent a year in France and four months in Arizona. He has been widely published and has been a professor at the University of Prishtina for many years. His political career began when he became a founding member of the LDK in December 1989. In 1991 Sejdiu was elected a member of its general council, and in 1992 he became a member of presidency of the LDK. In 1994 he was made general secretary of the LDK. He was elected a parliamentary deputy in both the 1992 and the 1998 elections. After the war, Sejdiu was again elected as deputy in 2001 and 2004. In February 2006, Sejdiu was elected president and then, later that year, also became the president of the LDK, stepping in to fill the void left by the death of Ibrahim Rugova. As president of Kosovo he took part in the Vienna negotiations with Serbia on the future status of Kosovo. After the 2007 parliamentary election, as the president of the LDK, he formed a coalition with the party’s main antagonists, the PDK. He was often and severely criticised for that move. In 2010, the Constitutional Court ruled that Sejdiu would have to choose between being president of the LDK or stay president of the country, as to hold both posts was unconstitutional. Sejdiu chose to resign from the latter. He then withdrew his party from the coalition with the PDK precipitating the country into an unexpected election. A month later, Sejdiu also lost the presidency of the LDK to Isa Mustafa. police units surrounded the house of Adem Jashari, an early UÇK member and, by the time the siege was over, more than 50 members of the family were dead. Rugova’s response was to call for the elections that he had already postponed for two years. They were held on 22 March 1998 and resulted in another sweeping victory for the LDK. Four smaller parties which followed the lead of Rexhep Qosja boycotted the poll arguing that now was not the time for voting. They were joined by organisations representing students, former political prisoners and others. The LDK’s hegemony was crumbling. The Fragmentation of the LDK As Kosovo descended into war in 1998 the UÇK eclipsed the LDK. Just one year later in February 1999, when the Kosovo Albanian delegation arrived at the Rambouillet Conference, Ibrahim Rugova had to play second fiddle to Hashim Thaçi, the political leader of the UÇK. In Rambouillet Thaçi, Rugova and Qosja agreed on the formation of a provisional government after the war. However, when it ended in June 1999, Rugova disowned this and proclaimed his support for Bukoshi’s government-in-exile. Thus Kosovo now had two “governments” of questionable legitimacy. On the one side there was the provisional government of UÇK leader Hashim Thaçi and Rexhep Qosja, supported by smaller parties. On the other side there was Bukoshi’s government, which had never been re-confirmed by either of the parliaments elected in 1992 and 1998. Bukoshi’s activity was however clearly extremely limited in comparison with that of Thaçi’s, which after all, had grown from the barrel of a gun. As the Serbs withdrew, the UÇK seized power at the municipal level.79 Rugova, who had gone into exile in Rome during the period of NATO bombing, tarried before returning. It was widely assumed that he was now a political busted flush. In the wake of the war the UN’s Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) established what was called the Joint Interim Administrative Structure (JIAS). In May 2000 it gathered a wide variety of Kosovo’s leaders including Kosovo Serbs. A 35-member transitional council was composed of representatives of political 79 European Stability Initiative ( (ESI), The Ottoman Dilemma: Power and Property Relations under the United Nations Mission in Kosovo. Berlin, 2002. WWW.IKSWEB.ORG 32—A POWER PRIMER: A HANDBOOK TO POLITICS, PEOPLE AND PARTIES IN KOSOVO ISA MUSTAFA 15 MAY 1951, PRAPASHTICË, PRISHTINA He went to school in Prishtina and graduated from the Faculty of Economics at Prishtina University, where he also obtained his masters and PhD. His professional career started in 1974, when he became an examiner at the University of Prishtina. Over time Mustafa has become a leading political figure. Between 1984 and 1988 he was appointed president of the municipal government [mayor] of Prishtina, as well as head of the office for the planning and development of Kosovo. Mustafa joined the LDK in 1990 and was appointed minister of economy and finance in Bukoshi’s government-in-exile. During the 1990s Isa Mustafa spent many years abroad, in exile. After the war Mustafa was engaged, alongside other various professional jobs, in teaching at different universities in Kosovo and in empirical research at the Riinvest Institute. He was also the member of several executivebanking councils including the Central Banking Authority of Kosovo. From 2006 to 2007 Isa Mustafa advised the president of Kosovo and the leader of the LDK, Fatmir Sejdiu. In 2007, Mustafa ran for mayor of Prishtina and defeated Fatmir Limaj. As a popular mayor he frequently used his position to criticise and oppose the LDK leadership for joining a coalition with PDK. In 2010 he defeated Fatmir Sejdiu in the race for the presidency of the LDK. In the 2010 parliamentary elections Mustafa was elected as a parliamentary deputy. Nevertheless, he chose to remain mayor of Prishtina and president of the LDK. parties, religious organisations, national minorities and groups representing civil society. However, in the short period between the end of the war and the introduction of the JIAS, the UÇK attempted to impose its authority via its own provisional government. Unexpectedly this gave a huge boost to the LDK. In the chaotic months after the war the UÇK damaged its heroic wartime image. For many it came to be associated with corruption, theft and revenge killings against so-called collaborators. In addition, with so much destruction and some ten thousand dead, many wondered if the LDK had not been right all along to try and avoid an armed conflict. Ibrahim Rugova’s party thus triumphed in the October 2000 municipal elections. The supremacy of the LDK would now continue until Rugova’s death in January 2006, which robbed the party of its single most valuable asset – himself. No one since has been able to re-establish the authority he once held and the party has seen its support decline despite attempts to lure voters with talk of “Rugovian philosophy.” The LDK has also lost voters to splinter parties, Lidhja Demokratike e Dardanisë (Democratic League of Dardania – the LDD) led by Nexhat Daci and the Lista Ibrahim Rugova (Ibrahim Rugova List), led by his son. In the party congress of 2006 the floor descended into chaos with fist fights erupting and delegates attacking each other with chairs. Still, Fatmir Sejdiu, general secretary under Rugova was elected leader. In the 2004 general election the LDK was still the largest single party with 45 percent of votes. In the 2007 elections this collapsed to 22 percent with the LDD taking 10 percent for itself. The LDK today The 2006 split within LDK proved to have disastrous effects both for its reputation and power. In addition the party was damaged by its coalition with the PDK of Hashim Thaçi in 2007 which led to a loss of support within the party for Fatmir Sejdiu. Sejdiu, who had become president of Kosovo with the support of PDK but had to step down in September 2010 after the Constitutional Court ruled that he could not hold both the position of president and that of head of the LDK simultaneously. Sejdiu left office, and ended the coalition with the PDK, hoping to hold on to his position as party boss. It was a manoeuvre which failed. In November 2010 Isa Mustafa, the mayor of Prishtina, successfully challenged Sejdiu for the post. A POWER PRIMER: A HANDBOOK TO POLITICS, PEOPLE AND PARTIES IN KOSOVO—33 Another candidate for the job was Bukoshi, but lacking support he quickly withdrew. Ironically, given his poor relations with Rugova from 1995, when he had actually cut funding for him, he was backed by Ukë Rugova, his son who had just joined the party. Immediately afterwards however he was to lead members out of the LDK, when he formed his own party. His Ibrahim Rugova List was ready to run for parliament in the December 2010 election in coalition with the AAK. Then, immediately after winning himself a seat in the parliament, (the party’s only seat,) Ukë Rugova changed horses and joined the PDK led governing coalition. The 2010 election saw a moderate rise in support for the LDK compared to 2007, but for the first time since 2000, the party found itself in opposition. Isa Mustafa has since tried to overhaul the party by bringing in new people.80 However, in the wake of the last party elections in November 2010 only six of 22 presidency members were newcomers.81 In order to tackle the government more effectively, the party formed groups of experts in different fields. At the same time, being in opposition has not prevented the LDK from talking to, and compromising with, the PDK where necessary. When in April 2010 the Constitutional Court declared the election of Behgjet Pacolli as president illegal, the LDK agreed on Ahtifete Jahjaga, the nonparty deputy head of the Kosovo police as a mutually acceptable replacement. 80 Apart from Arben Gashi, a vocal young MP, previously Isa Mustafa’s advisor in the Municipality of Prishtina, other young fresh faces are not so visible in the LDK. 81 Teuta Sahat�ija, Vjosa Osmani, Gazmend Muhaxheri, Avdullah Hoti, Kujtim Shala and Xhafer Tahiri were elected as members of �h� ���������� ��� �h� fi��� ����. 34—A POWER PRIMER: A HANDBOOK TO POLITICS, PEOPLE AND PARTIES IN KOSOVO WWW.IKSWEB.ORG Illegal Structures and the UÇK Although by 1998 it had become clear that Rugova’s strategy of passive resistance was not working, Dayton, in 1995, was the turning point.82 This was the moment when many Kosovars realised for the first time that Rugova’s strategy of cooperation with diplomats and other foreign interlocutors, and of not seeking open confrontation with the Serbian authorities was failing to deliver on independence. In the meantime Slovenia, Croatia and now Bosnia-Herzegovina, in the eyes of many Kosovars, had only secured their independence by force. 82 Dayton Peace Conference was held in US in Dayton, Ohio in 1995. �������� ���������, F����� T����� ��� A���� Iz��������� were brought together to signing a peace deal that would end the war in Bosnia. Kosovo was completely excluded. The result of Dayton, or rather its failure to provide for any solution for Kosovo, therefore strengthened the argument of the underground and illegal groups. They now felt at ease to argue their point, and publicly pursue their objective – that of armed conflict ‘to get rid of Serbia.’ The existence of illegal groups had long been a tradition in Kosovo. Frequent arrests throughout the post Second World War period were a constant reminder of their existence. Among those arrested was Adem Demaçi, who had established a Revolutionary Movement for the Unification with Albania. Other illegal groups were the Movement for National Liberation of Kosovo, established in 1964 and the Revolutionary Group which became the Marxist-Leninist Organisation in 1969. All of them promoted the same goal: Unification with XHAVIT HALITI 8 MARCH 1956, NOVO SELLË, PEJA He is graduate of Albanian Language and Literature from both the University of Prishtina and the University of Tirana. Haliti was involved with illegal, underground organisations, from his student days. After the 1981 protests and a short period in solitary confinement, Haliti emigrated to Switzerland, where he became an active member of the LPK. His activities during the 1980s were outside of Kosovo, mainly in Switzerland and in Albania. Xhavit Haliti claims he is one of the founding members of the UÇK. During this period, he liaised with officials in Albania and was often involved in arms smuggling and fundraising. After directorates were set up within the UÇK, he was appointed chief of finance and head of the Logistics Directorate becoming directly responsible for the management of the Homeland Calling Fund. After the war Haliti joined the PDK and is an important figure within the party. In every general election Haliti has been elected to parliamentary deputy. Even though he has remained popular and received a significant number of votes, he has never played an active part in government. Just like his boss and counterpart, Hashim Thaçi, Haliti has been associated in international reports with organised crime and organ trafficking. However, such allegations have not been proven. A POWER PRIMER: A HANDBOOK TO POLITICS, PEOPLE AND PARTIES IN KOSOVO—35 Albania.83 Between 1973 and 1975 all of these groups intensified their actions and were mostly uncovered by the secret police.84 From 1979 to 1981 six more groups were uncovered. Between 1974 and 1981 more than 600 persons were arrested on charges of “Albanian separatism.”85 They were mostly arrested, tried and convicted by Kosovar Albanian policemen and judges.86 From the time of the 1981 demonstrations onwards the authorities intensified their hunt for such people and it was only a matter of time before anyone died, or, in the eyes of Albanians, the first martyrs were created. In January 1982, three opponents of the communist regime were murdered. The brothers Jusuf and Bardhosh Gervalla and Kadri Zeka had participated in the events of 1981 before fleeing to Germany. To this day no one knows who killed them, but the prime suspects include both the Yugoslav and Albanian secret services. Their deaths prompted supporters to create the underground Movement for an Albanian Socialist Republic in Yugoslavia (LRSSHJ), in Turkey.87 The LRSSHJ did call for an independent Kosovo or unification with Albania.88 In 1985 the group changed its name to the Popular Movement for the Republic of Kosovo (LPRK). Such groups were, more often than not, small cliques of conspiratorial, ideologically motivated and badly organised people. The Yugoslav authorities labelled them “counter revolutionary” but with Milošević’s rise to power the terminology changed to “illegal structures.” In public discourse however, “illegal structures” became the commonly used phrase to identify people who opposed not just Yugoslav and then Serbian rule, but with the passage of time, also the LDK’s policy of passive resistance. These groups were also often called “Enverists.” This was not because they consciously 83 Sabile Ke�mezi-Basha. Organizatat dhe Grupet Ilegale në Kosovë 1981-1989. Prishtin�, Instituti i Historis�, 2003. pp. 91-101. Sabrina P. Ramet, The Three Yugoslavias: State Building and Legitimation, 1918 -2005. Washington, DC, and Bloomington: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2006. p.299. 84 Julie A. Mertus, Kosovo: how myths and truths started a war. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999. p.2. 85 Sabrina P. Ramet, The Three Yugoslavias: State Building and Legitimation, 1918 -2005. Washington, DC, and Bloomington: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2006. p.299. 86 A panel of judges comprised of Tahir Ibrani, Radomir Stojkovic, H�z�� H�z���, T�fi� �h��� ��� N���h Q��� ��������� ������� �� �h� LRBSH to lengthy prison sentences. Adem Demaci was sentenced to 15 years, Hazir Shala and Dibran Bajraktari to 13 years, Sabri N�������� ��� T�fi� ��h��� �� ���� �����. �h���z�� G��h�. Adem Demaçi, unauthorized biography. Prishtina. Rrokullia, 2010. p.51. 87 The LRSSHJ was founded on 17 February 1982 in Istanbul by Sabri Novosella and Avdullah Prapashtica. 88 IKS interview with Emrush Xhemajli, Prishtina. 16 February 2011. followed the philosophy of Albanian dictator Enver Hoxha, because only few of them knew anything about real life in the Stalinist neighbour. It was rather because the young conspirators often romanticised Hoxha’s brand of communism while simultaneously fantasising about creating a Greater Albania. LPRK activists worked mostly amongst the diaspora, especially in Switzerland. By the early 1990s it had gathered under one political roof many of those that had been arrested or prosecuted after the 1981 demonstrations.89 Following the referendum of 1992, in which the overwhelming majority of Kosovo Albanians voted in favour of an independent state, the movement underwent internal changes. In August 1993 a meeting was held in Drenica, the traditional heartland of Kosovar resistance. Discussions took place as to what approach should be adopted considering all that had happened in Kosovo and Yugoslavia in the past few years. The LPRK changed its name to the Lëvizja Popullore e Kosovës (the Popular Movement for Kosovo – the LPK). According to Tim Judah, the British journalist, it then delegated a committee of four men with the task of beginning an armed rebellion.90 This was the birth of the Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosovës (the Kosovo Liberation Army – the UÇK). By December the UÇK had been founded and the LPK had changed its statute. Emrush Xhemajli, one of its small band, recalls that they had decided to include, “war as a tool to preserve the peace.”91 From now on the LPK tried to secure weapons for the UÇK but their initial efforts to do this and create an army unit proved unsuccessful.92 The LPK was not the only militant group on the scene. It had a rival which was founded in March 1993, the Lëvizja Kombëtare për Çlirimin e Kosovës (the National Movement for the Liberation of Kosovo – the LKÇK).93 The difference between the two was somewhat theological, given the difficulty of 89 Mehmet Kraja in Vitet e Humbura says: ‘LP�K ����� ��� fi��� the biggest support among the ex-prisoners and politically persecuted, who were made such only by being its members and activists.’ 90 Tim Judah in his book Kosovo: War and Revenge claims that it was Xhavit Haliti, Ali Ahmeti, Kadri Veseli and Hashim Thaci. However, contradiction as to who founded the UÇK continues amongst ex-UÇK seniors. Rexhep Selimi claims that Muj� Krasniqi, Zahir Pajaziti and Nait Hasani were the initial architects of the movement and its approach. Nait Hasani claims that the UÇK was formed on 17 November 1994 by Nait Hasani, Azem Syla, Xhavit Haliti and Xheladin Gashi. 91 IKS interview with Emrush Xhemajli, Prishtina.16 February 2011 92 In Çeta e Llapit in the Llap region those involved included Hasan Ramadani, Gani Hoxha, Ismet Avdullahu, Sabri Ki�mari. 93 IKS interview with Avni Klinaku, Prishtina. 16 February 2011. The founders of the LKÇK included Avni Klinaku, Raif Qela, Bahri Fazliu, Sabit Gashi and Mursel Sopi. WWW.IKSWEB.ORG 36—A POWER PRIMER: A HANDBOOK TO POLITICS, PEOPLE AND PARTIES IN KOSOVO procuring weapons. The LKÇK insisted on an immediate uprising whilst the LPK stood for guerrilla war. The LPK however, was more active amongst the diaspora, while the LKÇK had a stronger presence in Kosovo. Avni Klinaku, one of its founders, claims that they established the organisation as an alternative to the pacifism of the LDK.94 One of its activities was the clandestine printing and distribution of a newspaper called Çlirimi which aimed at mobilising the population for an uprising. According to Liburn Aliu, then an LKÇK member, their aim was not just a popular armed revolt in Kosovo but also in Macedonia and in the Albanian-inhabited parts of south Serbia.95 Interestingly the LKÇK cooperated with Bukoshi’s government-in-exile, which gave it financial support.96 The LKÇK continued their clandestine activities in Kosovo throughout the 1990s and eventually it joined forces with the UÇK. In May 2000 the LKÇK decided, together with other smaller parties, to join Ramush Haradinaj, a former UÇK commander in the formation of the AAK which at that point was a coalition. However this move was short-lived. They soon left the AAK and resumed political life as a party on their own right. In 2008, after independence and due to changing circumstances, the party split in two. One group left and became the Lëvizja për Integrim dhe Bashkim (the Movement for Integration and Unity – the LIB,) while the rest led by Avni Klinaku, became the Lëvizja për Bashkim (the Movement for Unity – the LB). Shortly before the 2010 general election the LB joined Vetëvendosje! in a pre-election coalition. In October 2010, following claims that Vetëvendosje! had taken more than it was entitled from the funds allocated for political parties, LB left Vetëvendosje!. Currently they have two seats in parliament. It took almost four years for the UÇK to come out in public. Its first official appearance was at the funeral of Halit Geci on 28 November 1997, the Albanian national day. Halit Geci was a teacher, who had been killed by Serbian police in the village of Llaushe. At his grave three armed and uniformed men gave a short speech explaining the objectives of their struggle. They three were Rexhep Selimi, Mujë Krasniqi and Daut Haradinaj. They also took the opportunity to denounce claims made by the LDK that the emerging armed resistance was a creation of 94 IKS interview with Avni Klinaku, Prishtina. 16 February 2011 95 IKS interview with Liburn Aliu, Prishtina. 1 February 2011. According to Aliu, cooperation with Albanian political representatives in Macedonia were not that good; on the other hand, cooperation with Albania was “very good.” Liburn Aliu is one of the founders of the Vetëvendosje! movement and is currently a parliamentary deputy. 96 IKS interview with Liburn Aliu, Prishtina. 1 February 2011 the Serbian security forces aimed at discrediting the policy of passive resistance.97 The emergence of the UÇK would radically transform Kosovo’s political landscape. Firstly, it was the first serious and open challenge to the authority of the LDK and its policy of passive resistance. Secondly, its political legacy is the political parties which emerged from it in the wake of the war, i.e., today’s ruling PDK and the AAK. Its beginnings were not promising though. Indeed in January 1998 the UÇK hardly numbered more than 350 men.98 Rexhep Selimi, one of its Drenica commanders says that the organisation had only 100 men in 1997. Nevertheless, Selimi also claims, that UÇK had exploded to 10,000 armed fighters by late 1998.99 There are conflicting accounts as to the real number of men it had under arms, as there are about its command structure. The International Crisis Group (ICG) notes that prior to its demilitarisation in September 1999 the UÇK had some 10,000 registered members.100 Funding for the UÇK was organised by representatives abroad under the aegis of Vendëlindja Thërret, the Homeland Calling Fund. Based in Switzerland Jashar Salihu was the key money man, while the task had since 1997 been delegated in the US to Florin Krasniqi.101 In four and a half months Krasniqi collected half a million dollars. When in March 1998 Adem Jashari and more than 50 members of his extended family were killed after the Serbian siege of his compound in Prekaz, Albanians in New York organised a protest of around 2,000 people in front of the United Nations headquarters. Immediately people wanted to know more about Adem Jashari and the mysterious UÇK that he had been a member of. In that afternoon alone, Krasniqi collected $280,000. Elsewhere in the US Albanians began collecting money and sending it to him.102 During and after the war the UÇK managed to project a public image of a disciplined and organised 97 IKS interview with Daut Haradinaj, Prishtina. 11 May 2011. Haradinaj referred to the then Kosovo’s presidency, led by Ibrahim Rugova. Rugova’s policy towards the emergence of the UÇK was at best ambiguous. He hesitated to acknowledge its existence in the beginning claiming that, in case of an armed uprising, instead of a war, we would see a huge massacre of Kosovo Albanians. 98 Howard Clark, Civil Resistance in Kosovo. London. Pluto Press, 2000. p.173. 99 IKS interview with Rexhep Selimi, Prishtina. 23 February 2011. 100 International Crisis Group ( (ICG). Violence in Kosovo: Who’s killing whom??.Prishtina/London/Washington: ICG, 2 November 1999. 101 Tim Judah, Kosovo: War and Revenge. Yale. Yale University Press, 2002. p.127. 102 Stacy Sullivan, Mos kij frikë, se i ke djemtë në Amerikë: Si e futi pullazxhiu Amerikën në luftë në Kosovë (Be Not Afraid, For You Have Sons in America: How a Brooklyn Roofer Helped Lure the US into the Kosovo War). Prishtina. KOHA, 2004. pp.204-205. A POWER PRIMER: A HANDBOOK TO POLITICS, PEOPLE AND PARTIES IN KOSOVO—37 group. This did not reflect the truth. In reality the UÇK was raven with political, personal and regional disputes and proved poor at training its volunteers. Many complained of being left alone to wander around in poor villages in northern Albania.103 Nevertheless, the UÇK proved highly successful in achieving its aims and it appeared at the right time thanks to a conjunction of circumstances. One of the most important was the collapse of Albania in 1997, which enabled it to secure weapons. At the same time, during 1997 and 1998 it was supported by growing numbers disillusioned members of the LDK. Convinced that his popularity and authority was being hijacked by the UÇK, Rugova called for already postponed parliamentary and presidential elections to be held on 22 March 1998. American diplomats also successfully convinced Rugova to meet with Milošević for which he would be rewarded with a meeting with President Bill Clinton. By this time Rugova had established his own so called G-15 negotiating team but its members, which included LDK politicians, former communist leaders and opinion-makers, were sidelined.104 The UÇK’s support rocketed after Richard Holbrooke, the US special envoy, let himself be photographed meeting its commanders, by accident or design, when he visited Junik in June 1998.105 A factor that influenced many western countries to support the UÇK was the fear that unless they acted in Kosovo there might be a repeat of the July 1995 Srebrenica massacre in Bosnia. The UÇK did not fight a full-scale war but eventually it managed to convince NATO to intervene thus securing victory. In the meantime, given the initial expansion of an area under UÇK control in Drenica in 1998 and an influx of volunteers, there was a need to change 103 Uk Lushi, Shqiptaro-Amerikanët e UÇK-së. Prishtin�. KOHA, 2009. Tim Judah, Kosovo: War and Revenge. Yale. Yale University Press, 2002. 104 International Crisis Group ( (ICG), Kosovo’s Long Hot Summer: B���fi�� �� ��������, h����������� ��� ��������� ������������ �� Kosovo. 2 September 1998. In reality the group was the G-13 as Bukoshi was in Germany and Dema�i refused to be part of a body led by Rugova. In addition, according to the testimonials of the members, they viewed themselves as negotiators but Rugova saw them as “an advisory group.” By May 1998, Hydajet Hyseni, Rugova’s former deputy in the LDK and Bujar Dugolli, the student’s representative, walked out. On 13 August 1998, Rugova presented a new group of negotiators, now called the G-5, which with the exception of Fehmi Agani included “staunch Rugova supporters.” 