SCIR Fall 2012 Issue

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Fall 2012 Issue of the Southern California International Review, a global undergraduate international studies journal published biannually and funded by the School of International Relations at the University of