105 Holbrooke’s visit came after initial remarks of the US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and the US special envoy Robert Gelbard who labelled the KLA “a terrorist group.” The visit was also a strong signal that the UÇK was de-facto recognized by the US administration, hence their participation in the Rambouillet Conference sixth months later. the organisation’s structure. The lack of a political wing now needed to be addressed as the LPK could not properly fulfil this function anymore. In March 1998 Hashim Thaçi was appointed its director for public information, Kadri Veseli its head of Intelligence and Jakup Krasniqi, its spokesman.106 Soon afterwards Thaçi was promoted to become its political head. The spring and summer of 1998, after the deaths of the Jasharis, proved to be decisive. The emerging UÇK now received support from across the political spectrum, apart from the LDK, although by June Rugova’s attitude had softened.107 As a result of a meeting of the Contact Group countries, which coordinated over the former Yugoslavia on 9 March negotiations were called between the Serbian authorities and Albanian leaders.108 Richard Holbrooke and fellow US diplomat Chris Hill were despatched to convince Kosovars to reach a consensus in order to begin talks with Belgrade. The idea was to form a National Salvation Council, in which all parties, including the UÇK, would be represented. Meanwhile, in a sign of the oddity of the conflict, Adem Demaçi became the UÇK’s political representative in Serbian controlled Prishtina, while student leader Albin Kurti was engaged to help him.109 Rexhep Qosja joined forces with other former LDK members who gave their full public support to the UÇK. As a result the UÇK’s structure became more diverse. Following a major reverse in its military fortunes in the autumn of 1998 the conflict dragged on in a desultory fashion, with outside attempts to reach a peaceful solution. The international community was becoming ever less patient with Milošević, in particular given his track record in Croatia and Bosnia. There were already signs that NATO was becoming more and more concerned about the increasing cycle of violence and the deterioration of the situation on the ground. The first NATO threats were issued in autumn.110 Then, an unarmed OSCE operation, 106 IKS interview with Rexhep Selimi, Prishtina. 26 October 2011 107 Since then Rugova’s credibility has been further compromised by his refusal to openly acknowledge the existence of the UÇK. He came closest to it on 19 June 1998, during a press conference following his return from a visit to Washington D.C. when he said: “They are groups of ordinary citizens, who are trying to defend their homes. But we will see to it to ensure that those groups are under control and bear responsibility for the situation.” 108 International Crisis Group (ICG). Kosovo’s Long Hot Summer: Briefing on military, humanitarian and political developments in Kosovo. Prishtina: ICG, 2 September 1998. 109 The leader and founder of Vetëvendosje! movement. 110 For more see: ICG Kosovo Spring, 20 March 1998 and ICG Kosovo’s Long Hot Summer: Briefing on military, humanitarian and political developments in Kosovo. 2 September 1998. WWW.IKSWEB.ORG 38—A POWER PRIMER: A HANDBOOK TO POLITICS, PEOPLE AND PARTIES IN KOSOVO HASHIM THAÇI 24 APRIL 1968, BROJË, SKENDERAJ He started his career in 1989 in the Popular Movement for the Republic of Kosovo (LPRK). He was a prominent leader of the student movement from 1989 to 1993. In 1991 Thaçi was elected as student deputy-rector of the University of Prishtina where he enrolled in the Department of History. Later on Thaçi continued his studies at the University of Zurich, in Switzerland, until 1998. Thaçi is believed to be one of the founders of the UÇK in 1993. In 1997 he was sentenced to gaol in absentia by a Yugoslav court. In 1998 Hashim Thaçi became the head of the Political Directorate of the UÇK. In 1999 Thaçi headed the delegation of the UÇK to the Rambouillet Conference and became one of the four signatories of the document. In March 1999, Thaçi became prime minister of the Provisional Government, which lasted until the establishment of the JIAS in January 2000. In the period after the war, Thaçi joined the Transitional Council of the JIAS, which was central in drawing up the details of the new state institutions. Thaçi signed the agreement which demilitarised the UÇK and transformed it into the Kosovo Protection Corps. Immediately after this, Thaçi took on a leading role in the PDK. After the elections of 2001, which the PDK did not win, the LDK opposed his candidature for prime minister and Bajram Rexhepi was appointed as the compromise candidate. In 2007 however he was appointed prime minister, a position he still holds. Under his tenure Kosovo declared independence in 2008. Hashim Thaçi’s post-war career has been overshadowed by allegations of responsibility for crimes committed by the UÇK. Moreover the Swiss former state prosecutor of Ticino and member of the parliamentary assembly of the Council of Europe, Dick Marty, has openly accused him of links with the mafia and of organ trafficking after the war in 1999. However, such allegations remain unproven. In 2011 EULEX formed a task force to investigate the claims made in Marty’s report. a 2,000-strong international Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM) under the leadership of William Walker, an American, began deploying in November. Its role proved limited and included negotiating the release of Serb prisoners held by the UÇK. In February 1999 Albanians and Serbs were summoned to the French chateau of Rambouillet in a last ditch bid to secure a deal. It failed. On the 24 March NATO began bombing Serbia, a campaign which would last 78 days and lead to the defeat and withdrawal of Serbian forces. A one man show – PDK Hashim Thaçi, aka “The Snake” entered Prishtina on foot soon after NATO forces had arrived in June 1999. He was accompanied by Veton Surroi, the publisher of Koha Ditore, who had participated at the Rambouillet Conference and was one of the four signatories of the document. Thaçi, seen as the rising star, had been subtly supported by Koha Ditore in 1998 and would again be in the immediate aftermath of the war.111 The Rambouillet period marked the zenith of Kosovo Albanian unity, but even then, there was precious little of it. An agreement struck in Rambouillet for a post-war unity government including both the LDK and the UÇK never came to pass. Immediately after the war the UÇK seized power on the ground while the LDK claimed that its provisional government lacked support. The UÇK denounced the LDK in kind. According to Rexhep Qosja, the situation was so serious that it could have easily turned into civil war.112 In July 1999 a group of former UÇK members established a new political party, the Partia për 111 Baton Haxhiu was editor in chief of Koha Ditore at the time, whilst Dukagjin Gorani was one of its editors. Presently Haxhiu runs Klan Kosova and is widely believed to be very close to Hashim Tha�i. Dugagjin Gorani now serves as an advisor on security issues to Tha�i. 112 IKS interview with Rexhep Qosja. Prishtina. 23 February 2011. A POWER PRIMER: A HANDBOOK TO POLITICS, PEOPLE AND PARTIES IN KOSOVO—39 Bashkim Demokratik (the Democratic Union Party – the PBD).113 Their slogan was “Think of the future, don’t forget the war.” Among its founders were Bardhyl Mahmuti, who had represented the UÇK in Switzerland, Jakup Krasniqi and Shaban Shala. Other prominent figures were Jashar Saliu, who had run the Homeland Calling Fund in Switzerland, Azem Syla and Pleurat Sejdiu, the UÇK’s former London representative.114 Despite their background, its leaders denied that the party represented the UÇK. Indeed they objected to the idea of establishing a party that would represent the UÇK, arguing that the UÇK had been a broad church representing the resistance of all Kosovars, which the PBD did not claim to do.115 Thaçi was not amongst this group. A few months later PBD leaders struck a deal with Thaçi. The PBD was wound up and on 10 October 1999 they founded together the Partia për Progres Demokratik në Kosovë (the Party of Democratic Progress of Kosovo – the PPDK). It was, in effect, the direct successor of the UÇK’s political directorate. The PPDK retained its name until the party’s first congress, held in June 2000 when it was changed to the Partia Demokratike e Kosovës (the Democratic Party of Kosovo – the PDK).116 Thaçi was elected president. It established 32 regional branches, a presidency at the central level, as well as presidencies for youth and women, respectively.117 The PDK now assumed the position of the natural political heir of the UÇK’s wartime mantle. It presumed that, in the first post-war poll, the local elections in October 2000, held under the aegis of UNMIK, this would be enough. This was wrong. The LDK triumphed. Bajram Rexhepi, a leading PDK figure and former UÇK member noted that their main mistake was to exclude those who believed that they needed a political strategy. That is to say that a glorious heritage was not enough. Instead the party had only considered former UÇK members as really worthy of membership and that “was totally wrong.”118 The PDK had another problem though. Its reputation was severely damaged by the criminal acts 113 International Crisis Group (ICG). Who’s Who in Kosovo. Prish( tina: ICG, 31 August 1999. p.3. 114 Bardhyl Mahmuti is member of the Bashkimi Demokratik Shqip�tar (BDSH) in Macedonia, Jakup Krasniqi is the Speaker of Parliament, Azem Syla is a parliamentary deputy (MP), Shaban Shala is member of K����� �������� F����, P������ ����� �� ��fi���� ������� at the Ministry of EU integration and Jashar Salihu has died. 115 International Crisis Group (ICG). Who’s Who in Kosovo. Prish( tina. ICG, 31 August 1999. p.3. 116 IKS interview with Jakup Krasniqi, Prishtina. 10 March 2011. 117 IKS interview with Ramadan Gashi, head of PDK branch in Skenderaj. Skenderaj. 29 March 2011. 118 IKS interview with Bajram Rexhepi, Prishtina. 7 June 2011. of many who either were, or claimed to be, UÇK members during the chaotic period after the war. Quite apart from revenge attacks and the killings of Serbs and Roma, they also seized property and attacked and even allegedly killed LDK officials.119 Police investigation, albeit scarce at that time, did not find any evidence which would incriminate any PDK members, but the political significance of such accusations was beyond any doubt.120 The LDK was by far the largest party on the pre-war political scene. They lost ground however, as many Kosovars would hold it morally accountable for its passivity during the war and condemned Rugova for meeting Slobodan Milošević in Belgrade during the NATO bombardment. On the other hand, the belief that some former UÇK leaders were involved in organised crime and the intimidation of political opponents, swayed many voters in favour of its “more civilized” reputation.121 In the 2001 general election, the LDK experienced a drop in support by almost 10 percent, or around 39,000 votes. On the other hand, Thaçi’s PDK succeeded in increasing its total number of votes by almost 8 percent or some 15,000 votes.122 This result meant that the new Kosovo government had to be a coalition of the two main parties. After months of wrangling an agreement was reached. On 4 March 2002, four months after the elections, a government was formed with the PDK’s Bajram Rexhepi as prime minister. He was perceived as a moderate figure amongst former UÇK members. Representatives of the international community were generally against Thaçi, believing that if he was in the job this would only exacerbate animosity with the LDK. After the 2004 general elections the PDK went into opposition. However they formed their own socalled “shadow government.” This was an offensive project, by which they criticised the performance of the government. It was, Bajram Rexhepi recalls, part of the PDK’s strategy to take advantage of political changes and divisions within other parties, especially the LDK in order to give the party “an advantage in order to win the next elections.”123 119 United Nations (UN), Letter dated 24 October 2000 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council, 25 October 2000. 120 Human Rights Watch. HRW Backgrounder. 28 October 2000. Municipal Elections in Kosovo. 121 Clem S. Watkins. The Balkans. New York. Nova Science Publishers, 2003. p.39. 122 OSCE election results supplied by the Central Election Commission; a comparison of 2000 local and 2001 general elections. 123 For the PDK, the turning point was the creation of the so-called shadow government. This strategy was supported by many international advisers. The PDK had a very close relationship with the British Labour Party. Rexhepi says that the PDK were in a strong �������� ������� �� h�� �x����� �� �h� fi��� �� ��������� �h� ������WWW.IKSWEB.ORG 40—A POWER PRIMER: A HANDBOOK TO POLITICS, PEOPLE AND PARTIES IN KOSOVO JAKUP KRASNIQI 1 JANUARY 1951, DRENAS/GLLOGOVC Completed his secondary education in his hometown of Drenica before graduating from the Faculty of Philology at the University of Prishtina with a degree in History in 1976. He became a teacher and continued on this career path until 1981. During that time, he was secretly involved with illegal underground groups such as the MarxistLeninist Organisation. In 1981 he played an active role in the riots and was sentenced to ten years imprisonment. After his release in 1991, Krasniqi returned to teaching in Drenas where he worked in a school until 1994. It was during this time that Krasniqi joined the LDK presidency and chaired its Drenas branch from 1991 to 1998. He was elected as a deputy in the first Kosovo parliament from 1992 to 1998. In 1998, he became a UÇK spokesperson and took part in the Rambouillet Conference. After the war Krasniqi became minister of reconstruction and development in the Provisional Government. In 2000 he was one of the founders of the PDK. In 2002, he was appointed minister of public services. In 2007 he was elected president of the parliament. He held this position until after the 2010 elections. During the period following Fatmir Sejdiu’s resignation, Krasniqi stood as acting president. Krasniqi has more recently made his name as a member of the anti-Thaçi faction in the PDK and is renowned for his controversial statements and behaviour. As president of the parliament and general secretary of the PDK he openly opposed Behgjet Pacolli’s candidacy for president, despite the fact that his party had entered into a coalition agreement with the AKR. The 2004 poll gave the LDK 45 percent of the vote and it now it entered into a coalition with the AAK led by Ramush Haradinaj, the former UÇK commander, who had garnered 8.3 percent of the vote. Haradinaj became prime minister but was indicted three months later for alleged war crimes by the ICTY. Haradinaj duly resigned and left for The Hague. He was replaced first by Bajram Kosumi of the AAK and later by Agim Çeku, a then non-party figure but prominent former UÇK leader. Both were respectable figures but with no powerbases of their own found it hard to impose their authority. The PDK’s moment came in the wake of Rugova’s death on 21 January 2006. The rifts within the LDK, and the formation of the LDD, weakened it to such an extent that, in the November 2007 poll, the PDK finally took the lead. It did this however, not by increasing its own share of the vote, but rather thanks to the LDK’s loss of support. In January 2008, just one month before the declaration of independence, Hashim Thaçi became prime minister in coalition with the LDK. The UÇK lucky star was shining for Hashim Thaçi. His patience in opposition had paid off. Thus he was chosen by fate to read the American-drafted declaration of independence on 17 February 2008. Rugova’s death and Haradinaj’s incarceration in The Hague had proved to be hugely opportune for Thaçi. But it was not luck alone that favoured Thaçi and his PDK. The PDK’s strategy during the election campaign in 2007 had been to involve individuals from civil society and academia in an attempt to change its image from that of a macho party of former UÇK men. The new intake included Hajredin Kuçi, Enver Hoxhaj, Vlora Çitaku and Memli Krasniqi who were all given important ministerial positions.124 However, changes at the government level did not fully mirror what was happening in the party. Of the nine members of the PDK’s presidency, only three had not been members of the UÇK. The explanation for this is that the PDK did not have enough fresh faces 124 Prime Minister Hashim Tha�i has also surrounded himself in cabinet with many new names that had little connection with the UÇK or other illegal groups. His political advisors are: Bekim Çollaku, Chief of Staff, Lirim Grei�evci, Dhurata Hoxha, Mrika Kotorri, Fadil Hysa, Dukagjin G�����, I����� ���� ��� B����� L���fi. ment and put forward new strategies. A POWER PRIMER: A HANDBOOK TO POLITICS, PEOPLE AND PARTIES IN KOSOVO—41 FATMIR LIMAJ 4 FEBRUARY 1971, MALISHEVA He was involved in the underground movement from a young age. He became commander of KLA operations in the Llapushnik Zone during the Kosovo war. Immediately afterwards Limaj joined the PDK. In 2003 he was arrested by KFOR and indicted as a war criminal and tried at the ICTY. He was accused of atrocities committed against Serbian and Albanian civilians, as well as Serbian military prisoners and police officers in 1999. In 2005 however, he was acquitted and released. Limaj was considered until very recently to be Thaçi’s right hand man. In the 2007 elections, he received the second highest number of votes of all of Kosovo’s politicians. In the 2009 local elections he ran for mayor of Prishtina but lost to Isa Mustafa, who later became head of the LDK. After this he was appointed minister of post and telecommunications, a department that had the largest ministerial budget. During his term in office Limaj oversaw the construction 1,300 km of roads. Since 2010 Limaj has been accused of corruption and war crimes and is currently the subject of EULEX investigations. In the 2010 elections Limaj received the second highest number of votes among PDK politicians. However, in 2011, a EULEX judge confirmed an indictment charging Limaj with war crimes. The president of the assembly stood by Limaj and refused to rescind his immunity from prosecution. Currently Limaj is under house arrest and on trial for war crimes in the so-called Kleçka case. for both government and party. As Rexhepi notes, “obviously our commitment to the party was not the same as before.”125 In other words, in terms of image-freshening, the government came first. Thus the presidency of the party has since remained more or less the same.126 By contrast the list of deputies elected in 2010 has changed substantially, with only 10 out 34 remaining the same as in the previous parliament.127 But, friendly, smiling faces from civil society and academia were not the only novelty in the party. In 2010 several alleged ex-members of what was known as SHIK, the intelligence service of the UÇK, and then the PDK, won seats.128 In 2007 the party’s top five candidates in terms of votes came from ex-UÇK ranks. By 2010 this number had grown to seven, including former SHIK members. Decision-making within the PDK has become more difficult and cannot be characterised as a one125 IKS interview with Bajram Rexhepi, Prishtina. 7 June 2011. 126 The PDK presidency consists of: Hashim Tha�i, President, Jakup Krasniqi, General Secretary, Fatmir Limaj, Vice-President, Rrustem Mustafa, Bajram Rexhepi, Hajredin Ku�i, Enver Hoxhaj, Fehmi Mujota, Berat Luzha. 127 Adem Grabovci, Jakup Krasniqi, Xhavit Haliti, Safete Had�rgjonaj, Nait Hasani, Flora Brovina, Arsim Bajrami, Hydajet Hyseni, Fatmir Limaj and Sala Berisha. 128 ���� h��� �������� ���fi���� �h��� �������h��� �� �h� SHIK, for instance: Bekim Haxhiu – Kamishi, Latif Gashi, Fatmir Xhelili and Fadil Demaku. man show anymore. Thaçi’s decision in February 2011 to enter into a coalition with the New Kosovo Alliance (AKR), led by Behgjet Pacolli, a tycoonturned-politician, was severely and openly criticised by other senior party officials. Fatmir Limaj, a prominent former UÇK commander, attacked the decision to enter into such a coalition, saying that it had been made by Thaçi himself, disregarding the opinion of his party colleagues. Limaj was not alone in his criticism.129 Jakup Krasniqi, the speaker of parliament, also pointed at the lack of democratic decision-making within the PDK: “We can see signs of totalitarianism in the PDK, and in other parties as well. In the PDK, there has been a suffocation of democracy and debate.”130 Many, clearly including Thaçi himself, regard Limaj and Krasniqi as potential rivals for the leadership. With such serious disagreements being aired in public it is clear that Thaçi’s continued leadership of the PDK 129 L���� ���fi���� h�� ������ �� �h� ��� �h�� �h� P�������� ��� ���fi���� voted in the parliament. Following the session, Limaj publicly stated that he had voted against Pacolli, the only presidential candidate. In a televised debate, Limaj argued that with only two percent of the votes Pacolli should not “even be consider” the option of taking over the presidency. He also noted that Pacolli has not yet proven his “love for Kosovo.” Klan Kosova, Zona e Debatit; Debate run by Baton Haxhiu. 20 February 2011. 130 Jakup Krasniqi interviewed by Adriatik Kelmendi, Rubikon, KTV. 23 February 2011. WWW.IKSWEB.ORG 42—A POWER PRIMER: A HANDBOOK TO POLITICS, PEOPLE AND PARTIES IN KOSOVO AGIM ÇEKU 29 OCTOBER 1960, QYSHK, PEJA Started a career in the Yugoslav Army immediately after finishing school. He attended military academies in Belgrade and Zadar. During the Yugoslav wars he served in the newly established Croatian Army. During the course of war, he was promoted to higher ranks in the Croatian Army. In the same year Çeku was wounded in battle. Despite his injuries Çeku was appointed Chief of Staff of the Military District of Gospić in 1995 and was in command during operation “Oluja” (Storm), which led to the end of the Serbian occupation of Krajina. Until the Dayton Agreement of 1995, Çeku continued to take part in military operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In 1999, Çeku joined the UÇK and became its Chief of the General Staff. After the demilitarisation and transformation of the UÇK, Çeku was appointed head of the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC). He held this position until he became prime minister after Bajram Kosumi’s resignation. In this position he was part of the Unity Team for negotiations with Serbia on Kosovo’s status in Vienna. After his term as Prime Minister Çeku joined the Social Democratic Party of Kosovo in 2008 and soon became its leader. In 2010 he joined a pre-election coalition with Behgjet Pacolli’s AKR and became minister of security forces. cannot be guaranteed.131 Limaj and Krasniqi have gone so far as to suggest that Thaçi has betrayed the UÇK heritage of the party, which they consider to be its very essence. This demonstrates the legacy of the war in the creation and political ideology of different parties. The two hard-core dissenters within the PDK felt sidelined by the decision to enter into a coalition with the AKR and their open disagreement showed signs of the rift between them and those whom Krasniqi called the “parachuters.”132 While Limaj was attacking the prime minister he came under investigation for corruption and the subject of a domestic indictment for war crimes was served just at the time that the international community’s representatives were calling on the PDK to make sure that its new cabinet did not contain anyone under any cloud of suspicion. Limaj was thus one of the few high-ranked members of the party who did not get a ministerial post in the February 2011 government. On 28 April 2010 the Ministry of Transport and Telecommunications headed by Limaj, and his house had been raided by police from EULEX, the EU’s 131 In the general elections of 2010, the PDK gained 224,339 votes, Hashim Tha�i had 160,850 votes, Fatmir Limaj 75, 689 votes and Jakup Krasniqi 35,379 votes. 132 Krasniqi labelled the newcomers in the party as “parachuters” while talking about the internal organisation of the PDK. Interviewed by Adriatik Kelmendi, Rubikon, KTV. 23 February 2011. police and justice mission.133 In the current cabinet, the prime minister excepted, only two ministers have relatively weak ties with the old UÇK. The rest, plus the six deputy prime ministers have no UÇK background at all.134 Different, rival groups can thus now be identified within the PDK, a party which once had a reputation for internal discipline. On the one side are those that joined the party as a result of Thaçi’s attempt to open it up. They are regarded as loyal to him rather than to the party, and are ranged against those who believe that Thaçi’s strategy of reforming the party is a mistake made at the expense of party ideology. This later group, gathered around Limaj and Jakup Krasniqi, have called on Thaçi to ensure that the party does not become a magnet for ambitious opportunists. What their ideology actually amounts to after the war is however open to question. It is arguable, nonetheless, that their real fear is that under Thaçi the party is distancing itself ever more from its core values, namely the war and the UÇK. 133 Daily Express, Bastiset Ministria e Transportit, 29 April 2010. 134 Bajram Rexhepi, minister of interior was a doctor in the UÇK in the Shala region and Ram� Buja minister of education, Science and Technology was a member of the Political Directorate of the UÇK from November 1998 until April 1999. At the same time he served as the Chief of Directorate for Public Relations and Civic Administration of the UÇK. A POWER PRIMER: A HANDBOOK TO POLITICS, PEOPLE AND PARTIES IN KOSOVO—43 RAMUSH HARADINAJ 3 JULY 1968, GLLOGJAN, DEÇAN Went to the secondary school in Gjakova and after serving in the Yugoslav Army emigrated to Switzerland, where he worked in a variety of jobs from construction to security. While there he joined the LPK. In the late 1990s he joined the UÇK. During the Kosovo war Haradinaj became the commander of the Dukagjin Zone. He lost two brothers, Luan and Shkelzen, in the war and was himself injured on a number of occasions. After the war and the demilitarisation and transformation of the UÇK, he became a member of the KPC until 2000. The same year, Haradinaj founded the “Alliance for the Future of Kosovo” (AAK), which he tried to position between the polarised LDK and the PDK. At the same time he enrolled at the University of Prishtina to study law. In 2004 Haradinaj went into a coalition with the Rugova-led LDK and became prime minister, a position he held only for 100 days. In early 2005 he was forced to resign and to appear at the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). During his time in custody, Haradinaj attained a master’s degree from the American University in Kosovo. In 2008 he was acquitted, due to lack of convincing evidence. In 2010 however his case was reopened and he is again awaiting trial. Ambitious and Crafty - AAK In February 1999, at the “headquarters” of the UÇK in Likovc, a village in the middle of Drenica, commanders gathered for a crucial meeting. The UÇK’s top political and military leaders were in Rambouillet and the other commanders were coming together to decide what their stance would be regarding the outcome of the conference and how to reorganize their command structure. They appointed Sylejman Selimi to lead them in the absence of Azem Syla, who was in Rambouillet and who had held that position until then. Once the delegation returned from France, a decision was made, by consensus or otherwise, to make Agim Çeku, a former Yugoslav army officer who had then fought in the Croatian army, the Chief of the General Staff. This marked the moment of his entry onto the political landscape. He would subsequently become the head of the post-war Trupat Mbrojtëse të Kosovës (the Kosovo Protection Corps – the TMK) and later prime minister between 2005 and 2007. In the summer of 1999, much of the political wing of the UÇK organised itself into a new political party. However it did not include all those who claimed they had been an essential part of the liberation war. The most vocal of this group was Ramush Haradinaj, the commander of the Dukagjin region. Just as in the Likovc meeting, Haradinaj did not shy away from criticism of the political directorate. In the wake of the war the agreement supposedly struck at Rambouillet, to form an all-inclusive provisional government fell apart. Haradinaj had not been included in this government anyway, despite the fact that he had made clear to Thaçi that he wanted to become the minister of defense. As Rugova continued his support for Bukoshi’s governmentin-exile and the provisional government relied on people close to Thaçi, Haradinaj was left out in the cold. This would soon change. On 2 May 2000, Haradinaj founded a new movement, the Aleanca për Ardhmërine e Kosovës (the Alliance for the Future of Kosovo – the AAK). It was initially a coalition, including his own small party, the Aleanca Qytetare e Kosovës (the Civic Alliance of Kosovo – the AQK), other small parties and people of widely differing backgrounds, including former communists, ex-UÇK members and individuals who had, at times, been members of different political parties.135 According to the International Crisis Group, Haradinaj criticised the PDK, the bigger of the two main parties to emerge from the UÇK because of its “claim to sole legitimacy over the UÇK legacy.” He also objected to the division of the political arena between the LDK and PDK.136 135 IK� ��������� ���h Ah��� I��fi, Prishtina. 1 March 2010 136 International Crisis Group (ICG). What Happened to the KLA? Prishtina/Washington/Brussels: ICG, 3 March 2000. p.10. WWW.IKSWEB.ORG 44—A POWER PRIMER: A HANDBOOK TO POLITICS, PEOPLE AND PARTIES IN KOSOVO BLERIM SHALA 15 MARCH 1963, PRISHTINA Graduated from the University of Prishtina with a degree in sociology and philosophy. He worked as a journalist at Rilindja until 1992. Shala was one of the founders of the Parliamentary Party in 1991 and of the newspaper Zëri. Between 1991 and 1999 Shala was arrested five times by the Serbian authorities. As representative of civil society Shala was invited to participate in the Rambouillet Conference. His public life continued after the war, as he was part of the Transitional Council of the JIAS. From 2006 to 2007 Shala was coordinator of the Unity Team, the group of negotiators selected to take part in Talks with Serbia in 2006. His political career started in 2008, when he became the principal vice-president of the AAK. Since 2010, and in the absence of Ramush Haradinaj, Shala has run the party on a dayto-day basis. He is a deputy in parliament. In time the smaller parties, including the LPK, the LKÇK, and UNIKOMB left the AAK coalition while the PPK quietly went away. Thus, in 2004, Haradinaj transformed the AAK umbrella into a party in its own right. The original idea, behind which stood Haradinaj’s adviser, the former communist leader Mahmut Bakalli, was to bring together those who had fought in the war but were not now part of the PDK, non-LDK parties dating back to the 1990s (especially the PPK,) and former “illegal structures,” i.e., the LKÇK. By creating such a broad coalition Haradinaj attempted to create something which would have resembled the idea of a National Salvation Council which had been proposed by American diplomats in 1998. If it had worked it would have been a first in Kosovo Albanian politics. In the end one reason it did not was because of the fundamental difference in the aims between the parties. For example, the LKÇK advocated union with Albania while the AAK did not support this, at least not officially. The AAK entered the political scene only five months prior to the 2000 local elections. It did not win a single municipality. Its failure in Deçan, the home of Haradinaj, was especially surprising in a country where a party can be expected to win most of its votes in the home of its leader. In response to this, the party decided to consolidate its ranks, by reaching out to Naim Maloku another Dukagjini ex-UÇK member who was now head of the CentreLiberal Party of Kosovo (PQLK). In the 2002 local elections, the AAK led the ballot in Deçan. In the interim however, the 2001 general elections had already demonstrated that the party had potential. It won eight seats and entered the government with two ministerial portfolios.137 The election made the AAK the third party in Kosovo. In the aftermath of the 2004 general election the AAK, the PDK and the Reformist Party ORA engaged in direct talks to form a coalition which would have put the LDK in opposition for the first time. Haradinaj however, in what seems to have been a last minute decision, jumped at Rugova’s offer of a coalition. Although the AAK had only taken 8.3 percent of the votes, the deal made him prime minister. There has been much speculation as to why Haradinaj refused the idea of an anti-LDK coalition. One theory at the time was that Haradinaj wanted to take revenge on Thaçi for side-lining him when he wanted to become minister of defence in the provisional government. But Ardian Gjini, a deputy president of the AAK, provides a totally different and somewhat interesting explanation. “In 2004,” 137 In municipal elections the AAK won 53.074 votes (7.7percent), while in the general elections in 2001 they polled 61. 688 votes (7.83 percent). A POWER PRIMER: A HANDBOOK TO POLITICS, PEOPLE AND PARTIES IN KOSOVO—45 he said, “we reached a coalition with LDK which changed many things. We changed the post-war stereotype, that UÇK could not cooperate with the LDK and simultaneously we changed the political approach of the other political parties.”138 Another rather more stark explanation is that being prime minister was preferable to being the leader of a small opposition party. The government of 2004 to 2007 could best be described as complicated. One hundred days after becoming prime minister, Haradinaj resigned, having been indicted by the ICTY. Bajram Kosumi, one of his deputies became prime minister, while Ahmet Isufi was asked to run the party on a day-to-day basis. Rugova died in January 2006 and the AAK replaced the now flailing Kosumi with Agim Çeku. The LDK replaced the president with Fatmir Sejdiu and Nexhat Daci, the parliamentary speaker, was replaced by Kolë Berisha. With Haradinaj away the AAK’s popularity declined. However according to party presidency member Avni Arifi, the party was also damaged by its commitment to the UNMIK-designed “Standards before Status” concept. This process aimed attaining institutional standards in Kosovo before moving onto the topic of solving Kosovo’s eventual status. “The process damaged the AAK because focussing on technical standards meant that our main focus was the international community. So, citizens, tired of economic and social problems couldn’t understand our position and punished us in the elections.”139 The November 2007 general elections left the AAK in opposition. This was the first time since 2001 that it had not been in government. From now on, the strategy of the AAK switched to focussing on the municipal level. The split within the LDK, following Rugova’s death in 2006, was put to good use by its branches in Dukagjin, where in the 2007 local elections, held on the same day as the general election, it was victorious especially in Gjakova and Peja. This result inspired party activists to work hard for the next municipal elections. Ramush Haradinaj’s return, after being acquitted in The Hague in 2008 also boosted support for the party again, which had carefully chosen local candidates in the 2009 local poll, and now added Suhareka and Junik to municipalities it controlled. (It also “won” Zveqan, but only because its Serbian population, boycotted the poll and the area is actually under the de-facto control of the Serbian “parallel” municipality). 138 IKS interview with Ardian Gjini. Prishtina. 10 August 2011 139 IKS interview with A��� A��fi. Prishtina. 20 April 2011 Just as the party was now recovering from Haradinaj’s absence, an appeal by the ICTY prosecution forced Haradinaj to return to The Hague for a retrial in July 2010. This was a major blow to the party. In the run up to the December 2010 general election it formed a coalition with the Ibrahim Rugova List, headed by Ukë Rugova. The result left the AAK, the fourth political party in Kosovo. Following the election the PDK invited the AAK to join a coalition. Nevertheless, this time, Haradinaj and the rest of the party rejected the temptation of power. Ramush Haradinaj has been, and remains, the keystone of the AAK. According to its statute no single significant decision can be made without the say of the party leader.140 Waiting for his approval in 2011 as to whether or not to enter into a coalition with the PDK, while messages were exchanged with The Hague, demonstrates the party’s high level of dependence on him. In addition, even while incarcerated, his name headed the party’s list and he remains its most popular candidate. 140 AAK’s party statute, 2008. WWW.IKSWEB.ORG 46—A POWER PRIMER: A HANDBOOK TO POLITICS, PEOPLE AND PARTIES IN KOSOVO The roots of civil society can be traced back to the early 1990s, as communism gave way to political pluralism. The rise of the LDK as the only overarching political movement for Kosovo Albanians happened simultaneous to the creation of organisations which, more often than not, substituted for institutional bodies such as ministries and other government agencies. Thus the Mother Teresa Society, officially registered in Belgrade in 1990 as a humanitarian NGO, served as a de facto ministry of health for the Bukoshi-led government-in-exile, thus becoming, according to one observer, “the centrepiece of the parallel structures.”141 The Council for the 141 Bill Sterland. Civil Society Capacity Building in Post-Conflict Societies: The Experience of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo. Oxford. INTRAC Praxis Paper No.9. 2006. p.13 Defence of Human Rights and Freedoms (KMLDNJ) likewise acted as a sort of de facto government agency which, under normal circumstances would have been found within a ministerial portfolio dealing with information and the protection of citizen’s rights. It had a large network of people who would report daily on human rights abuses by the Serbian authorities.142 Both organisations made use of volunteers who came through community structures, family networks or thanks to clan relations.143 These, and a few other civil society organisations, which were created with the aim of promoting broader concepts of civil society, soon 142 KMLDNJ had a staff of 15 but was assisted by a network of around 2,000 local volunteers. 143 Bill Sterland, Civil Society Capacity Building in Post-Conflict Societies: The Experience of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo. Oxford: INTRAC Praxis Paper No.9. 2006. p.13 VETON SURROI 17 JULY 1961, PRISHTINA The son of a Yugoslav diplomat Surroi spent some of his youth in Latin America. He graduated in philosophy and literature from the National Autonomous University of Mexico. On his return to Kosovo, Surroi worked as a journalist for Rilindja. Surroi began his political life in 1989 when he became the head of the local branch of the United Yugoslav Democratic Initiative (UJDI) and a member of the Independent Trade Unions of Kosovo. In 1991 he participated in the foundation of the Youth Parliament, which later became the Parliamentary Party of Kosovo, (PPK). He led this until 1993, when he resigned and dedicated himself again to journalism. In 1992 with the support of the Open Society Foundation in Belgrade, Surroi set up the weekly magazine Koha, and assembled a team of young journalists, that included Ylber Hysa, Baton Haxhiu, Dukagjin Gorani, Eqrem Basha and Shkelzen Maliqi. In 1997 Surroi turned the weekly Koha into the daily newspaper Koha Ditore, which became the most widely read newspaper in Kosovo. As a representative of civil society, Surroi participated in the Rambouillet Conference. After the war the Koha business expanded with the creation of the Koha Group which now includes its own printing house. In 2000 Surroi established the KTV Kohavision television channel initially funded by USAID. Koha Ditore, Kohavision and Koha Publishing House are part of Koha Group. In 2004 Surroi founded the Reformist Party ORA, which in the same year gained 6.2 percent of the vote and seven seats in parliament. In the general election of 2007 ORA failed to pass the required five percent threshold. After that Surroi withdrew from an active role in politics and decided to return to civil society. He currently chairs the board of the Foreign Policy Club in Prishtina. A POWER PRIMER: A HANDBOOK TO POLITICS, PEOPLE AND PARTIES IN KOSOVO—47 found themselves involved in the need to promote and support the national resistance and the overall nationalist struggle. In 1999, in the wake of the war, Kosovo saw a huge influx of international non-governmental organisations. Six months after its end there were already some 285 NGOs registered with the United Nations in Kosovo compared to around 50 immediately prior to the NATO bombings. In such circumstances, local NGOs that emerged were, at the same time dependent upon and, in a way, induced by the abundance of donor cash. Such “artificial insemination” of civil society is often related to leader-dominated organisations lacking a clear social mission and overall organisational capacities. With the passing of time international organisations and their funds became scarcer, especially as far as relief and reconciliation projects were concerned. At the same time Kosovo’s immature political culture hindered the development of a process in which civil society organisations would be listened to for political and social advice. Those that would normally need such counsel did not see any benefit in asking for it and if they did, it was done at the last minute.144 Given the high degree of society’s politicisation, the shift of international donor support from civil society organisations to capacity-building for the country’s emerging institutions caused a sharp decline in the NGO sector. In the wake of independence many prominent civil society personalities began to reconsider their role. Many moved into politics. Some joined existing parties but others chose to create their own. They counted on their reputations built during their 144 Sterland argues that this was done only due to a feeling of accountability towards the international community which was the main donor of these organisations. time in civil society, and their well-established relations with key international interlocutors. The party that ran out of time - ORA Veton Surroi was a key figure in civil society from the late 1980s. His father was a Yugoslav diplomat and he is now the owner of Koha publishing group.145 He was the driving force behind the foundation of what was called the Reformist Party ORA in 2004. It was a social-democratically oriented party aiming especially to represent educated, urban voters, disillusioned with the old parties. Surroi was well known and had long been a recognisable part of the political landscape. He began as an ambitious young journalist with a good command of foreign languages and later came to be seen as a leading civil society representative. Surroi briefly headed the UJDI’s branch in Kosovo. After that he became a member of the PPK. He was then present, in one function or another, in most of the key meetings concerning Kosovo that took place between the early 1990s and the Rambouillet Conference of 1999. With the support of George Soros’s Open Society Foundation, Surroi established the successful Koha publishing group, which supported his position in civil society, but also gave him the opportunity to become a benevolent commentator on the political situation. Often seen as the civil society representative par excellence Surroi has spent much of his career with one foot in politics and the other in civil society. As the name of the party ORA, which means “time” implies, Surroi and the other party founders believed that Kosovo was running out of time and that 145 The KOHA Group is made up of Koha Ditore, Koha Vision TV and KOHA Publishing House. SHPEND AHMETI 18 APRIL 1978, PRISHTINA Graduated from the American University in Bulgaria with a degree in economics and business administration. Ahmeti took a master’s degree at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. His professional career began in research projects, after which he worked as a financial analyst at the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and at the World Bank office in Prishtina. As the executive director of the public policy think tank, the GAP Institute, Ahmeti was engaged in civil society. In 2010 along with other activists he decided to enter the political arena. With Ilir Deda, head of the think tank KIPRED, he founded a new political party, the Fryma e Re (FER). In the 2010 general election it did not pass the necessary five percent threshold. As a result some of the party members abandoned ship while Ahmeti and the rest of the FER joined Vetëvendosje!. In the first party congress that took place shortly after Ahmeti joined Vetëvendosje! he was elected its vice president. 48—A POWER PRIMER: A HANDBOOK TO POLITICS, PEOPLE AND PARTIES IN KOSOVO it needed substantial change.146 This was their main message in the 2004 election campaign. Even though founded only a few months prior to the poll ORA won 6.2 percent of the vote and entered parliament with seven deputies. As many expected, the party did well in urban areas where it took between seven and 16 percent. It received the third largest slice of the vote in Prishtina, after the PDK and the LDK and beat the AAK into fourth place. Their performance in the countryside was poor however, falling between one and two percent. ORA deputies were fully engaged in parliament Surroi, their leader, participated in the negotiations in Vienna on the future of Kosovo as a member of the so called Unity Team. According to Teuta Sahatqija, ORA’s vice president, this was one of the reasons for the party’s later failure in 2007. “We were involved in talks on very sensitive issues such as the rights of minorities and cultural heritage….Actually our position was misunderstood by public opinion and so ORA lost the elections.”147 The political program of ORA was innovative especially in terms of its liberal social policies. It promoted the importance of the continued national ownership of publicly owned enterprises (POEs) and of continued state involvement in economic sectors of national interest. It supported the creation of an agricultural bank. It favoured the liberalisation of the law on abortion and it was in favour of legalising samesex marriages. ORA gathered individuals who had been in favour of peaceful resistance in the 1990s but had not been part of the LDK or, later, part of the UÇK either. According to Sahatqija: “If the program had been the key to mobilising voters, ORA for sure would have won the 2007 elections.”148 That year however it failed to pass the five percent threshold to enter parliament. Ironically, it was ORA itself which had proposed raising the previous three percent bar to five percent. Most observers agree that ORA failed to capitalise on the loss of support that the LDK suffered, following its split and the birth of the LDD. But by 2007, the political scene had witnessed not just the birth of the LDD but also the AKR, created by tycoon Behgjet Pacolli. Also, despite a change in political strategy, its support remained almost exclusively in urban centres. Surroi made an attempt to reach the rural population however by taking long walks in villages across Kosovo. This unorthodox way of campaigning, in which Surroi 146 The founders of ORA were: Ylber Hysa (Executive Director of KACI, a local think tank), Ylli Hoxha (a KACI researcher) and Jetmir Balaj (head of the Forum NGO). Veton Surroi, was the head of the electoral list and Ylber Hysa was the president of ORA. 147 IKS interview with Teuta Sahatqija, Prishtina. 15 February 2011. 148 Ibid. would enter an ‘oda’ and would try to win the hearts and minds of the village elders, in the hope that this would then influence the rest of the village, proved futile, and even detrimental.149 Coming from a wellconnected family, which had prospered in communist times, Surroi miscalculated the value of his reputation in the eyes of the rural “elite.” Concentrating on the countryside Surroi took his urban support for granted. This not only proved to be a mistake but was a key factor in the party’s demise. ORA’s share of votes in rural areas saw virtually no increase, whereas in urban areas support dropped sharply. In Prishtina alone, the party’s bastion, votes fell from 11,100 in 2004 to a mere 5,700 in 2007. Failing to enter parliament led to the end of the party. Surroi quit and Sahatqija, one of its seven deputies in the previous parliament, took over in 2008. She was a businesswoman and her political activism began only when she joined ORA in 2004. The strategy of the founders was to draw in people from all walks of life that had not been closely linked with any political party in the past. Professionalism in their field of work, as well as a good reputation within their community, were seen as the only prerequisites to be fulfilled by potential members. When Sahatqija inherited the leadership it was left to her to explain to its dwindling number of supporters the reasons for the party’s poor performance in the elections. She attributed this to the fact that Kosovo was in the middle of negotiations for its final political status and that as Surroi had been engaged in the process and he had not been able to contribute much to the party. No longer in parliament however and without Surroi, ORA soon had to surrender to reality. It merged with the LDK, which had only recently elected Isa Mustafa, as its leader. In the new LDK executive council, Sahatqija became one of the party’s vice presidents. ORA’s importance in terms of the political landscape was that it demonstrated firstly how easy it was to break into the party system and secondly just how hard it then was to remain there. Life is not fair - FER FER was founded in October 2010 by the heads of two political and economic think tanks, Fryma e Re, which means “new spirit,” tried a different approach to other parties. It cultivated a young membership and many members had been educated abroad. None of the founders had been involved with the UÇK or had played a political role during the 1990s. The two main founders also pursued the idea of a “horizontal hierarchy” which 149 Oda - a traditional room set aside for receiving male visitors, often found in villages throughout Kosovo. A POWER PRIMER: A HANDBOOK TO POLITICS, PEOPLE AND PARTIES IN KOSOVO—49 aimed at attracting a more “technocratic” following. Consequently, it was not a surprise that it failed to pass the five percent electoral threshold in the elections barely two months after it was launched. Ilir Deda, one of the two leaders blames the short time between the party’s founding and the poll for its failure. They had believed that the election would actually be held in 2011.150 Thus the party had no time to create a proper country-wide structure and struggled to organize even in urban areas including Prishtina. In rural areas FER secured only 2.7 percent while in Prishtina, where they had their best result, they still only won 6.14 percent. FER also had difficulties in finding the right candidates. Their initial promise that only the welleducated and previously politically unaffiliated would make it onto their list. However this was undermined by the pressure of time and a lack of suitable people. Instead of the permitted number of 110 candidates, the party could only field 86. The top ten candidates were the core members of FER who tried to communicate the values of the new party during the campaign and in debates. But, lack of time also had a negative impact in terms of party coordination. Many candidates were not fully familiar with the party program, something which soon became painfully clear when they made contradictory statements on a wide array of issues. The manifesto was imaginative and economically and socially liberal. FER was seen as a political party, which enjoyed extensive support from diplomats and other internationals in Prishtina. Nevertheless it was FER, which wrote an exit-strategy plan for international missions in the country. Christopher W. Dell, the US ambassador, appeared to give the party a boost by visiting its founders and expressing his appreciation for the appearance of a new, liberally-oriented party. In retrospect however one could argue that his visit was rather counter-productive. Asked by reporters if he would treat Vetëvendosje!, the movement which had just become a party, in the same way, he answered negatively by saying that it was not worthy of a visit.151 Thus the visit was perceived by the public as an attempt by FER to weaken Vetëvendosje!. The party’s subsequent poor performance proved to be fatally discouraging not only for its most loyal 150 IKS interview with Ilir Deda, Prishtina. 7 March 2011. 151 Express. ‘Dell: Vetëvendosje nuk më meriton,’ 19 November 2010. Only two days prior to this, on 15 November 2010, Vet�vendosje! refused to sign the “Code of Conduct” signed by the representatives of all other political parties before the 12 December elections. Daily Express. Nënshkruhet Kodi i mirësjelljes për zgjedhjet e 12 dhjetorit, 15 November 2010. Dell labelled this act as “undemocratic.” supporters but for its founders as well. Ilir Deda and Shpend Ahmeti, its other leading light left it after the general elections. Ahmeti and a good chunk of the party joined Vetëvendosje! while Deda became chief of staff to the president. The brief adventure which the two had embarked upon, was seen as another failure of a political party attempting to emerge from the ranks of civil society. 50—A POWER PRIMER: A HANDBOOK TO POLITICS, PEOPLE AND PARTIES IN KOSOVO WWW.IKSWEB.ORG BEHGJET PACOLLI 30 AUGUST 1951, MAREC, PRISHTINA He was raised in a poor family. At the age of 17, Behgjet migrated to Hamburg, although he couldn’t speak a word of German. In 1990 Behgjet Pacolli set up a construction company in Switzerland, Mabetex Project Management. The company worked on projects across Europe and in the former Soviet bloc making its name in the reconstruction of the Russian Federal Parliament, the Russian Opera House, and the Kremlin. As a result Pacolli has often been accused of being involved in corrupt dealings with the then president of Russia, Boris Yeltsin. Despite the allegations Pacolli was to become one of the most well-known and wealthiest of Kosovo Albanians. Matebex now works mostly in Kazakhstan, where it has a large Kosovo Albanian workforce. In 2006 Pacolli founded the ‘New Kosova Alliance’ (AKR). In the 2007 parliamentary elections the party made a good showing winning 12.3 percent of the vote. Pacolli became a deputy. The AKR however has been falling in the polls ever since. Before the parliamentary elections of 2010 Pacolli formed a coalition with several other smaller parties, which allowed the AKR to pass the required five percent threshold. After the elections the group joined the governing coalition with the PDK. In 2010, parliament elected Pacolli president of Kosovo, but 35 days later the Constitutional Court ruled that the vote had been unconstitutional. Pacolli did not run for president again and is now one of a number of deputy prime ministers. Building Kosovo or itself ? – AKR The Aleanca Kosova e Re (the New Kosovo Alliance – the AKR) was founded on 3 May 2006 by Behgjet Pacolli, a tycoon who, for most of his working life, had lived abroad. The party mainly attracted new faces, who had no substantial experience in politics. As a result the party was, at least initially, identified with the larger than life character of its leader. In the run up to the 2007 elections the AKR presented itself as liberal-democratic party of the centre-right variety. It identified economic development as its main priority.152 However its strategy during the campaign was not just based on its manifesto. The party promised people in remote villages opportunities to go abroad, mostly to Kazakhstan, to work for a construction firm owned by Pacolli. Partly as a result 152 The AKR’s Political Program, 2006. of such campaigning, the AKR won 12.3 percent of the votes and hence became the third largest party in parliament with 13 seats. In spite of this it did not enter the government but took its seats on the opposition benches. Pacolli’s political ambitions have often overlapped with his economic ones. The most notorious case was in 2008 when Pacolli’s construction company, Mabetex, was awarded a €14m tender to renovate the media house building in Prishtina, which then became the home of several ministries. The official evaluation commission of the tender procedure reported that Pellagonia Construction, a Macedonian consortium, had secured 99 points in the competition for the job while Mabetex had only garnered 84 points.153 This 153 Koha Ditore cited in Balkan Insight. http://www.balkaninsight. com/en/article/kosovo-govt-under-pressure-over-contract Web. 18 October 2011. A POWER PRIMER: A HANDBOOK TO POLITICS, PEOPLE AND PARTIES IN KOSOVO—51 MIMOZA KUSARI-LILA 16 OCTOBER 1975, GJAKOVA Graduated from the Economics Faculty of University of Prishtina and holds a master’s degree in e-business from the Institute of Economics, University of Colorado and Duquesne University in Pittsburgh. From 2001 to 2003, Kusari-Lila worked for the AUK, USAID and the World Bank. From 2003 to 2004 she was a spokesperson for the Prime Minister Bajram Rexhepi. In the years 2006 to 2009 Kusari-Lila worked as the Executive Director of the American Chamber of Commerce in Kosovo. KusariLila became active in politics in 2009, when she decided to join the AKR and run for mayor of Gjakova. Although Kusari-Lila did not win, she gained considerable popularity and a large proportion of the vote. Kusari-Lila became vice president of the AKR and remains a strong player in the party together with Behgjet Pacolli. In the 2010 parliamentary elections, Kusari-Lila was the female candidate who received the highest number of votes. Currently, she is the minister of trade and industry and a deputy prime minister. story was soon to disappear from the newspapers and Pacolli’s reputation was not damaged beyond repair, but voters subsequently become less certain when it came to choosing between AKR and other parties. Decline for the AKR set in immediately after the election. This was most visible in parliament, when a number of its deputies decided to leave the party to become independents.154 In 2009 before the municipal elections the AKR entered a pre-electoral coalition with Nexhat Daci’s LDD. However, the result of the poll was a failure for the AKR. Its image had been hit by internal squabbling and, according to Ibrahim Makolli, its vice president, coalitions with other political parties also proved detrimental to its identity.155 The result of the 2009 poll led to a serious rethink by Pacolli. Taking a cue from Thaçi’s freshen-up strategy for the PDK he too began to recruit new members with faces already familiar to the public. One high profile new recruit, who actually joined the AKR just before the municipal elections, was Mimoza Kusari-Lila. Until then she had run a business organisation and been the spokeswoman of Bajram Rexhepi’s first, post-war government. In the local elections Kusari ran for mayor of Gjakova but was defeated by the AAK.156 Afterwards she became vice president of the party. Joining the AKR proved, for her, 154 ������ T��� ��� ��� �� �h� fi��� AKR members of the parliament who left on the basis that there was much nepotism and not enough democracy in decision making. 155 IKS interview with Ibrahim Makolli, Prishtina, 1 March 2011. 156 She was nominated by the party to run in her hometown of Gjakova, where she lost to the AAK’s Pal Lekaj, amidst alleged irregularities and vote thefts. The case was then taken to the Constitutional Court which deemed Kusari’s claims to be “baseless.” a success story. She immediately helped rebrand the party by becoming its new face and the voice. In the run up to the 2010 parliamentary elections, the AKR created a pre-election coalition with another six small parties. They were, the Justice Party (PD), the Social-Democratic Party (PSD), the Pensioners Party of Kosova (PPK), the Pensioners and Invalids Party (PPI), the Albanian National-Democratic Party (PNDSH) and the Green Party of Kosovo (PGJK). The umbrella they created was called the Koalicioni për Kosovën e Re (the Coalition for a New Kosovo).157 To this was added a group of 15 experts (E-15), who were mostly economists.158 The coalition took 7.29 percent of the vote and eight seats. Five went to the AKR and three to other coalition parties. In the wake of the election, the PDK, which had garnered the most votes, needed coalition partners to form a government. Isa Mustafa’s LDK decided to remain in opposition.159 The AAK also refused to enter a coalition.160 Thus the AKR found itself with significant bargaining power. An agreement signed on 19 February 2011 made Pacolli president and Thaçi prime minister. According to the deal the Koalicioni për 157 The AKR entered a pre-electoral coalition with the following: the Justice Party (PD), the Social-Democratic Party (PSD), the Partia e Pensionisteve dhe Invalideve (PPI), the Albanian NationalDemocratic Party (PNDSH) and the Green Party of Kosovo (PGJK). 158 The AKR reached an agreement on 9 November 2010 with the group E-15 which consisted of 15 experts led by Muhamet Mustafa, head of the Riinvest Institute, a local institute for developmental research. 159 Isa Mustafa has said on numerous occasions that his party will not enter a coalition if it does not win outright in the elections. 160 The AAK’s conditions were that it would enter in a coalition with the PDK only if the LDK was to join a grand coalition. WWW.IKSWEB.ORG 52—A POWER PRIMER: A HANDBOOK TO POLITICS, PEOPLE AND PARTIES IN KOSOVO ALBIN KURTI 24 MARCH 1975, PRISHTINA He began his studies in 1993 at the Electrical Faculty of the University of Prishtina, where he was an outstanding student. His political career started in the Students Union in 1997 when he began to organise peaceful protests. He soon gained prominence as a leader of the UPSUP (University of Prishtina Independent Student’s Union). During late 1990s Kurti travelled widely and was an interlocutor in many meetings abroad (Washington, New York, Brussels, Copenhagen). At that time Kurti visited the European Parliament in Strasbourg in order to raise the awareness of international community of the demands that students were putting forward. In 1998, Kurti became the secretary at the Political Office of the UÇK in Prishtina under Adem Demaçi. In 1999 Kurti was arrested by the Serbian police and sentenced to 15 years in prison. He was released two years later. After the war, Kurti worked for the Kosovo Action Network (KAN), which had been already been set up in 1997. In 2005, he transformed the association into the Vetëvendosje! (SelfDetermination!) movement, which would oppose Kosovar and international political structures in Kosovo and openly support the political goal of Kosovo’s union with Albania. In 2007 Vetëvendosje! organised demonstrations against the Ahtisaari package during which two people were killed by UNMIK policemen, who had been issued with out of date rubber bullets. As a result of these peaceful protests, that had turned violent, Kurti was arrested and put under house arrest by UNMIK police. After the declaration of independence 2008, the charges against Kurti were taken up by EULEX. Nevertheless, many lawyers in Kosovo were not willing to defend him, a move which was judged as civil disobedience. Kurti was found guilty and sentenced to nine months in prison but was immediately released having already served his time under house arrest. During the 2010 elections, Kurti led Vetëvendosje!, successfully transforming it from an extra-parliamentary movement into one which now won 12.7 percent of the vote. Kurti is now a deputy and head of the Parliamentary Commission for Foreign Affairs. Kosovën e Re got three ministries, of which only one was taken by an AKR member, namely Mimoza Kusari-Lila. She became a deputy prime minister and the minister of trade and industry. Agim Çeku of the PSD got the Ministry for Kosovo Security Force (KSF) and Ferid Agani, the head of the PD, Ministry of Health. Thirty five days after Pacolli’s inauguration as president the Constitutional Court found his election to be unconstitutional because of procedural irregularities. He resigned but was then appointed first deputy prime minister and is now often abroad, either on business or in his capacity as an envoy seeking recognition for Kosovo. Vetëvendosje! - Kosovo’s bright future? In 2003 UNMIK introduced the Standards before Status policy, by which it wanted to define a minimum set of standards that Kosovo would have to meet, before its final status could be addressed. At the same time the process did not address the issue of what that status would be or how Kosovo would get to it. With growing unease among Kosovo Albanians regarding their political future and an interim government all of whose decisions were ultimately subject to UNMIK approval, and with no clear end in sight to this system, frustration boiled over on 17 March 2004. Rioters attacked UNMIK property and the Serbian minority living scattered in quasi-enclaves. This was a major blow to the Standards before Status policy but A POWER PRIMER: A HANDBOOK TO POLITICS, PEOPLE AND PARTIES IN KOSOVO—53 it set in train a series of events, which were eventually to lead to independence. Kai Eide, a Norwegian diplomat, was appointed by the UN Secretary General to undertake a comprehensive review of the situation. On 7 October 2005 his report was released, which concluded that despite the uneven implementation of standards, Kosovo needed to enter the next phase of the political process to clarify its political status.161 In the interim a new movement emerged, which openly opposed the UN’s administration and any postponing of a process which would lead to independence. It called itself Vetëvendosje! which means “self-determination.” It was founded on 10 June 2005, six years after the adoption of the United Nations Security Council resolution 1244, which enshrined Kosovo’s interim status, and which was so fiercely opposed by Vetëvendosje!. In its manifesto, the movement stated that “the UNMIK administration of Kosovo is a non-democratic regime...Its presence is the antithesis of our self-determination.” It added that “the Provisional Self-Governing Institutions are, at best, an integral part of legitimizing this manner of governance.”162 Vetëvendosje! group had been active, even before its formal creation, often drawing on popular sympathy and attracting media attention through graffiti slogans such as UNMIK Jashtë (UNMIK Out) and Jo Negociata, Vetëvendosje! (No Negotiation, Self-Determination!).163 Vetëvendosje’s roots run deep. Albin Kurti, its leader, joined the Parliamentary Party of Kosovo (PPK) in 1996. A year later he left it and joined the University of Prishtina Independent Student Union (UPSUP). In this position Kurti was one of the main organisers of the student protests in autumn 1997 and spring 1998. The first mass protest was held on 1 October 1997. By then, a year had already elapsed since Rugova had signed a deal with Milošević which should have allowed Kosovo Albanian students to continue their studies in the official university premises, which had closed their doors to Albanians in 1991. But, the agreement had not been implemented. As Kurti notes: “This was unacceptable for us because the situation remained the same.”164 Kurti also become the editor at the student monthly Bota e Re (New World) which gave extensive coverage to the UÇK from the end of 1997. At time he was widely seen as young, long-haired revolutionary. However, as late as June 1998, when the UÇK had seized a large 161 United Nations Security Council (UNSC), letter dated 7 October 2005 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the UN Security Council. 162 Vet�vendosje!-s Manifesto, 2010. 163 Ashok Swain., eds. Ashok Swain, Ramses Amer and Joakim Öjendal: Globalization and challenges to building peace. London/ New York. Anthem Press, 2008. p.163. 164 IKS Interview with Albin Kurti, Prishtina. 26 March 2011. territory in central Kosovo, Kurti remained a staunch supporter of non-violent protests. He even tried to organise a workshop which gave priority to active nonviolence over armed struggle.165 By this time however the excitement that surrounded the appearance of the UÇK had long overshadowed the dynamism that accompanied the student protests. The massacres in Drenica in February and March 1998, as well as the fierce Serbian military offensive which would now drive the UÇK back, were key to increasing popular support for it. Rugova’s policy of passive non-violence was losing ground by the day. In these circumstances Kurti now came out in support of the UÇK and became an assistant to Adem Demaçi, who at the same time had become the political representative of the UÇK in Prishtina. He stayed when the NATO bombing campaign began on 24 March 1999 and was arrested on 28 April. On 13 March 2000 he was sentenced to 15 years in prison by a Serbian court on charges of “jeopardising Yugoslavia’s territorial integrity and conspiring to commit an enemy activity linked to terrorism.” More than a year after the fall of Milošević in October 2000, Kurti was released from prison in Niš. On his return Kurti joined the Kosovo Action Network (KAN), which founded in December 1997 and had funding from abroad. It gathered students from Prishtina and addressed the issues of human rights and education.166 Kurti took the organisation over and slowly transformed it into Vetëvendosje!, a strong extra-parliamentary movement. The idea was to promote active resistance, instead simply making statements. As Kosovo entered into negotiations with Belgrade over its final status, Vetëvendosje! expanded its range of unconventional methods. Its best known slogan, “Jo negociata – Vetëvendosje” (No Negotiations – Self-Determination) was sprayed on walls and red traffic lights from one end of Kosovo to the other. However the graffiti sprayers soon moved on to more muscular actions. On different occasions Vetëvendosje! activists overturned UNMIK police cars, (and EULEX cars later on) and pelted government buildings with paint and key politicians with eggs and rotten tomatoes. A key date in the history of the movement is 10 February 2007. A demonstration against the ongoing negotiations between the Kosovo and Serbian 165 Howard Clark, Civil Resistance in Kosovo, London. Pluto Press, 2000. pp.156-157. The author was to be a co-trainer in the workshop which was to be held in Tetovo, Macedonia in August, but was cancelled in July. 166 The Kosovo Action Network ( (KAN) was founded “with the purpose of supporting the Independent Students Union of the University of Pristina in their bid to regain access to their university buildings through active non-violent protests.” WWW.IKSWEB.ORG 54—A POWER PRIMER: A HANDBOOK TO POLITICS, PEOPLE AND PARTIES IN KOSOVO delegations in Vienna turned violent as protesters clashed with UNMIK police who used tear gas and rubber bullets. However two of the bullets, allegedly past their expiry date, killed two protesters close to Prishtina theatre. Kurti was arrested on charges of “organising a crowd committing a criminal offence; leading and participating in a group obstructing official persons in performing their official duties; and calling for resistance with force or serious threat.”167 The indictment against Kurti was issued on 31 May 2007 and the first court session was held on 19 September. Kurti was arrested on the day of the protest and was kept in jail until July 2007 after which he was put under house arrest; a restriction which was lifted on 19 December 2007. During this period Kurti was prohibited from leaving his apartment or contacting Vetevendosje! or the media. Kurti then refused to obey court summonses saying that the whole process was politically motivated. The process was suspended however on 7 February 2008 as six defending lawyers had refused to represent Kurti in court. With the declaration of independence in February 2008, the case was transferred from UNMIK to the newly-established European Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo, EULEX. After two years in suspension, the case was then revived on 15 February 2010. Kurti was to show up in front of the jury on the same indictment. It was only after Kurti’s refusal to come to court and failure of appointed defending lawyers to show up that the Kosovo police arrested him on 12 June 2010. Two days later, the EULEX-appointed judge Ferdinando Boatier de Mangeot, handed down a decision sentencing Kurti to nine months in prison. He was immediately released however due to the fact that he had already spent a combined 11 months in prison and house arrest in 2007. Between 2007 and 2010 Vetëvendosje! continued to oppose almost all political processes initiated by international community. They considered that EULEX was simply a replacement of UNMIK and criticised Albanian leaders for being servants of the international presence. Demonstrations and street actions continued and sometimes resulted in minor damage to official buildings. In 2007 Vetëvendosje! eschewed the idea of turning into a political party and taking part in the general elections. According to Kurti the main reason for this was that the whole process was legally based on the UNMIK sponsored Constitutional Framework.168 However, Glauk Konjufca, another leading member of Vetëvendosje! claims that this was not the only reason. He 167 Vetevendosje! The Restart of the trial against Albin Kurti 2010. Press Release, 2010. 18 November 2011. 168 IKS Interview with Albin Kurti, Prishtina. 26 March 2011 says that in 2007, the movement was just not ready for elections considering its limited membership.169 This had changed by 2010 though. Now an official party it secured 12.7 percent of the vote which gave it 12 seats in parliament. Vetëvendosje’s most striking feature is the evolution of its thinking with regard to Kosovo’s political future. Whereas previously it overwhelmingly opposed the ownership of internationals over Kosovo’s political processes and their presence, it continued to do so but now placed its emphasis on the idea of unification with Albania. They consider this to be the only way for Kosovo to survive, economically and politically. The idea of union with Albania however, remains vague and in effect, only a slogan, considering the refusal of institutions in either country to even talk about this issue. Konjufca however, thinks that union can be achieved once Kosovo’s sovereignty is fully established. “Unification does not have to be done by exchanging territories or with a compromise with a third state, but only with the willingness of citizens.”170 Vetëvendosje! is also often seen as trying to appropriate the UÇK legacy, traditionally the domain of the PDK and the AAK, which had emerged from its ranks. In October 2011 during a commemoration to mark the 14th anniversary of the death of Adrian Krasniqi, the first UÇK man to die in uniform, Rexhep Selimi, a former senior UÇK commander and AAK member, who had joined Vetëvendosje! claimed that there was a natural fit between his new party, the UÇK heritage and the aim of union with Albania.171 In terms of economic policy Vetëvendosje! differs from all other mainstream parties. It has clear left wing tendencies and opposes the privatisation of public enterprises. It argues that Kosovo’s strategic assets have great potential and are the basis for the country’s future economic development. In this context they cite KEK (Kosovo’s Energy Cooperation), Trepça (mines), and PTK (Post and Telecommunications os Kosovo). They opposed the granting of a concession for Prishtina airport and say: “To sell public property means harming the public.” Vetëvendosje! has declared that it will never go into coalition with political parties that have already been in government. However, it has been very receptive to former members of these parties, such as Rexhep Selimi (AAK), Ismajl Kurteshi and Gani Krasniqi (PDK). 169 IKS Interview with Glauk Konjufca, Prishtina. 15 February 2011 170 Ibid. 171 In his speech Rexhep Selimi said: “Adrian is a hero of the Albanian nation which is greater than Kosovo, greater than Albania, and greater than the two together.” A POWER PRIMER: A HANDBOOK TO POLITICS, PEOPLE AND PARTIES IN KOSOVO—55 Over the last decade or so Kosovo’s political landscape has changed fundamentally. During the first local elections in 2000, 89.5 percent of valid votes were cast for only three parties, the LDK, who polled 55.9 percent, the PDK, who took 26.3 percent and the AAK with 7.4 percent. No other parties managed to gain more than one percent of the vote. In the local elections of 2009 however, the three main parties received only 71.3 percent of the vote, the LDK taking 24.5 percent, the PDK 31.8 percent and the AAK 15.1 percent. This time however five smaller parties managed to win, not just more than one percent of the votes each but collectively, a significant share of the entire vote: Nexhat Daci’s breakaway LDD took 7.2 percent of the vote, Behgjet Pacolli’s AKR, 8.5 percent, the Reformist Party ORA, 1.5 percent and the Turkish party, KTDP, 1.2 percent. In the parliamentary elections of 2010 the combined share of the vote for the three main parties remained stable at 70.5 percent, with the LDK at 25.7 percent, the PDKat 33.4 percent and the AAK at 11.5 percent. The story was significantly different only for the smaller parties. The LDD’s share dropped to 2.1 percent. ORA which had merged with the LDK had already disappeared. The AKR, although in a pre-electoral pact with minor parties, dropped to 7.3 percent. The Turkish minority KTDP however remained at 1.2 percent. At the same time two new parties entered the political landscape: Vetevendosje! who won 12.7 percent, while the FER received a disappointing 2.2 percent. Finally the SLS, the Serbian party which participates in Kosovo’s institutions, jumped from 0.7 percent in the 2009 local elections to 2.1 percent. The political landscape was thus rendered more colourful, more ethnically mixed and also more decentralised. In more than ten years of post-war democracy there has been a distinct regional variation in voting patterns. This trend affects the larger Albanian parties in particular. In addition to this, there is an observable rural-urban split between the voting references in municipalities with larger towns and those with more rural populations. There is also a specific geographical pattern observable in the voting behaviour of minorities. As the main groups, i.e., Serbs, Turks, Bosniaks and Gorani all live in distinct areas, and are not evenly distributed across the country, this reinforces this regional voting pattern. Regionalisation A clear physical and geographical division of Kosovo creates three regions which leave their imprint on the voting behaviour of Kosovars. Western Kosovo Western Kosovo consists of the Dukagjin plain, which stretches along the Drin River, from the mountainous border with Montenegro, near Peja, to the south-west of Prizren and the Albanian border. These fertile plains are bordered in the south by the Sharr Mountains that divide Kosovo from Macedonia. The eastern border of this region is marked by the Caraleva mountain range along the borders of the municipalities of Suhareka, Rahovec and Klina. According to the preliminary results of the 2011 census, the rather small territory of western Kosovo is densely populated with 501 settlements. It has 644,000 inhabitants living in some 106,000 households with about 6.3 persons per household. Some 28 percent of all houses in the region are empty, which is partially a consequence of the flight of Serbs and Montenegrins after 1999. During the 2010 elections 258,955 inhabitants cast a valid vote.172 172 Data of population based on the preliminary results of the Kosovo census conducted in spring 2011. See: Statistical Institute of Kosovo (SOK). Election data relies on the published results of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Kosovo, which organised and conducted the elections in 2000, 2001, 2002, 2004 and the Central Election Committee (CEC), which was WWW.IKSWEB.ORG 56—A POWER PRIMER: A HANDBOOK TO POLITICS, PEOPLE AND PARTIES IN KOSOVO Leposaviq Mitrovica Podujeva Peja Prishtina Gjakova Western Kosovo has always had a more developed urban and political life than the rest of the country. A strong tradition of craftsmen and trade in urban centres laid the foundations for the national awakening of Albanians in the late nineteenth century, beginning with the League of Prizren in 1878. Even rural mountainous areas profited then from trade routes crossing Kosovo to and from Albania, Macedonia and Montenegro. Armed resistance against the Ottomans, later the Serbs and then the Zog regime in Albania found many of its staunchest supporters in Gjakova. In the post Second World War decades Kosovo’s Communist Party was also led by politicians from here. responsible for the organisation of the elections in 2007, 2009 and 2010. The region consists of 11 municipalities. Three of them, Peja, Gjakova and Prizren, are highly urbanised with centuries-old traditions of trade and commerce. Prizren is the second largest town in Kosovo and the historical capital of the former Ottoman, Kosovo vilayet. All three towns were heavily industrialised during the communist era. The municipalities of Deçan and Suhareka were partially industrialised, with textiles in Deçan and rubber processing in Suhareka. The municipality of Rahovec had a highly developed wine industry. Together with the fertile plains of Gjakova, Suhareka and Prizren this made up the second largest wine producing area in Yugoslavia. Kosovo’s wine was exported under the then well-known brand Amselfelder, especially A POWER PRIMER: A HANDBOOK TO POLITICS, PEOPLE AND PARTIES IN KOSOVO—57 to Germany.173 Klina and Istog were also relatively well developed agriculturally specialising in fruit and fish production. Only mountainous Dragash in the very south had virtually no industry and an underdeveloped agricultural sector. Historically there was always a strong minority presence here, especially of Turks and Serbs in Prizren, Serbs and Montenegrins in Peja and the surrounding villages and Gorani and Bosniaks in Dragash. There are also Serbs in Rahovec, Deçan Monastery (Visoki Dećani) is one of the important Serbian monasteries, and Peja is the historic seat of the patriarchate of the Serbian Orthodox Church. Recent decentralisation has created the only Turkish majority municipality of Mamusha which was previously part of Prizren and a new Albanian municipality, Junik that was sliced out of Deçan. Roma, Ashkali and Egyptians live in all municipalities particularly in towns and in their outskirts. Klina is the centre for Albanian Catholics while Prizren and Gjakova also have a small Catholic minority. While today, economically, eastern Kosovo is the most important part of the country, under communist rule much of its industrial production and socially owned enterprises (SOEs) were situated in Dukagjin, especially in Prizren, Peja and Gjakova. The dismissal of the Kosovo Albanian industrial workforce by the Milošević regime in 1990 thus proved extremely damaging for the most developed urban centres. Beside the mining and metallurgical centre of Mitrovica and the capital Prishtina, these included Peja and Gjakova. This, and proximity to the Albanian border, helps explain why the UÇK became particularly strong here. During the war of 1998-99 Peja, Gjakova and Deçan were the core of the UÇK’s Dukagjin operational zone. The area was therefore also the one, which was most affected by fighting between the UÇK and the Serbs and was particularly hard hit by reprisal attacks by Serbian forces. Ramush Haradinaj, the commander of the region, subsequently became the founder of the AAK and all three municipalities are now AAK led. The Highlands The Highlands consist of 11 municipalities. Due to the census boycott by Serbs, population data is very unreliable. The region has 427 settlements. It is inhabited by some 370,000 people but only 139,244 cast valid votes during the 2010 elections. The Highlands are divided into three regions. The Ibër River marks the geographical border of 173 See Iniciativa Kosovare p�r Stabilitet (IKS), Rahovec-Brussels Express, 2009. northern Kosovo. In the north-west the course of the Ibër has been channelled into the huge Gazivoda artificial lake which is situated in the municipality of Zubin Potok. The Ibër then runs south-east and divides the town of Mitrovica between north and south. It then continues north again through a narrow canyon along the Kopaonik mountain range, which borders Serbia. The valley ends at the border with the Sandźak region of Serbia. The municipalities of Zubin Potok, Zveqan, Leposaviq and Mitrovica north, (the last of which remains on paper only) are overwhelmingly populated by Serbs. Thus data for this area is extremely unreliable, as virtually all the Serbs ignore Kosovo’s elections, did not participate in Kosovo’s census and the local “parallel” institutions are part of Serbia’s municipal structures and hence have no contact with Kosovo’s authorities. The European Stability Initiative (ESI) think tank estimated in 2004 that the total population of north Mitrovica and the other northern municipalities to be some 57,000 inhabitants.174 Since the collapse of Yugoslavia the area has been in a state of deep economic depression. The Trepça complex, including coal mining in Leposaviq, as well as the lead smelter in Zveqan has long been more or less dead. People live off jobs created in the public sector by Serbia. These include employment in the hospital in Mitrovica and a cross the health sector, at the university, in the parallel municipalities and in state institutions.175 Work could also be found, at least until conflict over border crossings erupted in July 2010, by trading in the grey zone outside the control of Kosovo’s government and only loosely controlled by Belgrade. The central part of the Highlands is a fairly elevated plain that runs along the Caraleva mountain range from Mitrovica south to Shtime municipality. Mitrovica is the only large urban centre in the region. Its industries were once preeminent in Kosovo. Now they are mostly just memories and industrial archaeology. The town is divided into an Albanianpopulated south and a Serbian north. The very centre of Kosovo is traditionally called Drenica after the valley which is embedded into the high plateau of the Caraleva Mountains. It stretches from south Mitrovica to Shtime. This area physically divides Kosovo. The only connections between Dukagjin and eastern Kosovo are the highway from 174 See: European Stability Initiative ( (ESI), A post-industrial future? Economy and society in Mitrovica and Zvecan. 30 January 2004 175 See: Iniciativa Kosovare p�r Stabilitet (IKS), Mitrovica: One City two Realities, 2009. WWW.IKSWEB.ORG 58—A POWER PRIMER: A HANDBOOK TO POLITICS, PEOPLE AND PARTIES IN KOSOVO Fushë Kosova to Peja and the one running from Shtime to Suhareka. The economy consists of heavy industry which was set up during the socialist period and even before. There are lead and zinc mines in Mitrovica, which have partially recovered since the war, however the processing plants are now dysfunctional. There are quarries in Gllogovc (also: Drenas176) and also the Feronikel processing plant. This area is populated exclusively by Albanians. Malisheva is a completely rural municipality. Indeed, the whole area is predominantly rural, consisting of large villages marked by high rates of emigration. The centre of Drenica consists of three municipalities, Skenderaj, Drenas and Malisheva. It has always been poor. Economically and politically it was deliberately marginalised by the communist regime. Resistance against Serbian occupation was a tradition deeply rooted here, stretching back to the years of the reimposition of Serbian, or Yugoslav, rule in 1918. The Serbs had also controlled the area between 1912 and 1915. In the anti-Serbian Kaçak guerrilla movement, personalities from Drenica played a leading role. During the Second World War the nationalist Balli Kombëtar had its strongest support here. Shaban Polluzha, remembered for fighting the partisans in 1944, was also from here. During the Kosovo war Drenica was the heartland of the UÇK. Many of its members, including Adem Jashari were from here as is Hashim Thaçi, the prime minister, the former political head of the UÇK and head of the PDK. As a result, in Drenas and Skenderaj, the PDK has more than 90 percent support in elections. South of Drenica, the Highlands expand into the Sharri Mountains with the municipalities of Shtërpce, which has a Serbian majority and Kaçanik and Han i Elezit on the border with Macedonia, which are exclusively Albanian. Shtërpce boasts a developed skiing and tourist centre. Before the war it had substantial numbers of SOEs which, spread through 11 enterprises, employed 860 people, and not just in field of tourism. The Serbs in Shtërpce have recently become far less hostile to Kosovo’s institutions and many of them participated in the last elections. The economy in the other two municipalities depends on heavy industry. Kaçanik 176 K������� �������������� ��� ����� ��fi������ ����� �� �h� ��fi������ Serbian and Albanian names, which they had in Yugoslav times. Nevertheless there have been attempts by different political groups to rename towns and municipalities, often to get rid of too obviously Serbian names. Suva Reka (Serbian) /Suhareka (Albanian) or Obilic (Serbian) /Obiliq (Albanian) for example. Most attempts have proven futile, because the Kosovo Albanian population just did not accept them. Some have nevertheless been accepted, such as Skenderaj as the Albanian name for Srbice (Srbica in Serbian) or Theranda for Suhareke. It needs to be seen, if the Kosovo parliament ���� �� ������ ��fi������ �������� ���� �h�����. has a chalk mine and factory and Han i Elezit is the home of the Sharri cement factory. Eastern Kosovo Eastern Kosovo consists of 15 municipalities. It is home to 776,881 citizens living in 196,101 houses, which are inhabited by 140,091 households. Some 340,070 citizens voted in the last elections. The municipalities include Vushtrri, Podujeva, Fushë Kosova, Lipjan, Viti, and the four recently decentralised Serbian municipalities of Graqanica, Kllokot, Partesh and Ranilug. The new Serbian municipalities are rural but agriculturally well developed. The municipality of Obiliq sits a top one of the largest lignite coal reserves in Europe.177 Obiliq’s power stations produce most of Kosovo’s energy. Ferizaj and Gjilan are former industrial towns which have now fallen on extremely hard times. Prishtina is the largest town in Kosovo and its economic powerhouse with government, financial services, health and educational institutions all concentrated here. Novobërd is the only mountainous municipality in the region and has zinc and lead mines. East of the Highlands, Kosovo’s most fertile plains stretch from Vushtrri in the north to Ferizaj in the south. Two separate valleys extend eastwards from these plains. The municipality of Podujeva is situated north-east of Prishtina and borders central Serbia. The Anamorava plains stretch from Ferizaj, along the Karadag mountains, on the border with Macedonia, towards Gjilan and into the Kamenica valley, along the borders of south Serbia. The municipality of Novobërd situated in the Gollak mountains in the west above Prishtina. If we look at the results of elections between 2000 and 2010, we find that these geographical differences have translated into socially and regionally differing voting patterns. These have only become more marked over the decade and have clear repercussions for national politics. Strongholds In 2000, in the first local elections, the three main parties, the LDK, the PDK and the AAK together won 89.5 percent of the vote in Dukagjin, 96.1 percent in the Highlands and 87.5 percent in eastern Kosovo. It was already clear that, while the 177 See: M. Rizaj, E. Beqiri, I. McBow, E.Z. O’Brien, and F. Kongoli, The Mineral Base and Productive Capacities of Metals and Non-Metals of Kosovo, Journal of the Minerals, Metals and Materials Society, vol. 60, no. 8. See: http:// www.springerlink.com/content/v3662817182g3134/fulltext.pdf. A POWER PRIMER: A HANDBOOK TO POLITICS, PEOPLE AND PARTIES IN KOSOVO—59 Western Kosovo Election year Total votes cast LDK PDK AAK other parties 2000L 265,527 161,535 45,214 30,878 27,900 2010P 245,682 59,804 57,697 52,575 75,606 Highlands 2000L 125,096 49,694 67,680 2,840 4,882 2010P 129,692 16,257 86,156 5,280 21,999 Eastern Kosovo 2000L 296,709 187,643 74,925 19,356 14,785 2010P 322,343 96,430 80,371 19,248 126,294 2000 Top 3 total LDK-PDK-AAK inwestern Kosovo LDK-PDK-AAK inthe Highlands LDK-PDK-AAK ineastern Kosovo Other parties over 1% Total parties below 1% 89.50% 89.50% 96.10% 87.50% 0% 10.50% 2010 70.50% 69.23% 83.04% 60.82% 27.60% 1.90% AAK was an important player in western Kosovo, the PDK prevailed in the Highlands and the LDK in eastern Kosovo. While it might have been natural to expect that this regional bias would dissipate over time exactly the contrary has proved to be true. The tendency of each of the main parties to dominate in one region to the exclusion of the other two has increased. The three big parties remain, overall, just that, i.e., big. Thus together they secured 83 percent of all valid votes in the Highlands in the 2010 general election. However in Dukagjin the figure was 69.2 percent and in eastern Kosovo it was 66.1 percent. However each of the regions has its own large player. For example within Dukagjin the AAK has expanded its power base considerably but failed completely to extend its voter appeal throughout the rest of the country. With every election the PDK has strengthened its support within the Highlands and managed to widen it by spreading out from its heartland, both eastwards and westwards. However, the PDK has not managed to secure areas lost by the LDK. While the LDK, of course, lost its prewar grip over the whole of Kosovo, it has staged a significant recovery in eastern Kosovo. New parties, not the PDK and the AAK, have benefitted most from that decline. The major cause of these changes can be found in the decline and dissolution of the LDK. In 2000 it was still the overarching, Kosovo-wide party. So, in the 2000 local elections, it came top in 21 out of the then 27 municipalities. It won 60.8 percent of valid votes in Dukagjin, in eastern Kosovo it took 58.2 percent and even in the Highlands it won 39.7 percent of valid votes. By 2010 that dominance had gone. The LDK came top of the poll in only four out of 37 municipalities, leading in Prishtina and in Fushë Kosova, Obiliq and Podujeva which are all adjacent to the capital. Between 2000 and 2010 the numbers voting for the LDK dropped from 398,872 to 172,491, a decrease of 56.8 percent. In 2010 only 24.3 percent of the voters in Dukagjin cast their votes for the LDK, in the Highlands this figure was 12.5 percent, or half as much. Only in eastern Kosovo did the LDK manage to stay stronger than the PDK with 32.5 percent. This development changed the LDK from a Kosovo-wide party to a regional one. While in 2000 eastern Kosovo accounted for 47 percent of its support, by 2010 this had increased to 55.9 percent. However there is a trend within a trend here. The 2009 municipal elections show that the LDK has preserved a stronger municipal basis. The party came in first in seven municipalities, Prishtina, Podujeva, Obiliq, Fushë Kosova, Suhareka, Istog and Zubin Potok, (due to the Serbian boycott,) and it participates in 12 municipal councils. The LDK also has seven directly elected mayors. The decline of the LDK can be seen in the fact that between the 2000 local elections and the 2004 WWW.IKSWEB.ORG 60—A POWER PRIMER: A HANDBOOK TO POLITICS, PEOPLE AND PARTIES IN KOSOVO parlia Stronghold municipalities of political parties in parliamentary elections 2001 (parties that won more than 40 percent) Leposaviq Zubin Potok Mitrovica Zvecan Podujeva Vushtrri Istog Peja Klina Gllogovc Malisheva Obiliq Prishtina Novobrda Fushe Kosova Kamenica Lipjan Shtimje Gjakova Rahovec Suhareka Strpce Kaçanik Viti Dragash parliamentary elections it lost more than a fifth of its voters. Then, in 2006, it was hit by the death of Rugova and, in 2007, by internal party squabbling which led to the exit of former party presidency member Nexhat Daci who took members with him to form his LDD. The LDD did not manage however, to supplant the LDK. It did take votes however mostly from former LDK supporters in border regions and in the Highlands. It defeated the LDK in the 2007 local elections in eastern Kosovo in Kamenicë, Viti and Ferizaj and it chopped the LDK’s support in Gjilan by a half. This is the so-called Anamorava area, with significant numbers of migrants and people with roots in Macedonia and south Serbia. Daci is one of them. He comes from Ternoc, in the Albanian popullated part of Preshevo municipality just across the border from Kamenica in south Serbia. In the Highlands the party managed to win as many votes as the LDK in Drenas and Skenderaj, but it failed, despite its more nationalistic program, to take voters from the PDK. In western Kosovo the party also won almost the same number of votes as the LDK in Deçan and Peja (Shtime also). In Klina, Kaçanik, Gjakova and Lipjan, the party took roughly one third of the LDK’s supporters. Nevertheless, as early as the 2009 municipal elections, the support base of the LDD had begun to shrink. This time around the party came first in only one municipality, Viti. The results suggest that a large part of their voters had now opted for Vetëvendosje! whose own nationalistic program may have been more convincing for urban voters. It is widely believed that the PDK gained power in 2010 only because it was able to win overwhelming support in the Highlands and thus beat the other parties. Clearly, ever since 2000, the Highlands have been the heartland of PDK support A POWER PRIMER: A HANDBOOK TO POLITICS, PEOPLE AND PARTIES IN KOSOVO—61 but, with the exception of a small decline in the 2004 parliamentary elections, the PDK managed to expand its support elsewhere in Kosovo, from 187,821 votes in 2000 to 224,339 voters in 2010. Thus the PDK increased its overall support from 27.1 percent nationally in 2000 to 32.6 percent in 2010. Half of that increase came from the Highlands. The Highlands however also saw an increase in voter numbers. In western Kosovo, the figure of valid votes dropped between 2000 and 2010 by 7.4 percent, from 265,527 to 245,682. In the Highlands the number of valid votes increased from 125,096 in 2000 to 129,692 in 2010, i.e., by 3.7 percent. In eastern Kosovo the numbers increased by 8.6 percent mainly as a result of the mobilisation of voters in Prishtina, where the votes rocketed from the 2009 local elections to general elections in 2010 by 34 percent. This mobilisation can mainly be attributed to the effect of Vetevendosje!. Thus, the success of PDK has a couple of central elements. One is that its opponents have weakened and the other is that it has gradually expanded to consolidate control throughout the Highlands. During the local elections of 2000 the PDK received 54.1 percent of the vote in the Highlands, but it came top of the poll only in Skenderaj, Drenas, Shtime and Kaçanik. At that point the LDK still took 39.7 percent of votes in the Highlands. In 2004 the PDK came in first in Malisheva and Shtërpce as well. Taking advantage of reductions in the LDK, the PDK managed to expand its dominance in the 2007 local elections, increasing its control from six to 14 out of the then 30 municipalities. Nevertheless it did this, not by becoming stronger in its own right, but rather because the LDK lost ground. From that point the party had the best showing in the three big towns of Mitrovica and Prizren, where the LDK had lost votes and in Gjilan where it even managed to become the strongest party without actually gaining any new votes. In the parliamentary elections of 2010 that dominance extended to 18 of now 36 municipalities. The success of the PDK shows significant regional differences. In the Highlands the PDK grew from 54.1 percent in 2000 to 66.4 percent in 2010, or by almost 20,000 votes. In Dukagjin the party gained only 17 percent in 2000. In 2010 it got 23.5 percent. This growth was concentrated largely in the municipalities of Gjakova, Prizren and Dragash and only partially in Klina and Malisheva. In eastern Kosovo though the PDK gained 24.9 percent in 2000 and by 2010 this support had nudged up to only 25.3 percent. The AAK has always been, and remains, essentially a regional party. While the PDK managed to considerably expand its influence from the Highlands into the neighbouring regions, the AAK by contrast increased its vote within its own heartland of Dukagjin, where it is based. Ever since 2000 the party has been strong in the area stretching from Peja to Gjakova. However the AAK did not lead in any of these municipalities until the beginning of the decline of LDK. Since then the AAK has been strongest party in Peja, Gjakova and Deçan and, after decentralisation, in the newly formed Junik. In 2000, the party gained 53,074 votes and in 2007 it was still only 54,611 votes in the general election. In 2009 however, with the return of its leader, Ramush Haradinaj, from The Hague support surged to 95,066 votes. This then fell back to 77,130 in 2010, after Haradinaj had been compelled to return to The Hague. Between 2000 and 2010 the AAK doubled its share of the vote in Dukagjin from 11.6 percent to 21.4 percent. In the Highlands again it almost doubled its share of the vote, rising from a modest 2.3 percent to 4.1 percent. In eastern Kosovo, where the party won 6.0 percent in 2000 it was still on only 6.5 percent in 2010. In its best ever result in 2009 the AAK was able to gain the trust of 23.3 percent of voters in Dukagjin, 8.0 percent in the Highlands and 11.3 percent in eastern Kosovo. Rural-Urban split In 2001, 2004 and 2007 Kosovo’s governments were all coalitions which were made as a result of a deal between two of the three big parties. This changed in 2010 however when the PDK formed a coalition with the smaller Albanian and minority parties. Before the poll the PDK had struck a pre-election pact with Edita Tahiri’s ADK and Bajram Kosumi’s PPK. Afterwards it built a coalition with the support of the Turkish minority party, the KTDP, the Serbian SLS and with the AKR. The AKR had in turn entered the election together with the PD, the PSD, the PGJK, the PNDSH, the PPK, the PPI, and the economic expert group E15. The AAK had a preelection alliance with the Lista Ibrahim Rugova led by Ukë Rugova. Afterwards Rugova broke that agreement to enter into government with the PDK. Through creating this multi-party alliance the PDK managed turn the disadvantage of a disaggregated party landscape into its own advantage. At the same time it managed to tackle an inherent weakness in the PDK itself – its inability to mobilise urban voters. Most of the small parties, which joined into coalition with PDK, took their votes from urban areas. WWW.IKSWEB.ORG 62—A POWER PRIMER: A HANDBOOK TO POLITICS, PEOPLE AND PARTIES IN KOSOVO Stronghold municipalities of political parties in parliamentary elections 2010 (parties that won more than 40 percent) Leposaviq Zubin Potok Mitrovica Zvecan Podujeva Vushtrri Istog Peja Klina Junik Obiliq Gllogovc Prishtina Novobrda Fushe Kosova Gracanica Kamenica Ranillug Malisheva Lipjan Shtimje Gjakova Rahovec Mamushe Partesh Suhareka Strpce Kaçanik Hani i Elezit Viti Kllokot Dragash There is a clear and observable split between rural and urban voting behaviour in Kosovo. Its municipalities can also be divided into rural and urban ones. This is due to the fact, that they have largely remained the same as the ones that were created under Yugoslav socialist rule. They were created to fit the then socialist development concept, which combined decentralisation and self-governance with a related funds allocation policy which dated back to the 1950s. Thus towns which already existed in Kosovo at the end of the Second World War were the primary targets of socialist development. Towns with significant numbers of Serbs or Montenegrins, like Mitrovica, Peja and Prishtina, which at that time included Fushë Kosova and Obiliq, were clearly favoured. Together with Prizren, Gjakova, Gjilan and Ferizaj they were the main urban centres, and from the 1950s onwards, were developed with top- down industrial allocations and social housing. Most of the industries dating from that period are now obsolete. Every larger town has an industrial story to tell, almost all of which end in tears, or at least the closure of the industrial plant concerned. At the end of the Second World War Kosovo, like the rest of Yugoslavia was overwhelmingly rural, desperately poor, had little infrastructure and hardly any money for development. The socialist model for tackling the latter foresaw the creation of new municipalities around smaller central settlements, often with mixed ethnic populations, which would be planned and built completely from the scratch, in order to develop them into urban centres. Kosovo however was different and, until the late 1960s, was deprived of larger funds, especially decentralised ones that would target rural areas. Therefore the smaller municipalities did not, in the main, develop A POWER PRIMER: A HANDBOOK TO POLITICS, PEOPLE AND PARTIES IN KOSOVO—63 until the 1970s. With the increased autonomy of the 1970s, and the expansion of development funding for the province from the Yugoslav level, larger industrial allocations also now began to reach smaller rural municipalities, where they were mostly channelled into agriculture and agro-industries. This process ground to a halt in the mid1980s. Today, in these municipalities, we find smaller, semi-developed towns with a mayor, a municipal assembly, state and cultural institutions, primary and secondary schools, primary health centres and asphalted roads. Earlier, for the socialist political elite and for workers of the allocated industries, housing would be provided. All this is surrounded however by overpopulated and mainly underdeveloped villages. All these municipalities therefore still retain their semi-rural characteristics. Today, the decentralisation policy foreseen by the Ahtisaari plan which ushered in independence in 2008 has created seven more small, and mainly rural, municipalities. The logic of this is completely different from what went before however. At least five of them were created to empower and reassure minorities, and to enable their municipalities, at least in the Serbian case, to be able to have special links with Serbia, as foreseen by the plan. Ranilug, Klokot and Parteš are in eastern Kosovo and are overwhelmingly rural. Graqanica is also largely rural but centred on a larger semi-urban settlement carved out of the Prishtina municipality for the Serbs. Likewise Mamusha is a rural municipality sliced out of Prizren for Turks. Junik however was separated from Deçan in western Kosovo. It is Albanian populated and rural. Han i Elezit is largely mountainous, but centred on the small town of the same name built around the Sharri cement factory, right on the border of Macedonia. If in future the planned municipality of Mitrovica north ever moves from the drawing board to reality it will be the first “city-municipality,” again designed on ethnic criteria, for Serbs. Meanwhile Prishtina and the larger towns, Prizren, Peja, Gjakova, Ferizaj, Gjilan and Mitrovica are striving to find a new economic raison d’etre after almost complete de-industrialisation. Research conducted by the Lessons Learned and Analysis Unit of the EU Pillar at UNMIK in 2003-04 found that once overwhelmingly industrial Mitrovica had, by that time, less manufacturing industry left than the rural municipality of Viti, which had developed a clandestine private sector on the basis of remittances from the diaspora.178 176 European Stability Initiative (ESI) Lessons Learned and Analysis Unit at UNMIK EU Pillar IV, internal documentation. Research by IKS in 2005-06 found that Prishtina had literally no functioning processing industry except for the assembly of doors and windows, printing houses and one ketchup plant.179 Development in urban areas after the war in 1999 was therefore mainly achieved through large housing projects and construction in general. This attempted to cater for existing pent up demand, a post-war influx of people from the countryside and returnees from abroad, as well as additional demand created by foreigners working in the various international missions. Construction, especially illegal, coupled with trade, has thus been the dominant feature in the current “planning” for urban areas. How should we analyse voting behaviour in urban and in rural areas? The municipalities with larger towns are mainly inhabited by their urban population with only a small percentage of people living in rural areas. On the other hand the rural municipalities are mostly made up of large village populations with comparatively small numbers in their semi-urban centres. We thus analyse the ruralurban split by comparing the voting behaviour of the rural municipalities with that of the six urban ones. The number of voters in rural municipalities is similar to that of urban ones. In all local and parliamentary elections the population of urban municipalities has cast between 277,000 and 355,000 votes. Likewise the population of rural municipalities has cast between 287,000 and 362,000 votes. The first visible trend is that votes in rural municipalities have increased over the last decade by some 20,000, while the numbers of votes cast in urban ones shows a decline of some 40,000 votes. Still, until 2004 more votes were cast in urban municipalities than in rural ones. In 2009 voters in rural municipalities cast five percent more votes than voters from urban municipalities and in 2010 that figure was some four percent. The behaviour of voters in rural municipalities is distinctly different from voters in urban municipalities for all parties except the LDK and the AAK. These two parties show similar results in both rural and urban areas. The PDK is the only party which consistently has more support in rural municipalities than in urban ones. By contrast, the smaller parties, the LDD, ORA, FER, the AKR and Vetëvendosje! have always done better in urban municipalities than in rural ones. Because the PDK has not managed to significantly expand its support base to urban areas it has thus not profited directly from the drop in 179 Iniciativa Kosovare p�r Stabilitet (IKS) research in Prishtina in 2005. WWW.IKSWEB.ORG 64—A POWER PRIMER: A HANDBOOK TO POLITICS, PEOPLE AND PARTIES IN KOSOVO Electoral behaviour in urban and in rural municipalities 2000 – 2010 by valid votes cast. Urban municipalities 2000 local 2001 parliamentary 2002 local 2004 parliamentary 2007 local 2007 parliamentary 2009 local 2010 parliamentary 354,555 355,376 353,874 348,400 277,592 277,864 298,582 334,839 Rural municipalities 332,777 346,669 345,525 337,479 288,327 287,670 331,732 362,878 Total “urban” vote % “rural” vote % 48,4% 49,4% 49,4% 49,2% 50,9% 50,9% 52,6% 52,0% 687,332 51,6% 702,045 50,6% 699,399 50,6% 685,879 50,8% 565,919 49,1% 565,534 49,1% 630,314 47,4% 697,717 48,0% Electoral behaviour in rural and urban municipalities 2000- 2010, by parties Urban/ Rural municipalities Urban Rural 2001 P 2002 L 2004 P 2007 L 2007 P 2009 L 2010 P Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural LDK 63.4% 52.4% 53.4% 44.6% 48.8% 43.0% 46.7% 44.1% 21.6% 23.9% 21.2% 23.8% 25.8% 23.2% 25.8% 23.7% 10.1% 8.7% 10.9% 8.8% 8.1% 6.4% 2.6% 1.7% LDD PDK 20.1% 35.0% 21.5% 34.8% 23.3% 36.0% 20.9% 37.3% 25.0% 41.4% 25.8% 42.9% 23.2% 39.5% 23.1% 40.5% AAK 8.1% 7.3% 10.6% 6.3% 10.5% 7.1% 8.5% 10.1% 8.3% 10.1% 9.9% 10.0% 9.1% 14.3% 15.8% 11.5% 10.6% 2.3% 6.6% 16.0% 1.7% 1.7% 0.2% 7.9% 8.4% 5.7% 10.3% 4.5% 3.6% 15.8% 0.9% 9.8% 6.8% 16.4% 2.9% 11.6% ORA AKR FER VV 2000 L support for the LDK. On the other hand it has profited from the fact that the number of votes cast in rural areas increased, while the number of urban votes decreased. In 2000, the LDK was still a party which could count on the support of about 11 percent more of urban voters than it could of those in rural areas. In 2002, the difference between urban and rural voters narrowed to five percent and in the 2004 parliamentary poll to 2.6 percent. Since then the difference has remained marginal in all elections. The AAK generally manages to mobilise similar numbers of voters in both types of municipality. Only in the years 2001-02, when the party’s support declined, it lost more votes in the countryside than in the big towns. By contrast the PDK has always had more rural voters than urban ones. In the 2000 local elections the margin of difference was 15 percent but by 2010 this had expanded to 17.4 percent. Although the PDK enlarged its share of the vote from 26.3 percent to 31.8 percent, this process took place mainly in rural areas. This is because of the rural nature of its Drenica heartland. In towns the party has been unable to attract new voters. A good example is Ferizaj. Between 2004 and 2007 the LDK lost almost 20,000 votes but the PDK gained no more than 500 extra ballots in 2007. A POWER PRIMER: A HANDBOOK TO POLITICS, PEOPLE AND PARTIES IN KOSOVO—65 Results of ethnic groups in Kosovo local and parliamentary elections 2000 - 2010 Elections Total minority valid votes Turkish parties: KDTP, KTB Bosniak parties: BSDAK, SDA, VAKAT, NDS, SDP Gorani party: GIG Montenegrin party: CDS Ashkali parties: PDASHK, PDAK, BDA, PAI Egyptian parties: PAI, IRDK, LEK Roma party: PREBK Kosovo Serb parties: KP, GIS, SLKiM, SNS, ND, SLS, JSL, SDSKiM, SKMS, SNSDKiM 2000L 2001P 2002L 2004P 2007L 2007P 2009L 2010P 13,973 119,398 37,198 27,061 20,209 24,517 27,910 51,675 0 7,760 8,353 5,184 4,999 7,497 7,721 8,294 8,944 7,737 9,089 9,411 1,789 0 1,505 1,358 989 1,227 454 787 0 0 0 0 0 470 771 1,552 3,502 3,265 2,916 2,718 3,443 2,542 2,871 0 3,976 3,136 2,658 2,135 2,121 2,306 4,086 0 2,717 0 1,049 442 600 596 690 2,911 89,388* 13,238 1,783 1,004 3,038 4,634 21,364 7,879 11,936 9,912 11,194 * 2001 votes for Serbian parties include votes cast in Serbia and Montenegro – a total of 56,318. The AAK has also been incapable of gaining the votes lost by the LDK, which the PDK has been unable to grab. This is because the party is, in effect if not design, an intrinsically regional one. While voters in urban municipalities lost faith in the LDK they did not then transfer their support to the other two big parties. As a result a whole host of other parties have been vying for their support, i.e., ORA, FER, the AKR and Vetëvendosje!. At its peak, during the elections of 2004 and 2007, ORA was a distinctly urban party. In 2004 it garnered 10.1 percent of urban votes but only 2.3 percent of rural ones. In the 2007 local and parliamentary elections those figures stood at 6.6 and 6.8 percent of urban votes while rural support shrivelled to a mere 1.7 percent. The AKR is also a mainly urban party. After its foundation it took some 16.0 percent in the 2007 local elections and 16.4 percent in the parliamentary polls in urban areas. In rural municipalities by contrast the party got just 7.9 percent and 8.4 percent. Since then the party has been on a downwards trajectory, but the proportions of votes have stayed similar. A third of its support is from rural areas with the rest from urban ones. Vetëvendosje! is also a distinctly urban party with 15.6 percent of votes in urban areas in 2010. However the party still managed to garner a respectable 9.8 percent of rural votes. The last of the smaller urban parties is the FER. In the 2010 parliamentary elections it gained 3.6 percent of the urban vote and 0.9 percent of ballots cast in rural municipalities. Since this was not enough to enter parliament, it then committed political suicide and was technically absorbed into VV. Ethnic parties Ethnic or minority parties are the last factor that adds a geographic component to the distribution of votes. Minorities are unevenly distributed across the country. With their guaranteed parliamentary and municipal representation they are therefore in a position to acquire strong leverage in the political landscape, if the Albanian electorate does not confer enough power to any of the mainstream parties. Ethnic minorities apart, there are also Albanian parties with a distinct religious orientation. There is a tradition of Albanian Catholic parties in Kosovo, even though Catholics only make up a small share of the entire Albanian population. These parties have played an active social and political role since the early 1990s. As Albanian Catholics are, like Serbs and others, also unevenly distributed, living in and around Prizren, Gjakova, Klina and Viti, they contribute to the regional dimension of voter distribution. More recently the country has witnessed the phenomena of parties that aim at the specifically Muslim vote amongst Albanians. These parties cannot be considered “ethnic parties” however. Catholics WWW.IKSWEB.ORG 66—A POWER PRIMER: A HANDBOOK TO POLITICS, PEOPLE AND PARTIES IN KOSOVO cannot profit from seats reserved by the constitution in parliament for minorities, as they are a religious and not ethnic minority, and Muslim Albanians are of course the overwhelming majority of the population. Ethnic parties are a special phenomenon. Firstly the constitution acknowledges the multi-ethnic character of society in Article 3 which describes the country as a multi-ethnic one “consisting of Albanian and other Communities.”180 Articles 5762 in Chapter III define the provisions to be taken to protect the rights of minorities and to promote their social, cultural and political wellbeing. Article 61 explicitly notes, that “communities and their members shall be entitled to equitable representation in employment in public bodies and publicly owned enterprises at all levels.” The constitution acknowledges that besides Albanian, the Serbian language is of equal status and that Bosnian, Roma and Turkish have equality at municipal levels, in the areas in which they are strongly represented (Article 6).181 Additionally, and most interestingly for the political landscape, are the regulations, which reserve special parliamentary representation for the different communities. In Article 148, a transitional regulation refers to the distribution of twenty reserved seats in parliament. It says that in the two first parliaments after independence, 10 seats shall go to “to the parties, coalitions, citizens’ initiatives and independent candidates having declared themselves representing the Kosovo Serb Community.”182 Also, one seat is assigned to the Roma community, one for Ashkalis, one for Egyptians and a further one is awarded to either of the three. Additionally Bosniaks get three seats, Turks two and Goranis one. Article 64 regulates the structure of the assembly for the long-term along the same lines.183 Very similar regulations existed in the framework under which the Provisional Institutions of Self-Governance (PISG) conducted elections between 2000 and the declaration of independence on 17 February 2008.184 After these “reserved seats” are awarded according to prescribed ethnic keys, the votes are once more counted as a share of the total vote (including all votes for non-ethnic parties) which 180 Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo, Article 3. 2008 http:// www.kushtetutakosoves.info/repository/docs/Constitution.of.the. Republic.of.Kosovo.pdf 181 Ibid. Chapter III. 2008 182 Ibid. Article 148. 2008 183 Ibid. Article 64. 2008 184 UNMIK Regulation 2001/9. On a Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-Government in Kosovo. results in additional ethnic seats amongst the remaining one hundred seats. This leads to positive discrimination for ethnic parties. In the parliamentary elections of 2001 minority parties gained an additional fifteen seats on top of their 20 reserved seats. In 2004 they gained an extra two, in 2007 four and in 2010 five. The results of the eight elections since 2000 reflect the diversity of national and ethnic selfperception but also the lack of will to participate in the electoral process by Kosovo’s Serbs. This generous regulation has some flaws. For instance, it does not have any provision as to what to do in case a minority boycotts the poll. Thus, when Serbs did not vote in the elections of 2004 and 2007, this led to a situation, in which those Serbian minority parties participating received all the reserved Serbian seats in Kosovo’s parliament with only some hundreds of votes, clearly calling into question their credibility and legitimacy. In 2010 there was more interest in contesting these seats, with four new parties entering the field: One new Turkish party, the Kosova Türk Birliki – the Kosovo Turkish Union, the KTU. One new Bosniak party, the Nova Demokratska Stranka – the New Democratic Party, the NDS One Ashkali party, the Partia Ashkalinjëve për Integrim – the Ashkali Party for Integration, the PAI. One Egyptian party, the Lidhja e Egjiptianëve të Kosovës – the League of Egyptians of Kosovo, the LEK. At the same time this process has led to two minority parties losing ground. The Roma Partia Rome e Bashkuar e Kosovës, (the United Party of Roma of Kosovo – the PREBK), fell from 2,717 votes in 2001 to 690 in 2010. The Gorani party the Građanska Inicijativa Gore (the Gora Citizen’s Initiative – GIG), fell from 1,789 votes in the 2000 local elections to 778 in 2010. Their votes are now largely going to the better organised and funded Bosniak parties. No new Gorani party has emerged. An inconsistency in the parliamentary system of Kosovo is the fact that there is no reserved seat for Montenegrins. They were obviously forgotten by those who framed the legislation. In the census of 1981 some 27,000 were registered as Montenegrins. As a reaction to this the Crnogorska Demokratska Stranka (the Montenegrin Democratic Party – the DCS) took part in the 2010 poll, although standing no chance of getting into parliament. It received 771 votes. While Gorani were entitled to a reserved seat with a similar number of votes, the Montenegrins were not taken into account. A POWER PRIMER: A HANDBOOK TO POLITICS, PEOPLE AND PARTIES IN KOSOVO—67 Representation of minorities in the municipal assemblies Ruling Parties Municipal. Istog Peje Gjakova Total seats LDK, AAK AAK, LDD, ORA AAK, ORA, PSHDK, IRDK, LIB, PLK PDK, PD, LDK, AKR, KDTP, 3 Vakat, and LDD 11 3 1 2 3 1 1 1 KDTP VAKAT 18 7 SDA 3 PDAK BDA IRDK GIG SLS 1 2 4 1 1 1 2 31 SNSD ZBB 2 2 SKMS SDSKIM CDS 1 1 1 Prizren - Mamusha KDTP Dragash Leposaviq Zubin Potok Zveqan Mitrovica Shtërpce Vushtrri Fushë Kosova Prishtina PDK, VAKAT boycotted elections 2009 boycotted elections 2009 boycotted elections 2009 PDK, AKR SLS, PDK PDK, AKR, LB LDK, LDD, AKR, AAK, CDS, PDAK and PSD 1 8 1 1 1 1 LDK, PDK, KDTP 1 12 1 2 2 1 1 - Graqanica SLS Novobërd - Ranilug Gjilan - Partes - Klokot Ferizaj LDK, SNSD, ZBB GIZO PDK, AAK, ORA, PD, PSD formed after 2009 SLS PDK AKR 1 1 1 10 As long as the number of seats that are awarded to ethnic minorities do not relate to the number of valid votes cast by them, the issue of their representation will remain controversial. On the one hand their participation and representation are a positive element for society. However the way the system is structured leads to an over-representation of the areas where the minorities are situated. This applies especially to Serbian areas, which are mainly situated in eastern Kosovo, in the Anamorava region and in the vicinity of Prishtina. Then there is also the large Serbian community in the municipality of Shtërpce and the municipalities of the north which are overwhelmingly populated by Serbs. By contrast western Kosovo, where the largest numbers of Montenegrins once lived, is under-represented and this cannot be balanced out by the three votes for Turks and Gorani, who live mostly in Prizren and Dragash. How are minority votes spread across Kosovo? This can be best seen by analysing the results of the municipal elections of 2009. From this we can see that Turkish votes went to the KTDP, mainly in Mamusha, where it won 11 seats in the municipal council, and Prizren where it won three. It also won one seat in each of the four municipalities of Mitrovica, Vushtrri, Prishtina and Gjilan. The Bosniak votes were represented by VAKAT and the SDA. In Dragash they won four seats, in Prizren four and in Peja two. Roma, Ashkali and Egyptians votes (RAE in Kosovo newspeak,) are specific for each ethnicity. Ashkali are represented WWW.IKSWEB.ORG 68—A POWER PRIMER: A HANDBOOK TO POLITICS, PEOPLE AND PARTIES IN KOSOVO by one seat in Ferizaj for the PDAK and by one seat each for the BDA in Fushë Kosova and Ferizaj. The Egyptians are represented with one seat each for the IRDK in the municipal assemblies of Istog, Peja, Gjakova, and Fushë Kosova. Kosovo Serbs are represented with 33 seats in five municipalities. The SLS has eight seats in Shtërpce, 12 in the new municipality of Graqanica and 10 in the new municipality of Klokot. Elections in Ranilug were won by the Serbian Citizens Association. Elections in Leposaviq, Zubin Potok and Zveqan were boycotted by Serbian electorate. The SKMS and SDSKiM have one seat each in Graqanica. The Montenegrin Party CDS gained one seat in Fushë Kosova. A POWER PRIMER: A HANDBOOK TO POLITICS, PEOPLE AND PARTIES IN KOSOVO—69 LDK – Lidhja Demokratike e Kosovës (Democratic League of Kosovo) [President: Isa Mustafa. Has 41 branches including those located abroad] The LDK describes itself as a conservative party favouring economic liberalism, the lowering of taxes, a free and open market economy, laissez-faire trade and the general advancement of capitalism. The notion of small government and private property is central to its ideology. In social policy it favours the preservation of social values and traditions.185 The LDK perceives itself as an anti-communist party that seeks to promote values such as independence, democracy, freedom, tolerance and the family as the cornerstone of a healthy society. It stands between Kosovo Albanian ethnic nationalism and respect for the civic state. On the issues of minorities, the party stresses so-called “metropolitan values,” and does not differentiate between Kosovo citizens according to whether they are Albanians or not. It believes that religion should be separate from the state and should not be included in the public education curriculum. It supports the law on abortion. However, LDK refers to this as “the right to premature termination of pregnancy.” The party does not promote issues related to Gay rights and is against the legalisation of prostitution and soft drugs. It favours privatisation, including that of the big SOEs although it believes that this process needs to be slowly and carefully implemented. It favours the option Public Private Partnerships (PPP) with 185 See the publications commissioned by Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Prishtina: 1. Kushtrim Shaipi and Agon Maliqi, Q�ndrimet e Partive kundrejt Shoqerise: Vlerat, Religjioni, Shteti dhe Individualiteti, [Seria e Analizave te Politikave e FES-it – Raporti per Analize te Politikave #3: Kushtrim], May, 2009, Prishtine; 2. Kushtrim Shaipi and Agon Maliqi, Party attitudes Towards Social Policies: Pensions, Healthcare and Privatization. [FES Policy Analysis Series – Policy Analysis Report #1], May, 2008, Prishtina; 3.Kushtrim Shaipi and Agon Maliqi, Q�ndrimet e Partive Kundrejt Ekonomise: Privatizimi, Politikat Fiskale dhe Zhvillimi, [Seria e Analizave te Politikave e FES-it – Raporti per Analize te Politikave #2], Shtator, 2008, Prishtine. regards to very large SOEs instead of 100 percent privatisation. Thus, for example, the state would remain a key shareholder, for example in KEK. Funds generated from privatisation should in turn be invested in capital projects and be used to generate employment. The LDK supports progressive taxation. It supports the CEFTA agreement. It believes that government should subsidise economic sectors that show potential. The LDK supports the current three pillar pension system, (basic pension, pension’s savings, and supplementary pensions). It is against horizontal linkages, i.e., the redistribution of pension benefits, and also against cross generational linkages. The LDK believes that the market for pension savings should be further liberalised and part of the existing pension savings should be invested in Kosovo. Health insurance should be guaranteed by law with basic health services and medicines available free for those who are unable to make contributions to costs. The LDK is against increasing social assistance payments believing that this would create disincentives for the poor to work. The LDK has participated in every election held in Kosovo since its foundation. In the 1992 parliamentary elections it won 76 percent of the vote. In the election of March 1998 they also won a very high percentage of the votes cast. The party leader, Ibrahim Rugova, was the directly elected president of Kosovo from 1992 onwards. In 2001 he was appointed president of Kosovo under the UNMIK Provisional Institutions of Self-Governance. Rugova died in January 2006 and until 10 February 2006 the acting president was Nexhat Daci, a key LDK leader. He was succeeded by the leader of the LDK, Fatmir Sejdiu, who held the post until February 2008, when he was re-elected for a second term. He was forced to step down however in September 2010 after the Constitutional Court ruled that he could not simultaneously be head of the state and his party. He was succeeded by Jakup Krasniqi, a PDK member, who was acting president until February 2011. WWW.IKSWEB.ORG 70—A POWER PRIMER: A HANDBOOK TO POLITICS, PEOPLE AND PARTIES IN KOSOVO LDK *L 2000 **P 2001 L 2002 P 2004 Votes 398,872 359,851 321,239 313,437 Percentage Election aftermath and remarks 58.0% Won 20/27 municipalities with over 50% 47 seats in parliament; presidency; coalition with PDK and AAK 45.6% 3/10 ministries 45.9% Won 11/30 municipalities with over 50% 47 seats in parliament; Presidency; coalition with AAK; 8/15 45.4% ministries First elections after the death of Ibrahim Rugova, and the formation of the LDD a splinter from the LDK; won 2/30 22.8% municipalities with over 40% (Suhareka and Podujeva) 25 seats in parliament; presidency; coalition with PDK; 7/18 22.6% ministries 24.5% Won 3/30 municipalities with over 40% 24.7% 27 seats in parliament; first time as opposition L 2007 P 2007 L 2009 P 2010 118,084 129,410 154,207 172,552 *Local elections; **Parliamentary elections. LDD L 2007 P 2007 L 2009 P 2010 Votes 45,259 57,002 45,285 14,924 Percentage Election aftermath and remarks Entered into a pre-electoral coalition with the (Albanian Catholic) 8.75%. PSHDK; stronger than the LDK in four municipalities Entered into a pre-electoral coalition with the PSHDK; 11 seats in 10.0% parliament 7.2% Have a stronger showing than the LDK in two municipalities 2.1% Did not pass the 5% threshold LDD – Lidhja Demokratike e Dardanise (Democratic League of Dardania) [President: Nexhat Daci. Has 51 branches including those situated outside of Kosovo]. The LDD was formed in 2007 by Nexhat Daci and other former members of the LDK. Nexhat Daci left the LDK after his failure to be elected party chairman following the death of Ibrahim Rugova. It claims to stand for conservatism and Rugova’s policies. It favours lower taxes and a free and open market economy with no barriers to the development of capitalism. It stands for the preservation of social values and traditions. Research has shown the LDD is a pro-European conservative party that puts group interest above that of the individual.186 The LDD emphasises Albanian identity and demands that minorities pledge allegiance to the state of Kosovo. It is against affirmative action. As the LDD stands for state secularism, it is against religious instruction in public education. It is opposed to euthanasia and same sex marriages, and is also opposed to the legalisation of prostitution and soft drugs. The LDD wants to amend the three-pillar186 See the publication commissioned by Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Prishtina: 1. Kushtrim Shaipi and Agon Maliqi. pension system with a solidarity component to be financed by government. The LDD believes in the liberalisation of the pension savings market so that contributions will take into account income levels. Health insurance should be guaranteed for all citizens of Kosovo and be financed from three sources: employers, employees and the state. Health services for citizens receiving social assistance should be free. As for social assistance itself, the party believes that the number of people receiving benefits should decrease and the amount disbursed should rise. The LDD proposes that the majority of SOEs be given as concessions and is against the privatisation of large scale state owned enterprises. In any case, should the privatization proceed as until now, they believe that income from this process should largely be given to employees and the rest put into capital investment. The LDD has no clear taxation policy, some members favouring flat taxation while others argue for progressive taxation. The LDD supports CEFTA. It is in favour of state subsidies for agriculture, forestry, tourism and some other economic sectors. A POWER PRIMER: A HANDBOOK TO POLITICS, PEOPLE AND PARTIES IN KOSOVO—71 LPK/PSK L 2000 P 2001 L 2002 P 2004 L 2007 P 2007 L 2009 P 2010 Votes 4404 2801 4526 Percentage Election aftermath and remarks Took part as part of the AAK coalition 0.6% 1 seat in parliament Ran in 17 municipalities 0.4% Half of the votes gained were polled in Suhareka 0.7% 1 seat in parliament Ran in a pre-election coalition with the PDK Ran in a pre-election coalition with the PDK Ran in 13 municipalities 0.5% Re-emerges as the PSK Did not participate 3,085 LKCK 2000L 2001P 2002L 2004P 2007L 2007P 2009L 2010P 2,578 2,702 8,725 1,636 LB LIB Election aftermath and remarks 1,984 - 2,437 LB was in coalition with VV until October 2011 two seats in parliament LPK – Lëvizja Popullore e Kosovës (People’s Movement of Kosovo), grew out of the old underground Lëvizjen për Republikën Socialiste Shqiptare në Jugosllavi (Movement for an Albanian Socialist Republic in Yugoslavia), which was founded in 1982 by Xhafer Shatri, Sabri Novosella, Ibrahim Kelmendi, Fahredin Tafallari, Hasan Mala and Kadri Abdullahu. The organisation officially came into being in 1987 in Switzerland and was then called the LPRK. In 1993 it was renamed the LPK. The party did not take part in Kosovo’s 1992 elections. The founders of the LPK claim to have set up the UÇK in 1993 at a meeting in Drenica. Ideologically the LPK stands on left of the political spectrum. During the local elections in 2000, the LPK ran in a six party coalition with the AAK. It also put up candidates in the parliamentary elections in 2001 and 2004 and the 2002 local elections. In 2007 it entered into a pre-election coalition with the PDK in the run up to the parliamentary elections. After the parliamentary elections of 2007, the LPK became the PSK (Partia Socialiste e Kosovës). PSK - Partia Socialiste e Kosovës (Socialist Party of Kosovo) [President: Ilaz Kadolli]. The PSK does not differ substantially from LPK. It remains a leftist party, however the reason for the transformation are the new circumstances that have emerged, i.e., independence and the need for a party with a strong ideological profile in the political spectrum. The LKÇK – Lëvizja Kombëtare për Çlirimin e Kosovës (National Movement for the Liberation of Kosovo). Founded by Avni Klinaku, Raif Qela, Bahri Fazliu, Sabit Gashi and Mursel Sopi in 1993. The party, unlike the LPK, advocated a war of liberation. In the post- war period the LKÇK merged with the AAK before reforming for the 2001 parliamentary elections. It won 8,725 votes and a seat in parliament for Smajl Latifi. In the 2002 local elections the LKÇK polled just 1,636 votes across 17 municipalities. It did not take part in the 2004 parliamentary elections. In the local elections of 2007 the party managed to increase its share of the vote to 2,578 in 11 municipalities. In the 2007 parliamentary elections the party won 2,702 votes. The LKÇK then split into two separate parties. LB - Lëvizja për Bashkim (Movement for Unity) [President: Avni Klinaku].The LB is one of the new parties which emerged from the demise of the LKÇK. It campaigns for a union of Kosovo WWW.IKSWEB.ORG 72—A POWER PRIMER: A HANDBOOK TO POLITICS, PEOPLE AND PARTIES IN KOSOVO PDK L 2000 P 2001 L 2002 P 2004 L 2007 Votes 187,821 202,622 207,012 199,112 181,141 Percentage Election aftermath and remarks 27.33% Won 4/30 municipalities with over 50% of the vote 26 seats in parliament; coalition with the LDK and AAK. Bajram 25.70% Rexhepi becomes prime minister; 2/10 ministries 29.60% Won 4/30 municipalities with over 50% of the vote 28.85% 30 seats in parliament; opposition 35.01% Won 8/30 municipalities with over 40% of the vote First time the PDK comes top in the elections with 34 seats in parliament; forms a coalition with the LDK; Hashim Thaçi 34.32% becomes prime minister; 9/18 ministries First elections since independence. Won 6/30 municipalities 31.75% with over 40% of the vote 34 seats in the parliament; Hashim Thaçi becomes prime minister; forms a coalition with the KDTP, the ARK coalition and 32.11% the Ibrahim Rugova List; 12/19 ministries P 2007 L 2009 196,207 200,148 P 2010 224,339 and Albania. It considers national unity as its main goal. It also focuses on the everyday problems that individuals face but fails to address specific issues with solutions. In the local election in 2009 the LB only ran in Vushtrri and Obiliq and polled 1,984 votes. During the 2010 parliamentary elections The LB joined Vetëvendosje! in a pre-electoral coalition and won two seats in parliament for Agim Kuleta and Aurora Bakalli. In October 2011 the LB decided to leave its coalition with Vetëvendosje!. LIB – Lëvizja për Integrim dhe Bashkim (Movement for Integration and Unity) [President: Fadil Fazliu] The LIB is the second party to emerge from the split of the old LKÇK. It also focuses on campaigning for the unification of all Albanians in a single state. Its then leader Smajl Latifi, who made his name in the UÇK during the war, was a deputy from 2001 to 2004. The LIB took part in the 2009 local elections running in five municipalities (Vushtrri, Malisheva, Skenderaj, Gjakova, and Rahovec) and won 2,436 votes, of which 2,009 were polled in Rahovec and in Gjakova alone. Since Latifi left the party in August 2010 it has been effectively leaderless and it did not take part in the elections in 2010. In December 2010 Smajl Latifi successfully ran for mayor of Rahovec as part of the AAK. PDK – Partia Demokratike e Kosovës (Kosovo Democratic Party) [President: Hashim Thaçi. Has 32 branches in 28 municipalities.] The PDK was founded on 12 October 1999 as the Party of Democratic Prosperity of Kosovo (PPDK). In 2000 it changed its name the PDK. The party grew out of the UÇK. According to FES research the PDK favours the supremacy of the individual over the group.187 To the PDK ethnic identity is more important than a citizen’s identification with the state, therefore the PDK only supports the issue of minority rights, as regulated by constitutional provisions. It believes in a secular state and that religion should not play a role in public education or be part of the curriculum. The party supports the legalisation of abortion but with specific caveats. It has no policies regarding euthanasia, homosexuality or prostitution. It is against the legalisation of soft drugs such as marijuana. As part of its social policy programme the PDK supports a pension system which is based on contributions and is without horizontal or cross generational linkages. The party supports the liberalisation of the compulsory pensions savings market, but believes the level of contributions should be low, and in line with income levels. The PDK would like to see the current levels of social assistance payments increased to reflect the level of inflation. All other services should be covered by a health insurance fund which would be financed by both employees and employers. Those unemployed and unable to contribute would be insured by the state. The PDK initially believed that the state should retain ownership of companies if they were deemed to be of national importance or particularly significant, such as KEK and the railways. All other SOEs should be privatised. However by the end of their first term in office the party had moved to the right. Now they believe that all public companies should be privatised including KEK and PTK. 187 See the publications commissioned by Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Prishtina: Kushtrim Shaipi and Agon Maliqi. A POWER PRIMER: A HANDBOOK TO POLITICS, PEOPLE AND PARTIES IN KOSOVO—73 AAK L 2000 P 2001 L 2002 Votes 53,074 61,688 61,732 Percentage Election aftermath and remarks 7.7% No majority in any municipality 9 seats in parliament; coalition with the LDK and PDK; 2/10 7.8% ministries 8.8% Wins its first municipality, Deçan, with over 50% of the vote 11 seats in parliament; coalition with LDK. The AAK’s Ramush Haradinaj becomes prime minister; 6/15 ministries; after three months in office Haradinaj is sent to The Hague; replaced by 8.4% Bajram Kosumi, later by the head of the KPC, Agim Çeku 9.1% Won Deçan with over 50% of the votes P 2004 L 2007 P 2007 L 2009 57,931 47,240 54,611 95,066 P 2010 77,130 9.6% 11 seats in parliament; opposition Haradinaj returns from The Hague; takes over 50% of the votes in 15.1% Deçan and over 40% in Junik Haradinaj forced to return to The Hague. The AAK goes into a pre-election coalition with the Ibrahim Rugova List;12 seats in 11.0% parliament; opposition ORA P 2004 L 2007 P 2007 L 2009 P 2010 Votes 43,017 19,092 23,722 9,142 Percentage 3.7% Election aftermath and remarks 6.2% 7 seats in the parliament 4.1% Did not pass the 5% threshold 1.5% Ran in 9 municipalities Income from privatisation should be invested in the country’s infrastructure, and other capital investments. The PDK supports a progressive tax system, and believes that the current level of tax is too high. The PDK supports CEFTA. It would like to see the agricultural sector subsidised. The PDK believes that public capital should be invested in the private sector, in public-private partnerships. AAK – Aleanca për Ardhmërine e Kosovës (Alliance for Future of Kosovo) [President: Ramush Haradinaj.] The AAK was formed in 1999 by a group of former UÇK members from the Dukagjin region. The driving force behind the movement was Ramush Haradinaj. The AAK attracted a variety of different politicians including the former communist leader Mahmut Bakalli. The AAK’s core beliefs centre on the importance of family and adherence to traditional values rather than individualism. The individual is very important to AAK, as he or she represents the smallest unit of a family. The AAK supports the unitary character of Kosovo and its cultural and ethnic diversity. It believes that Albanian identity is of equal importance as Kosovar identity, and that both are not necessarily mutually exclusive. The AAK believes that minorities have the right to be protected, but is against affirmative action. They believe the state should be secular and religion should not be part of the public education curriculum. It has no policy on euthanasia, prostitution or soft drugs. It takes an unsympathetic view of homosexuality, as it does not strengthen the family. It believes that the market for pension savings should be liberalised and is a strong supporter of the current pension system. The AAK considers the current pension system’s first pillar as a special form of social assistance. It advocates universal health insurance for all citizens and that those below the breadline should be exempted from contributions. The AAK believes that the level of unemployment should be reduced and the amount of benefits paid out increased. The party however, does not propose specific solutions as to how realise this goal, beyond their general economic plan. As far as the state sector is concerned the AAK would like to see all SOEs privatised, except for companies of national strategic importance such as KEK. It believes that these should be partially privatised and the monies accrued allocated to improving the position of employees. WWW.IKSWEB.ORG 74—A POWER PRIMER: A HANDBOOK TO POLITICS, PEOPLE AND PARTIES IN KOSOVO AKR L 2007 P 2007 L 2009 P 2010 Votes 63039 70165 53,362 50,951 Percentage 12.2% Election aftermath and remarks 12.3% 12 seats in parliament 8.5% 8 seats in parliament; coalition with PDK, KDTP and Ibrahim 7.3% Rugova List; 3/19 ministries; 2 deputy prime ministers The majority of the money raised from privatisation should be spent on raising the salaries of the highly skilled experts the companies employ and in capital investments. The AAK also supports a progressive taxation system and believes that the government should lower taxes. The AAK supports CEFTA. It believes that governments should subsidise those sectors of the economy that have the potential to grow such as agriculture, energy and tourism. In the local elections in 2000, they were part of a six party coalition made up of the AQK, the LPK, the LKCK, UNIKOMB, the PPK and the USHDK. The AAK also stood as part of a coalition in the run up to the elections in 2010 with former members of the LDK who had formed the ‘Ibrahim Rugova List.’ After the election the coalition collapsed when the List entered into an alliance with the PDK to form a government. VV – Lëvizja Vetëvendosje! (SelfDetermination Movement!) [Leader: Albin Kurti]. VV is totally opposed to any international interference in politics in Kosovo, is against privatisation and supports unification with Albania. VV grew out of the Kosovo Action Network (KAN). KAN was originally formed in 1997 by a group of international activists under the guidance of the American writer Alice Mead. The aim of KAN was to promote active citizen’s participation. It was mainly involved with issues such as missing persons and human rights. KAN operated in Kosovo until 2005. The movement’s leaders, including Albin Kurti and Glauk Konjufca, continued its activities as Vetëvendosje!. They concentrated on organising protests against negotiations with Serbia, decentralisation, and any plans for Kosovo which did not see it immediately as a fully independent state. In a 2007 protest march organized by VV, two demonstrators were killed by UNMIK police. This strengthened VV’s position and gained them widespread popularity throughout Kosovo. In the 2010 parliamentary elections they won 88,652 votes and received 12 seats in the parliament. ORA – Partia Reformiste ORA (Reformist Party ORA). ORA, which means “time” was set up in 2004, just a few months before the general elections by a group of intellectuals who had been gathered together by Veton Surroi, the owner and editor-in-chief of the newspaper KohaDitore. ORA was a social democratic movement that supported government intervention in the economy. It opposed privatisation, advocated the granting of subsidies to strategic sectors and the establishment of an agricultural bank. It advocated a secular state. ORA was in favour of abortion and adopted a liberal stance towards same sex marriages. After the elections in 2007, Surroi resigned and following the local elections in 2009 ORA decided to merge with the LDK. FER – Partia Fryma e Re (New Spirit Party) Formed a month before the 2010 elections by think tank chairmen Ilir Deda (KIPRED) and Shpend Ahmeti (GAP). The party had a centrist economic policy and liberal social policy. During the campaign, they were often seen as a continuation of ORA and like Surroi’s party were solidly urban. They did not pass the five percent threshold. Three months after the elections, FER merged with VV, but two days before this merge two of the top-three FER members Ilir Deda and Qëndrim Gashi, resigned. Deda is presently senior advisor and chief of staff to the president. Most of the remaining members joined Vetëvendosje!. They won 15,156 votes mainly in the urban areas of Prishtinë, Pejë, Gjakovë, Prizren, and Ferizaj. AKR – Aleanca Kosova e Re (New Kosovo Alliance) [President: Behgjet Pacolli]. Founded in 2006 by Behgjet Pacolli, Kosovo’s only real tycoon and the owner of Mabetex, a construction company. The AKR advocates a mixture of economic liberalism and conservative social policies. In 2010 the AKR entered into a preelection coalition with the PD, the PSD, the PGJK, the PNDSH, the Pensioners Party and the Party of Pensioners and Invalids plus the so-called expert group, E15. After the election, Pacolli was elected president by parliament but the Constitutional Court A POWER PRIMER: A HANDBOOK TO POLITICS, PEOPLE AND PARTIES IN KOSOVO—75 PSD L 2000 P 2001 L 2002 P 2004 L 2007 P 2007 L 2009 P 2010 PSHDK L 2000 P 2001 L 2002 P 2004 L 2007 P 2007 L 2009 P 2010 PDKI L 2007 P 2007 L 2009 P 2010 PLK L 2000 P 2001 L 2002 P 2004 L 2007 P 2007 L 2009 P 2010 Votes 2659 1785 2239 2107 Percentage 0.4% 0.2% 0.32% 0.3% Election aftermath and remarks Ran in 17 municipalities Ran in 13 municipalities Did not get a seat Ran as part of PDK-led coalition 8,055 1.3% Ran in 18 municipalities Part of the AKR pre-election coalition; Ministry of Defence; Agim Çeku Election aftermath and remarks Ran in 13 municipalities 1 seat in parliament; in coalition with the LDK, the PDK and the AAK; Ministry of Transport and Communications Ran in 12 municipalities 2 seats in parliament Ran in 12 municipalities Joined a pre-election coalition with the LDD Ran in 4 municipalities; Mark Krasniqi resigns Joined a pre-election coalition with the PDK Votes 8533 7701 10271 12427 4123 4,361 Percentage 1.2% 1.0% 1.5% 1.8% 0.8% 0.7% Votes 3545 1858 Percentage 0.69% 0.29% Election aftermath and remarks Ran in 4 municipalities Ran in 10 municipalities Joined a pre-election coalition with the LDK Votes 4,138 3,600 4,519 3542 Percentage 0.60% 0.46% 0.65% 0.51% Election aftermath and remarks Ran in 19 municipalities Ran in 24 municipalities 1 seat in parliament Joined a pre-election coalition with the PDK Joined a pre-election coalition with PDK. Gjergj Dedaj is appointed vice minister of labour and social welfare 1,252 0.20% Ran in 10 municipalities ruled this unconstitutional as the necessary quorum had not been met during the voting. PPK – Partia Parlamentare e Kosovës (Parliamentary Party of Kosovo). Emerged from the former (Socialist) Youth Parliament of Kosovo set up by Shkelzen Maliqi and Halil Matoshi. During the 1990s, the PPK was the second most popular party and took part in the 1992 election winning 4.87 percent of the vote which translated into 13 seats. It did not stand in the 1998 election, as it joined the LBD coalition, which crumbled immediately after the WWW.IKSWEB.ORG 76—A POWER PRIMER: A HANDBOOK TO POLITICS, PEOPLE AND PARTIES IN KOSOVO war. From 1993 to 1996 the PPK was led by Bajram Kosumi and then Adem Demaçi until 1998, before he left to become the UÇK political representative in Prishtina. Kosumi then, once again, resumed the leadership. After the war, the PPK joined the AAK in May 2000. In 2006 Bajram Kosumi took the post of prime minister after Ramush Haradinaj was indicted by The Hague tribunal. After a year Kosumi resigned and left the AAK to join the PDK as part of the ‘Civic Movement for Democracy’ founded only few days prior to PPKs membership in the PDK. PSD – Partia Socialdemokrate e Kosovës (Social Democratic Party of Kosovo) [President: Agim Çeku]. The PSD was set up by Muhamedin Kullashi and Shkelzen Maliqi in the early 1990s. Its first leader was Luljeta Pula, who was replaced in 1998 by Kaqusha Jashari. The PSD took part in the 1992 elections and Shkelzen Maliqi and Behlul Beqaj secured two parliamentary seats. The PSD did not take part in the 1998 elections. After the war, the PSD stood in all elections that took place. In the 2007 elections, they formed a pre-election coalition with the PDK, and won a seat in parliament for their leader Kaqusha Jashari. In 2009 Agim Çeku became chairman of the PSD and in 2010 they joined a pre-election coalition with the AKR. The PSD’s core policies are equality, solidarity, freedom of movement and speech and human rights with a strong emphasis on labour and small business rights. The PSD places the community before the individual. The PSD considers Albanian identity in Kosovo to be more influential than Kosovar identity, but the two are not necessarily in competition. The PSD supports minorities and is in favour of affirmative action. The party believes in secularism and consequently that religion should not be part of the public education curriculum. The PSD is in favour of abortion, but against euthanasia. The party would like tougher action taken to prevent prostitution which they regard as morally degrading. As for social assistance, they believe that the amount of benefits given to people unable to work should be increased. The PSD believes in partial privatisation as long as national interest is not put at risk. They would like to see the funds raised by any privatisation to be used to create a pension solidarity fund and to be used to fight certain negative social phenomena such as drug addiction and alcoholism. The PSD supports the current taxation system but thinks that the current taxation levels should fall. The PSD believes that both agriculture and small and medium enterprises should be subsidised. PSHDK – Partia Shqipëtare Demokristiane e Kosovës (Albanian Christian Democratic Party) [President: Nikë Gjeloshi]. The PSHDK was set up in 1990 by Gjergj Rrapi, Lazër Krasniqi, Nikë Gjeloshi, Gjergj Dedaj and Umberto Bytyqi to represent Catholic Albanians. Their orientation is conservative in both economic and social policies. In 1991 Gjergj Dedaj split from the PSHDK and founded the PLK. The PSHDK ran in the 1992 elections and won three percent of the vote. In 1993 the well-known academic Mark Krasniqi became party chairman, a post he held until 2008. The PSHDK had two representatives in the government-in-exile, two vice-presidents and at one point, two ministers. The PSHDK ran in the 1998 elections and took part in every election that was held after the war. Between 2001 and 2004, they were in coalition with the LDK, the PDK, and the AKK and Zef Morina, member of the PSHDK, was made minister of transport and communications. However, in 2007, just before the elections, the PDKI (Partia Demokristiane për Integrim) split away from the PSHDK. In 2009 Mark Krasniqi resigned as party chairman and was replaced by Marjan Demaj. The PSHDK then entered into a pre-election coalition with the PDK. PDKI – Partia Demokristiane për Integrim (Christian Democrat Party for Integration) [President: Zef Morina]. The PDKI broke away from the PSHDK in 2007 and is led by Zef Morina. Its policies are very similar to those of the PSHDK. PLK – Partia Liberale e Kosovës (Liberal Party of Kosovo) [President: Gjergj Dedaj]. The PLK broke away from the PSHDK in 1991 and has been led by Gjergj Dedaj ever since. The PLK has a liberal orientation and it is a member of the European Liberal Democrat and Reform Party. The PLK took part in the 1992 elections but did not stand in 1998. After the war, the PLK continued to be a lively actor on political scene and has taken took part in elections. In 2007 they entered into a pre-election coalition with the PDK. PD – Partia e Drejtësisë (Party of Justice) [President: Ferid Agani]. The PD was founded in September 1999 by Fuad Ramiqi, a well-known soldier in the Bosnian war, who also fought with the UÇK and who now campaigns in support of Palestinians in the Gaza strip. The second most important person in the party is the neuropsychiatrist Ferid Agani from Gjakova. A POWER PRIMER: A HANDBOOK TO POLITICS, PEOPLE AND PARTIES IN KOSOVO—77 PD P 2001 L 2002 P 2004 L 2007 P 2007 L 2009 P 2010 ADK P 2004 L 2007 P 2007 L 2009 Votes 4,504 5,679 7,013 8,709 9,890 13,203 Percentage 0.6% 0.8% 1.0% 1.7% 1.7% 2.1% Election aftermath and remarks 1 seat in parliament Ran in 11 municipalities Strong in Prishtina and Prizren 1 seat in parliament Ran in 22 municipalities Did not pass 5% threshold Ran in 19 municipalities Joined a pre-electoral coalition with the AKR; member of the governing coalition; Ministry of Health Election aftermath and remarks Joined a pre-election coalition with the PDK Joined a pre-election coalition with the PDK; 1 seat in parliament Votes 3,042 Percentage 0.44% 797 0.13% P 2010 PQLK L2000 P 2001 L 2002 BK P 2001 L 2002 P 2004 L 2007 P 2007 L 2009 P 2010 UNIKOMB L 2000 P 2001 L 2002 P 2004 1,001 2,607 Votes Percentage Votes 2,881 2,537 2,156 921 1,199 597 Percentage 0.37% Votes 5329 2403 Percentage 0.78% 0.30% Ran in 2 municipalities (Prishtina and Prizren) Joined a pre-election coalition with the PDK. Edita Tahiri appointed deputy prime minister, despite failing to win a parliamentary seat Election aftermath and remarks Ran in 16 municipalities; 1091 votes solely in Suhareka Fails to win a seat in parliament Party merges with the AAK (Maloku) and the LDK (Kuçi) Election aftermath and remarks Ran in 9 municipalities, of which 4 where situated in the 0.36% Highlands 0.31% 0.18% Ran in 8 municipalities 0.21% 0.90% Ran in 7 municipalities Did not take part in the elections Election aftermath and remarks Ran as part of AAK coalition Ran as part of AAK coalition 0.14% Ran in 9 municipalities 0.38% Does not get a seat; disbanded 78—A POWER PRIMER: A HANDBOOK TO POLITICS, PEOPLE AND PARTIES IN KOSOVO WWW.IKSWEB.ORG The party is widely regarded as a Muslim party because of its support for the construction of a big new mosque in the centre of Prishtina and because it campaigns for the right for girls to wear the veil in schools. It wants religious education to become part of the school curriculum. Ramiqi is the main organiser of numerous protests in support of these issues. As a result, they draw most of their support from the Albanian Muslim community. ADK – Alternativa Demokratike e Kosovës (The Kosovo Democratic Alternative) [President: Edita Tahiri]. The ADK was formed in 2004 a few months before ORA and regards itself as the “original reformist party.” It was founded by Edita Tahiri, a long-serving member of the LDK, who had become disenchanted with the party. Active since the early 1990s Tahiri was the LDK representative for foreign policy and took part in the Rambouillet Conference and other international conferences on Kosovo. In the 2007 elections, the ADK joined a pre-election coalition with the PDK. In 2010, Tahiri was appointed deputy prime-minister and became Kosovo’s chief negotiator in the EU-sponsored dialogue with Serbia. PQLK – Partia e Qendrës Liberale të Kosovës (Center Liberal Party of Kosovo). Founded in 1999 by ex-UÇK soldiers, among them Naim Maloku and Blerim Kuçi. Maloku was a military academy graduate who had been living in Slovenia and an ex-political prisoner. He fought in Slovenia and Croatia before joining the UÇK. Kuçi was the president of the youth forum of the LDK, before joining the UÇK. The idea behind the formation of the PQLK was to create a party that sat between the two polarised extremes, those calling for war and those who advocated peaceful resistance. Their policies were centrist and liberal in nature. After failing to gain a seat in the parliament in 2001, its leaders joined the AAK and the LDK. BK - Balli Kombëtar (National Front) [President: Ahmet Mulliqi]. The BK was originally founded in 1939 by Ali Këlcyra and Mit’hat Frashëri as a nationwide party which would have a presence everywhere Albanians lived, a concept that was diametrically opposed to communist and monarchist ideas. The BK during the Second World War formed a provisional national committee which declared Albania independent and further elected an executive committee with the aim of forming a provisional government. At the end of the Second World War, the BK was forced underground by the communists. In 1991 the BK reappeared as a right wing political party in both Kosovo and in Albania. While its social policy was firmly on the right it had very few economic policies. The BK did not participate in the local elections in 2000. UNIKOMB – Uniteti i Kombit (National Unity Party) UNIKOMB was set up on 5 May 1991 by Halil Alidemaj. In 1994 Ukshin Hoti became its leader and was subsequently imprisoned. The party entered into a coalition with Rexhep Qosja’s LBD (Lëvizja e Bashkuar Demokratike) in 1998. During the war, Ukshin Hoti disappeared and is widely believed to have been murdered. Muhamet Kelmendi led the party from 2000 until 2004. In the local elections of 2000 and the 2001 parliamentary elections UNIKOMB ran in a pre-election coalition with the AAK. In the 2001 parliamentary elections, UNIKOMB’s Muhamet Kelmendi won a seat in parliament. The party was disbanded in 2004. LDSH - Lëvizja Demokratike Shqipëtare (Albanian Democratic Movement). Formed on 27 June 1998 and led by Rexhep Qosja. The party opposed the policy of passive resistance led by the LDK and had close ideological relations with the UÇK. The LDSH, at their foundation, proposed the creation of a political body of the main political parties which would coordinate political parties and the UÇK. The LDSH soon joined the LBD coalition Lëvizja e Bashkuar Shqiptare (Albanian Democratic Union). LBD - Lëvizja e Bashkuar Demokratike (United Democratic Movement) The LBD was created in 1998 out of a coalition of seven parties: the Parliamentary Party of Kosovo headed by Bajram Kosumi, the LDSH headed by Rexhep Qosja, members of which include exprisoners and ex-LDK members such as Hydajet Hyseni and Mehmet Hajrizi, UNIKOMB headed by Ukshin Hoti, the PLK headed by Gjergj Rrapi, the Albanian National Party headed by Milaim Kadriu, the Green Party under Daut Maloku, and the Albanian Republican Party led by Skender Hoti. The coalition is headed by Rexhep Qosja. In 1998 the LBD demanded active resistance as opposed to the passive resistance policy adopted by the LDK. The coalition did not take part in 1998 election. It was represented at Rambouillet by Qosja, and took part in the post-war provisional government and in A POWER PRIMER: A HANDBOOK TO POLITICS, PEOPLE AND PARTIES IN KOSOVO—79 PNDSH L 2000 P 2001 L 2002 P 2004 L 2007 P 2007 L 2009 P 2010 UD L 2002 P 2004 Votes 1980 1066 451 857 Percentage 0.29% 0.14% 0.06% 0.12% Election aftermath and remarks Ran in 9 municipalities Does not get a seat Ran in 4 municipalities (Ferizaj, Prishtina, Skenderaj, and Gjakova) Does not get a seat Does not take part in elections Does not take part in elections Does not take part in elections Enters into a pre-election coalition with the AKR Votes 2881 2696 Percentage 0.41% 0.39% Election aftermath and remarks Runs in Gjakova only Polls 768 votes in Gjakova; party ceases to exist after the elections the Transitional Council of the JIAS. The coalition ceased to exist after the JIAS was terminated following November 2001 general elections. PNDSH – Partia Nacionale Demokratike e Shqiptarëve (Albanian National Democratic Party) [President: Bujar Abdullahu]. The PNDSH was set up on 3 May 1992 in Prishtina and its roots lie in the Albanian National Democratic Movement (LNDSH), which had been active between 1945 and 1947. The PNDSH embraces pro-Western and pro-liberal values and takes a clear stand against communism, terrorism and racism. Nevertheless the party considers the protection of Albanian culture, tradition and family values as a basis for a liberal democratic society, which puts it on the right of the political spectrum. UD – Unioni Demokratik (Democratic Union) Established just before the local elections of 2002 under the name Democratic Union of Gjakova (UDGJ). It was founded by Mentor Kaçi, a former political prisoner. At that time it primarily represented local interests. In its second year, the UDGJ made the decision to broaden the scope of its activities to a Kosovo-wide level. The party had no defining policies on economic and social issues and after it took part in the general elections of 2004 it ceased to exist. PARTIES RUNNING FOR RESERVED SEATS IN THE KOSOVO PARLIAMENT TURKISH PARTIES KDTP – Kosova Demokratik Türk Partisi (Turkish Democratic Party of Kosovo) [President: Mahir Yağcılar]. The KDTP is a Turkish minority party. According to the constitution the Turks have two reserved seats in parliament. The KDTP was founded in 1990 as Turkish Democratic Union (Türk Demokratik Birliği) and changed its name in 2001, when it began to act as a political party. The KDTP has been part a number of governments and took control of the newly formed municipality of Mamusha in 2009. KTB - Kosova Turk Birligi (Kosovo Turkish Union) [President: Reshit Hanadan]. The KTB is a Turkish community party and was founded in 2010. It is a party based in the newly established municipality of Mamusha. It participated in the 2010 parliamentary elections and won 1,364 votes, but could not break the predominance of the KDTP and was not allocated a seat in parliament. BOSNIAK PARTIES SDA – Stranka Demokratske Akcije (Party of Democratic Action) [President: Numan Balić]. The SDA was founded on 14 October 1990 in Vitomirica, near Peja. In the early 1990s, the SDA held a number of public gatherings in which the party condemned the Milošević regime, as a result of which the president and a number of associates had fled the country by 1993 under pressure. After WWW.IKSWEB.ORG 80—A POWER PRIMER: A HANDBOOK TO POLITICS, PEOPLE AND PARTIES IN KOSOVO KDTP L 2000 P 2001 L 2002 P 2004 L 2007 P 2007 L 2009 P 2010 SDA L 2000 P 2001 L 2002 P 2004 L 2007 P 2007 L 2009 P 2010 Votes 7879 7760 8353 5184 4999 7,497 8,548 Votes 3,653 Percentage 1.0% 1.1% 1.2% 1.0% 0.9% 1.2% 1.2% Percentage Election aftermath and remarks 3 reserved seats in parliament Ran in 4 municipalities 3 reserved seats in parliament Ran in 6 municipalities 3 reserved seats in parliament; Ministry of Environment and Spatial Planning Ran in 7 municipalities and won the new municipality of Mamusha 3 reserved seats in parliament; Ministry of Public Administration Election aftermath and remarks 0.5% Ran in 5 municipalities Pre-election coalition with VAKAT; Numan Balić, leader of the SDA, becomes minister of health Pre-election coalition with VAKAT 0.4% 1 seat in parliament 0.5% Ran in 5 municipalities 0.6% 2 seats in parliament 0.3% Ran in 5 municipalities 0.2% No seat in parliament 2,520 2,468 3,661 1,973 1,602 NATO troops were deployed in Kosovo, the SDA played a key role in defending and promoting not only Bosniaks’ interests and rights but also those of other communities. BSDAK – Bošnjaćka Stranka Demokratske Akcije Kosova (Bosniak Party of Democratic Action of Kosovo) [President: Hilmo Kandić]. The BSDAK is a Bosniak community party, which runs for three reserved seats in the Kosovo parliament, in addition to the ones won by direct vote. It was formed in 1990 and in 2000 the party appropriated the symbol of the state of Bosnia as party’s logo, in an attempt to appeal to a wider Bosniak national sentiment. Its leader is Hilmo Kandić, an ex-member of the SDA in the 1990s. He was elected a deputy in 1992 and was re-elected in 1998. VATAN (VATAN) [President Džezair Murati]. VATAN is a Bosniak/Gorani community party formed in 2001. In 2004 VATAN joined two other parties, the Democratic Party of the Bosniaks (DSB) and the Bosniak Party of Kosovo (BSK), from Prizren, Dragash and Peja respectively, forming a coalition called ‘Koalicija VAKAT.’ The coalition represents the interests of the Bosniaks in Kosovo, but also of those who declare themselves as Gorani. NDS – Nova Demokratska Stranka (New Democratic Party) [President: Emilija Redžepi]. The NDS was formed in 2009 under the leadership of Emilija Redžepi. The party’s main principles are the affirmation of human rights and freedoms, the democratisation of society, the equality of nations and the affirmation of the rights of national minorities in accordance with international documents and the market economy. GORANI PARTIES GIG – Gradanska Inicijativa Gora (Gora Citizens Initiative) [President: Murselj Haljilji]. Gorani have one seat set aside for them in parliament. Originally founded in 2000 as a citizens’ association, GIG took part in the local elections of that year. In 2002 it turned into a political party. It is based in Dragash. The core of its program is advancing the rights and interests of the Gorani community in Kosovo. Vezira Emruš, a former GIG member, has since stood twice for the SDA and won a seat in parliament in 2007. A POWER PRIMER: A HANDBOOK TO POLITICS, PEOPLE AND PARTIES IN KOSOVO—81 BSDAK L 2000 P 2001 L 2002 P 2004 L 2007 P 2007 L 2009 P 2010 Votes 4,068 2,906 1,322 1,452 Percentage Election aftermath and remarks 0.6% Ran in 5 municipalities 0.4% 1 seat in parliament 0.2% Ran in 5 municipalities 0.2% Does not get a seat Does not take part in elections Does not take part in elections Does not take part in elections 1,818 0.3% 1 seat in parliament Election aftermath and remarks Remarks 4 seats in parliament; coalition with the PDK, the AAK and the 1.1% LDK; Ministry of Health 1.0% Ran in 8 municipalities 3 seats in parliament; coalition with the LDK and the AAK; Ministry of Health 0.7% SDA leaves the coalition 1.0% Ran in 4 municipalities 0.9% 3 seats in the parliament 0.7% Ran in 5 municipalities 0.8% 2 seats in parliament Percentage Election aftermath and remarks VAKAT L 2000 P 2001 L 2002 Votes Percentage 9,030 6,972 P 2004 L 2007 P 2007 L 2009 P 2010 NDS L 2009 P 2010 GIG L 2000 P 2001 L 2002 P 2004 L 2007 P 2007 L 2009 P 2010 4,972 5,269 5,428 4,168 5,296 Votes 2,480 2,478 Votes 1,789 0.39% Ran in 2 municipalities (Prizren and Istog) 0.35% 1 seat in parliament Percentage Election aftermath and remarks 0.26% Ran only in Dragash and as a citizens association 1 seat in parliament Ran in coalition with VATAN 0.22% Ran in 2 municipalities (Dragash and Peja) 0.20% 1 reserved seat. Vezira Emruš leaves the party. 0.19% Ran only in Dragash 0.21% 1 reserved seat 0.07% Runs only in Dragash 0.11% 1 reserved seat 1,505 1,358 989 1,227 454 787 ASHKALI PARTIES PDASHK – Partia Demokratike Ashkali Shqiptare e Kosovës (Ashkali Albanian Democratic Party of Kosovo) Established on 19 December 1999 in Ferizaj by Beqir Bytyqi. The PDASHK focused on the reconstruction of burned Ashkali houses, reclaiming occupied homes and properties and improving employment opportunities for members of the Ashkali community. The PDASHK ceased to exist after parliamentary elections 2004. PDAK – Partia Demokratike e Ashkalinjëve të Kosovës (Ashkali Democratic Party of Kosovo) [President: Danush Ademi]. WWW.IKSWEB.ORG 82—A POWER PRIMER: A HANDBOOK TO POLITICS, PEOPLE AND PARTIES IN KOSOVO PDASHK L 2000 P 2001 L 2002 P 2004 PDAK L 2000 P 2001 L 2002 P 2004 L 2007 P 2007 L 2009 P 2010 Votes 1,552 3,411 505 361 Votes Percentage 0.23% 0.43% 0.07% 0.05% Percentage Election aftermath and remarks Ran in 7 municipalities 1 seat in parliament Ran in 3 municipalities Formation of competing PDAK Did not get a seat Election aftermath and remarks 2,760 2,555 2,718 3,443 1,337 2,871 0.39% 0.37% 0.53% 0.60% 0.21% 0.41% Ran in 9 municipalities 1 seat in parliament Ran in 10 municipalities 3 seats in parliament Ran in 9 municipalities 1 seat in parliament Ashkali have one reserved seat in parliament and run for a second reserved seat in competition with Roma and Egyptian parties. The PDAK was formed in 2002. It aims to improve respect for human rights on the basis of democracy and freedom, ensure the security and peace for all the nations and nationalities and promotes understanding and dialogue between all political parties, and between opposing views. PAI – Partia e Ashkalinjëve për Integrim (Ashkali Party for Integration) [President: Etem Arifi]. Founded in 2010. Its main goals are to represent and protect the rights of Ashkali. In the 2010 parliamentary elections it won 1,386 votes and gained a seat in parliament for its president Etem Arifi. EGYPTIAN PARTIES IRDK – Iniciativa e Re Demokratike e Kosovës (New Democratic Initiative of Kosovo) [President: Xhevdet Neziraj]. Egyptians have one reserved seat in parliament and compete for a second reserved seat with Roma and Ashkali parties. The IRDK was established in April 2001. The party aims to affirm and protect Egyptian national identity, traditions, culture. The IRDK is a western Kosovo regionally based party. LEK - Lidhja e Egjiptianëve të Kosovës (Egyptian League of Kosovo) [President: Bislim Hoti]. Founded in 2010 just before the general elections. The LEK’s goals are to represent and protect the rights of its community. It won 1,010 votes, which was not enough for it to get a seat in parliament. ROMA PARTIES PREBK – Partia Rome e Bashkuar e Kosovës (United Roma Party of Kosovo) [President: Haxhi Zylfi Merxha]. The Roma have one reserved seat in parliament and compete for a second with Egyptian and Ashkali parties. The PREBK is the only Roma party. It was established in the summer of 2000 with its head office in Prizren. The party promotes the security, rights and employment opportunities of its community. The PREBK is a member of the Roma Union of the World (RUW). MONTENEGRIN PARTIES CDS - Crnogorska Demokratska Stranka (Democratic Party of Montenegrins) [President: Predrag Despotović]. The CDS was formed in 2009. Its main goals are the representation and protection of the rights of its community. Montenegrins have no reserved seat in parliament and the CDS is campaigning to have this omission rectified. In the 2009 local elections it ran in five municipalities and won 470 votes. In the 2010 parliamentarian elections, it won 771 votes. SERB PARTIES The KP – Koalicija za Povratak (Coalition “Return”). Formed in 2001 as a Kosovo-wide Serbian coalition. Prominent leaders included: Rada Tajković, Oliver Ivanović and Gojko Savić. The purpose of A POWER PRIMER: A HANDBOOK TO POLITICS, PEOPLE AND PARTIES IN KOSOVO—83 IRDK L 2000 P 2001 L 2002 P 2004 L 2007 P 2007 L 2009 P 2010 PREBK L 2000 P 2001 L 2002 P 2004 L 2007 P 2007 L 2009 P 2010 KP P 2001 L 2002 Votes 3,976 3,136 2,658 2,135 2,121 2,306 1,690 Votes 2,717 1,049 442 600 596 690 Votes 89,388 13,238 Percentage 0.50% 0.45% 0.39% 0.41% 0.37% 0.37% 0.24% Percentage 0.34% 0.15% 0.09% 0.10% 0.09% 0.10% Percentage 11.34% 1.89% Election aftermath and remarks 2 seats in parliament Ran in 7 municipalities; 6 of them in Dukagjin 2 seats in parliament Ran in 7 municipalities; 6 municipalities in Dukagjin 1 seats in parliament Ran in 7 municipalities; 6 municipalities in Dukagjin 1 seats in parliament Election aftermath and remarks 1 reserved seat in parliament 1 reserved seat in parliament Ran in 6 municipalities 1 reserved seat in parliament Ran in 4 municipalities 1 reserved seat in parliament Election aftermath and remarks 22 seats in parliament. Ran in 23 municipalities Election aftermath and remarks Remarks Ran in 8 municipalities 5 seats in parliament, Ministry of Communities and Returns Ran 9 municipalities 8 seats in parliament; deputy prime minister; 3 ministries Election aftermath and remarks 2 seats in parliament 1 seat in parliament SLS L 2007 P 2007 L 2009 P 2010 SDSKiM P 2007 L 2009 P 2010 Votes 500 855 4,331 14,352 Votes 939 303 1,008 Percentage 0.00% 0.00% 0.01% 0.02% Percentage 0.16% 0.05% 0.14% the coalition was to unify Serbs and protect the rights and interests of their community. Another aim of the coalition, as its name indicated, was to help Kosovo Serb refugees to return home. Povratak ceased to exist after the elections of 2002. SLS - Samostalna Liberalna Stranka (Independent Liberal Party) [President: Slobodan Petrović]. The SLS was established on 27 January 2006 in the municipality of Gračanica when a group of likeminded people got together and decided to form a new, liberal, pro-European political party. Currently WWW.IKSWEB.ORG 84—A POWER PRIMER: A HANDBOOK TO POLITICS, PEOPLE AND PARTIES IN KOSOVO the SLS is in the governing coalition with the PDK and the AKR. Slobodan Petrović, its president, is one of the six deputy prime ministers and minister of local administration. Additionally, the party leads two more ministries; Labour and Social Welfare Ministry headed by Nenad Rašić and the Ministry of Communities and Returns headed by Radojica Tomić. JSL - Jedinstvena Srpska Lista (United Serbian List) Formed just before the 2010 elections. It was composed of candidates that represent political parties and independent candidates from NGOs and a large range of Serbian political entities, in order to attract a wide range of voters. It is led by Rada Trajković, a former Serbian representative in the JIAS and a leading figure in the Koalicija za Povratak. The JSL aims to protect and represent the interests of the Serbian community rather than having a specific political orientation. The JSL represents a more radical and pro-Belgrade approach than other major Serb political parties. In the 2010 parliamentary elections, the JSL won 6,004 votes, which in turn won them four seats in parliament. SDSKiM - Srpska Demokratska Stranka Kosova i Metohije (Serbian Democratic Party of Kosovo and Metohija) [President: Saša Ðokić]. The SDSKiM was founded in 2004 by its current leader Saša Ðokić and its first leader Slaviša Petković. Petković had previously been the returns minister but was accused of corruption and is now awaiting trial. The main aim of the SDS is reconciliation between Serbs and Albanians, while being ideologically positioned as social-democratic. SNSKiM - Savez Nezavisnih Socijaldemokrata Kosova i Metohije (Union of Independent Social Democrats of Kosovo and Metohija). Formed in 2007 and ran in local and parliamentary elections. The SNSKiM ran in 6 municipalities in the local elections but won only 329 votes. In the parliamentary elections, they won 447 votes which were enough to get them two seats in parliament. That was the first and the last time that SNSKiM participated in elections. SKMS - Srpska Kosovsko-Metohijska Stranka (Serbian Party of Kosovo and Metohija) was formed in 2007 and ran in the 2007 local and parliamentary elections. The SKMS ran in four municipalities in local elections, however it won only 57 votes; whereas in parliamentary elections, won 317 votes, enough to get them one seat in parliament. That was the first and the last time that SKMS participated in elections. SLKM - Srpska Lista za Kosovo i Metohiju (Serbian List for Kosovo and Metohija). Formed after the breakup of the KP. The SLKM was led by Oliver Ivanović and took part in the 2004 parliamentary elections and won 1,414 votes which gained them eight out of ten reserved seats. The party boycotted Kosovar institutions though, did not take up these seats, and was then disbanded. GIS - Građanska Inicijativa Srbija (Citizen Initiative Serbia) was formed after the breakup of the KP by Saša Djokić. They took part in the 2004 parliamentary elections and won 369 votes, which was enough to win them two out of ten reserved seats in parliament. After the elections the party disbanded. SNS - Srpska Narodna Stranka (Serbian People’s Party) formed in 2007 and ran in the 2007 local and parliamentary elections. The SNS ran in only one municipality (Rahovec) in the local elections though and won just 23 votes. In the parliamentary elections, it won 224 votes, enough to acquire one seat in parliament. That was the first and the last time that SNS took part in elections. ND - Nova Demokratija (New Democracy) Formed in 2007 and ran in the local and parliamentary elections. The ND took part in six municipalities in the local elections, but won only 92 votes. In the parliamentary elections, they won 256 votes which were enough to acquire one seat in parliament. That was the first and the last time that the ND took part in elections. A POWER PRIMER: A HANDBOOK TO POLITICS, PEOPLE AND PARTIES IN KOSOVO—85 Table 1. Overview of electorate, turnout, and valid votes. 2000 L* Total Electorate Votes Cast Valid Votes 913,179 721,260 687,332 2001 P** 2002 L 2004 P 2007 L 2007 P 2009 L 2010 P 1,249,987 1,320,481 1,412,680 1,567,690 1,567,690 1,563,741 1,632,276 803,796 788,303 711,205 699,399 699,519 690,089 628,630 517,373 628,630 571,767 697,212 630,314 739,258 698,751 *- indicates Local Elections; **- indicates Parliamentary elections Table 2. Overview of voter distribution among main Albanian parties. 2000L LDK LDD PDK AAK LKCK LB VV ORA FER AKR PD PSD LPK PSK PSHDK PDKI PLK PQLK PNDSH ADK BK UNIKOMB PGJK 1,187 2,325 2,881 2,537 1,001 680 3,600 2,403 1,066 451 857 3,042 2,156 2,607 921 797 1,199 597 4,519 3,542 8,533 7,701 10,271 12,427 4,123 3,545 2,659 4,504 1,785 4,404 5,679 2,557 2,801 7,013 2,107 4,526 3,085 4,361 1,858 1,252 63,039 8,709 70,165 9,890 53,362 13,203 8,055 43,017 19,092 23,722 9,142 15,156 50,951 187,821 53,074 202,622 61,688 8,725 207,012 61,732 1,636 199,112 57,931 398,872 2001P 359,851 2002L 321,239 2004P 313,437 2007L 118,084 45,259 181,141 47,240 2,578 2007P 129,410 57,002 196,207 54,611 2,702 1,984 88,652 2009L 154,207 45,285 200,148 95,066 2010P 172,552 14,924 224,339 77,130 86—A POWER PRIMER: A HANDBOOK TO POLITICS, PEOPLE AND PARTIES IN KOSOVO WWW.IKSWEB.ORG Table 3. Overview of the voter distribution among main minority parties. 2000L KDTP KTB BSDAK SDA VAKAT NDS GIG CDS SDP PDASHK PDAK BDA PAI IRDK LEK PREBK KP GIS SLKM SNS ND SLS JSL SDSKiM SKMS SNSDKiM 57 329 939 317 447 303 2717 89388 13238 369 1414 26 92 500 224 256 855 4,331 14,352 6,004 1,008 1049 442 600 596 3976 3136 2658 2135 2121 2,306 1552 3411 505 2760 361 2555 2718 3443 1,337 1,205 1,386 1,690 1,010 690 2,871 1789 1505 1358 989 1227 3653 9030 6972 2906 1322 1452 2520 4972 2468 5269 3661 5428 1,973 4,168 2,480 454 470 790 2001P 7879 2002L 7760 2004P 8353 2007L 5184 2007P 4999 2009L 7,497 2010P 8,548 1,364 1,818 1,602 5,296 2,478 787 A POWER PRIMER: A HANDBOOK TO POLITICS, PEOPLE AND PARTIES IN KOSOVO—87 Symbols 1981 protests 20, 21, 22, 35 A AAK 5, 8, 10, 21, 29, 34, 37, 41, 43, 44, 45, 46, 49, 52, 55, 56, 58, 59, 60, 62, 64, 65, 66, 68, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 82, 86 Adem Demaçi 18, 26, 28, 29, 35, 36, 38, 53, 54, 76 Adem Jashari 26, 32, 37, 59 Adem Limani 28 ADK 8, 30, 62, 78, 79, 86 Agim Çeku 19, 41, 43, 45, 50, 53, 74, 76, 77 Ahmet Mulliqi 79 AKR 5, 8, 11, 41, 42, 43, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 56, 62, 64, 65, 66, 68, 75, 76, 77, 78, 80, 85, 86 Albania 10, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 22, 24, 27, 31, 35, 36, 37, 38, 44, 53, 55, 57, 72, 75, 79, 87 Albanian identity 71, 74, 77 Albin Kurti 38, 53, 54, 55, 75 Aleksander Ranković 16 Alfred Moisiu 24 Ali Shukriu 23 Anton Çetta 25, 27, 28 Appeal 215 23 AQK 8, 43, 75 Ardian Gjini 45 Ashkali 8, 9, 58, 66, 67, 68, 69, 81, 82, 83 Atifete Jahjaga 11 Autonomous Region of Kosovo 15 Avni Arifi 45 Avni Klinaku 36, 37, 72 AVNOJ 8, 14 Azem Syla 36, 40, 43 Azem Vllasi 19, 20, 22 Bajram Rexhepi 39, 40, 42, 43, 51, 52, 73 Bardhyl Mahmuti 40 Baton Haxhiu 39, 42, 47 BDA 8, 66, 68, 69, 87 Behgjet Pacolli 10, 34, 41, 42, 49, 50, 51, 52, 56, 75 Belgrade University 17, 21 Beqir Bytyqi 82 Bill Clinton 38 Bislim Hoti 83 BK 8, 78, 79, 86 Blerim Kuçi 79 Blerim Shala 45 Boris Yeltsin 50 Bosnia and Herzegovina 47, 50 Bosniaks 56, 58, 67, 81 BSDAK 8, 66, 81, 82, 87 Bujar Abdullahu 80 Bujar Bukoshi 25, 28, 29 Bujar Dugolli 38 Bujku 29 45, 47, 56, 58, 59, 60, 62, 74, 84 Dukagjin Gorani 39, 41, 47 Džezair Murati 81 E E15 8, 62, 75 Eastern Kosovo 59, 60 Edita Tahiri 28, 30, 62, 78, 79 Egyptians 9, 58, 67, 69, 83 Elections 40, 66, 69, 86 Emilija Redžepi 81 Enver Hoxha 19, 36 Enver Hoxhaj 41, 42 Eqrem Basha 47 ESI 8, 32, 58, 64 Etem Arifi 83 EU 8, 30, 40, 43, 64, 79 EULEX 8, 39, 42, 43, 53, 54, 55 European Parliament 53 F Faculty of Philosophy 24, 25, 26 Fadil Fazliu 73 Fadil Hoxha 14, 16, 18, 27 FARK 8, 29 Fatmir Limaj 10, 11, 33, 42, 43 Fehmi Agani 25, 26, 27, 38 FER 5, 8, 48, 49, 51, 56, 64, 65, 66, 75, 86 Ferdinando Boatier de Mangeot 55 Ferid Agani 53, 77 Ferizaj 59, 61, 63, 64, 65, 68, 69, 75, 80, 82 FES 8, 70, 73 First World War 15 Florin Krasniqi 37 Former political prisoners 27 Fuad Ramiqi 77 C Catholics 58, 66, 67 CDS 8, 66, 68, 69, 83, 87 CEFTA 70, 71, 74, 75 Chris Hill 38 Christopher W. Dell 51 CLY 8 Communism 14 Communist Party 8, 14, 15, 17, 23, 24, 26, 57 Constitutional Court 10, 32, 33, 34, 50, 52, 53, 70, 75 Coordinating Council of Political Parties 28 CPY 8, 15 D Danush Ademi 83 Daut Haradinaj 37 Daut Maloku 28, 79 Dayton Accords 30 Deçan 27, 44, 57, 58, 61, 62, 64, 74 Dick Marty 10, 39 Dragash 58, 62, 68, 81, 82 Drenas 41, 59, 61, 62 Drenica 15, 36, 37, 38, 41, 43, 54, 58, 59, 65, 72 Dukagjin 14, 31, 39, 41, 43, 44, B Bahri Fazliu 36, 72 Bajram Kosumi 19, 28, 41, 45, 50, 62, 74, 76, 77, 79 88—A POWER PRIMER: A HANDBOOK TO POLITICS, PEOPLE AND PARTIES IN KOSOVO WWW.IKSWEB.ORG G Gani Krasniqi 55 GAP 8, 48, 75 GIG 8, 66, 67, 68, 81, 82, 87 GIS 8, 66, 85, 87 Gjakova 11, 14, 16, 21, 26, 44, 45, 51, 52, 57, 58, 61, 62, 63, 64, 66, 68, 69, 73, 77, 80 Gjergj Dedaj 76, 77 Gjilan 20, 59, 61, 62, 63, 64, 68 Gllogjan 44 Gojko Savić 84 Gorani 28, 39, 41, 47, 56, 58, 66, 67, 68, 81 Gospić 50 Government of Kosovo 9 49, 52, 70 Istog 24, 58, 60, 68, 69, 82 J Jakup Krasniqi 28, 38, 40, 41, 42, 43, 70 Jashar Salihu 37, 40 JIAS 8, 25, 32, 33, 39, 45, 80, 85 JNA 8, 21 JSL 8, 66, 85, 87 Junik 38, 45, 58, 62, 64, 74 Jusuf Bajraktari 25 Jusuf Buxhovi 25, 26, 27, 28 K Kaçanik 23, 28, 59, 61, 62 KACI 8, 49 Kadri Veseli 36, 38 Kadri Zeka 36 Kai Eide 54 Kamenica 19, 59, 61 KAN 8, 53, 54, 75 Kaqusha Jashari 19, 77 Karadag 59 KDTP 8, 66, 68, 73, 75, 80, 81, 87 KEK 8, 55, 70, 73, 74 KFOR 8, 42 KIC 8, 28 KIPRED 8, 48, 75 KKR 8 Kllokot 59 KMLDNJ 8, 28, 47 KOHA 27, 37, 38, 48 Koha Ditore 39, 47, 48, 52 Kolë Berisha 45 Kosovo Committee of the Yugoslav 14 Kosovo Police 9, 10, 11 Kosovo Security Force 40, 53 KP 8, 66, 84, 85, 87 Krajina 50 KTB 8, 66, 80, 87 KTV 8, 42, 43, 47 KVM 8, 39 H Hajredin Kuçi 41, 42 Hajrullah Gorani 28 Hamëz Jashari 26 Hashim Thaçi 10, 26, 32, 33, 35, 38, 39, 41, 42, 43, 59, 73 Haxhi Zylfi Merxha 83 Helsinki Committee for Human Rights 28 Highlands 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 78 Hilmo Kandić 81 Hivzi Islami 28 Homeland Calling 35, 37, 40 HRW 8, 40 Hydajet Hyseni 27, 28, 38, 42, 79 Hysamedin Azemi 23 64, 65, 68, 71, 76, 86 LDK 5, 7, 8, 10, 11, 16, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 44, 45, 47, 49, 52, 56, 59, 60, 61, 62, 64, 65, 66, 68, 70, 71, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 82, 86 LDSH 8, 79 LEK 8, 66, 67, 83, 87 Leposaviq 58, 68, 69 LIB 8, 37, 68, 72, 73 Lipjan 59, 61 LKCK 72, 75, 86 LPK 8, 35, 36, 37, 38, 44, 71, 72, 75, 86 LPRK 8, 36, 39, 72 LRSSHJ 8, 36 Luljeta Pula 28, 77 M Mabetex 50, 52, 75 Mahmut Bakalli 19, 20, 21, 44, 74 Mark Krasniqi 25, 76, 77 Martinović case 20 Mehmet Hajrizi 27, 28, 79 Mehmet Kraja 23, 24, 25, 27, 36 Memli Krasniqi 41 Mentor Kaçi 80 Milazim Krasniqi 25, 27 Mimoza Kusari-Lila 51, 52, 53 Minorities 22, 66 Mitrovica 58, 59, 62, 63, 64, 68 Montenegrins 8, 14, 15, 16, 20, 21, 28, 56, 58, 63, 67, 68, 83 Montenegro 14, 15, 25, 27, 31, 56, 57, 66 Muhamedin Kullashi 27, 28, 77 Muhamet Bicaj 28 Mujë Krasniqi 36, 37 Murselj Haljilji 81 I Ibrahim Makolli 52 Ibrahim Rugova 18, 21, 24, 25, 26, 28, 29, 30, 32, 33, 34, 37, 46, 62, 70, 71, 73, 74, 75 ICG 8, 37, 38, 40, 44 ICTY 8, 10, 21, 41, 42, 44, 45 Idriz Ajeti 25, 28 IKS 8, 11, 12, 19, 25, 26, 27, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 42, 43, 45, 49, 51, 52, 54, 55, 58, 64 Ilaz Kadolli 72 Ilir Deda 48, 51, 75 INGO 8 Institute of Albanology 24 IRDK 8, 66, 68, 69, 83, 84, 87 Isa Mustafa 10, 28, 32, 33, 34, 42, L LB 8, 37, 68, 72, 73, 86 LBD 8, 25, 76, 79 LCK 8, 20, 22, 23, 24, 26, 27, 30 LDD 8, 31, 33, 41, 49, 52, 56, 61, A POWER PRIMER: A HANDBOOK TO POLITICS, PEOPLE AND PARTIES IN KOSOVO—89 N Naim Maloku 44, 79 National Salvation Council 38, 44 NATO 8, 26, 32, 38, 39, 40, 48, 54, 81 ND 8, 66, 85, 87 NDS 8, 66, 67, 81, 82, 87 Nexhat Daci 29, 31, 33, 45, 52, 56, 61, 70, 71 NGO 8, 28, 47, 48, 49 NGO sector 48 Nikë Gjeloshi 28, 77 Numan Balić 80, 81 O Obilic 59 Oliver Ivanović 84, 85 Open Society Foundation 29, 47, 48 ORA 5, 8, 44, 47, 48, 49, 56, 64, 65, 66, 68, 74, 75, 79, 86 Orthodox 20, 58 OSCE 8, 38, 40, 56 OZNA 17 PPK 9, 18, 28, 44, 47, 48, 52, 54, 62, 75, 76, 77 PQLK 9, 44, 78, 79, 86 PREBK 9, 66, 67, 83, 84, 87 Predrag Despotović 83 PReK 29 Prishtina 7, 11, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 58, 59, 60, 62, 63, 64, 68, 70, 71, 73, 75, 77, 78, 79, 80 Privatization 70 Prizren 15, 21, 30, 56, 57, 58, 62, 63, 64, 66, 68, 75, 78, 81, 82, 83 Provisional Government 9, 39, 41 Provisional Institutions of SelfGovernance (PISG) 67 PSDK 9, 28 PSHDK 9, 28, 31, 68, 71, 76, 77, 86 PSK 9, 72, 86 PTK 9, 55, 73 S Sabit Gashi 36, 72 Sabri Novosella 36, 72 Sali Gashi 31 SANU 9, 20, 21 SAP 9 Saša Djokić 85 SAWP 9, 27 SDA 9, 66, 68, 80, 81, 82, 87 SDSKiM 9, 66, 69, 84, 85, 87 Second World War 14, 15, 17, 35, 57, 59, 63, 79 Serb 11, 16, 20, 22, 39, 66, 67, 84, 85 Serbia 8, 14, 15, 17, 19, 21, 22, 23, 24, 27, 29, 30, 31, 32, 35, 37, 39, 45, 50, 58, 59, 61, 64, 66, 75, 79, 85 SFRJ 9 Shaban Polluzha 15, 59 Shaban Shala 40 SHIK 9, 42 Shpend Ahmeti 48, 51, 75 Shtime 58, 59, 61, 62 Skenderaj 39, 40, 59, 61, 62, 73, 80 SKMS 9, 66, 68, 69, 85, 87 SLKM 9, 85, 87 Slobodan Milošević 21, 22, 35, 40 Slobodan Petrović 10, 11, 85 SLS 9, 10, 11, 56, 62, 66, 68, 69, 84, 85, 87 Smajl Latifi 72, 73 SNS 9, 66, 85, 87 SNSKiM 9, 85 Socialist Alliance of Working People 9, 26 SOE 9 Stalinist 17, 19, 36 Student Union (UPSUP) 54 Suhareka 29, 45, 56, 57, 59, 60, 71, 72, 78 Switzerland 35, 36, 37, 39, 40, 44, 50, 72 Sylejman Selimi 43 Q Qëndrim Gashi 75 QPK 9 Qyshk 50 P PAI 8, 66, 67, 83, 87 Paris 17, 24 Partesh 59 PBD 8, 40 PD 8, 52, 53, 62, 68, 75, 77, 78, 86 PDAK 9, 66, 68, 69, 83, 87 PDASHK 9, 66, 82, 83, 87 PDK 5, 9, 10, 11, 29, 30, 32, 33, 34, 35, 37, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 46, 49, 50, 52, 55, 56, 59, 60, 61, 62, 64, 65, 66, 68, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 82, 85, 86 PDKI 9, 76, 77, 86 Peja 24, 35, 45, 50, 56, 57, 58, 59, 61, 62, 63, 64, 68, 69, 80, 81, 82 PFK 9, 28 PGJK 9, 52, 62, 75, 86 Pleurat Sejdiu 40 PLK 9, 68, 76, 77, 79, 86 PNDSh 9 Podujeva 32, 59, 60, 71, 85 POE 9 PPDK 9, 40, 73 PPI 9, 52, 62 R Rada Trajković 85 RAE 9, 69 Rahovec 56, 57, 58, 73, 85 Raif Qela 36, 72 Rambouillet Conference 18, 25, 30, 32, 38, 39, 41, 45, 47, 48, 79 Ramush Haradinaj 10, 37, 41, 43, 44, 45, 46, 58, 62, 74, 77 Ramush Tahiri 28 Regional People’s Council of Kosovo 15 Reshit Hanadan 80 Rexhep Qosja 24, 25, 26, 32, 38, 39, 79 Rexhep Selimi 36, 37, 38, 55 Richard Holbrooke 38 Rilindja 23, 24, 45, 47 Roma 9, 40, 58, 66, 67, 68, 83 Rrahman Morina 23 90—A POWER PRIMER: A HANDBOOK TO POLITICS, PEOPLE AND PARTIES IN KOSOVO WWW.IKSWEB.ORG T Teuta Sahatqija 49 The Hague 10, 41, 45, 46, 62, 74, 77 Tito 14, 16, 17, 19, 20 TMK 9, 43 Transitional Council 39, 45, 80 Trepça 15, 22, 23, 55, 58 Turks 56, 58, 64, 67, 68, 80 W Western Kosovo 56, 57, 60 William Walker 39 Women’s Forum 30 World Bank 48, 51 X Xhavit Haliti 35, 36, 42 Xhevdet Neziraj 83 U UÇK 5, 7, 9, 11, 12, 13, 16, 18, 24, 25, 26, 31, 32, 33, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 49, 50, 53, 54, 55, 58, 59, 72, 73, 74, 76, 77, 79 UD 9, 80 UDBA 9, 17, 24 UJDI 9, 27, 47, 48 Ukë Rugova 29, 34, 46, 62 Ukshin Hoti 79 Unification 18, 35, 55 UNIKOMB 9, 44, 75, 78, 79, 86 Union of Independent Trade Unions of Kosovo 28 United Nations 9, 11, 32, 37, 40, 48, 54 University of Prishtina 11, 19, 20, 24, 26, 30, 31, 32, 33, 35, 39, 41, 44, 45, 51, 53, 54 University of Prishtina Independent 31, 53, 54 UNMIK 9, 11, 32, 40, 45, 53, 54, 55, 64, 67, 70, 75 UNSC 9, 54 US 9, 10, 11, 30, 35, 37, 38, 51 USAID 47, 51 Y Ylber Hysa 47, 49 Youth Parliament 28, 47, 76 Yugoslav Central Committee 19 Yugoslav secret service 17 Z Zadar 50 Zagreb University 31 Zef Morina 77 Zubin Potok 58, 60, 68, 69 V VATAN 9, 81, 82 Veton Surroi 27, 28, 39, 47, 48, 49, 75 Vezira Emruš 81, 82 Vienna 24, 32, 49, 50, 55 Vienna negotiations 32 Viti 20, 59, 61, 64, 66 Vlora Çitaku 41 Vushtrri 59, 68, 73 VV 9, 65, 66, 72, 75, 86 A POWER PRIMER: A HANDBOOK TO POLITICS, PEOPLE AND PARTIES IN KOSOVO—91 ABOUT US The Kosovar Stability Initiative (IKS) is an independent, notfor-profit think tank focusing on empirical research and analysis of socio-economic developments in Kosovo. Founded in 2004, IKS offers innovative and policy-relevant research with the aim of initiating debates on issues of importance for Kosovo’s future. We believe that evidence-based public debates stand at the core of democratic decision making. Since summer 2004, IKS has expanded its team to eight full-time analysts and researchers, with a growing network of part time researchers and associates. The work of IKS is also supported by the Board of Directors including Kosovar and international analysts and practitioners. Since its inception IKS’s work has focused on issues of governance, socio economic development, urban planning, corruption in post-war reconstruction, education, youth, environmental issues and Kosovo’s image problem. IKS is also part of an ESI-inspired network of think-tanks across South East Europe. All reports are freely available on our website at: www.iksweb. org. Kosovar Stability Initiative — IKS Phone: + 381 38 222 321 E-mail: info@iksweb.org; www.iksweb.org Address: Rr. Garibaldi H11/6, Prishtinë, Kosovë 92—A POWER PRIMER: A HANDBOOK TO POLITICS, PEOPLE AND PARTIES IN KOSOVO WWW.IKSWEB.ORG Design and illustration: trembelat Typeface used: On biographies: Trembelat Test; On text: Garamond; On main titles & cover: Kapital. This page is B5 format with top, outside & inside margins 1.6 cm. Bottom margin is 1.8 cm. A POWER PRIMER: A HANDBOOK TO POLITICS, PEOPLE AND PARTIES IN KOSOVO—93 Katalogimi në botim – (CIP) Biblioteka Kombëtare dhe Universitare e Kosovës 329 (496.51) A Power Primer Kosovo : A handbook to Politics, People and Parties in Kosovo / [Kosovar Stability Initiative]. – Prishtina : IKS, 2011. – 96 f. : ilustr. me ngjyra ; 21 cm Preface: pg. 7 ISBN 978-9951-600-03-3 94—A POWER PRIMER: A HANDBOOK TO POLITICS, PEOPLE AND PARTIES IN KOSOVO WWW.IKSWEB.ORG A POWER PRIMER: A HANDBOOK TO POLITICS, PEOPLE AND PARTIES IN KOSOVO—95 ©Copyright IKS, December 2011 96—A POWER PRIMER: A HANDBOOK TO POLITICS, PEOPLE AND PARTIES IN KOSOVO WWW.IKSWEB.ORG
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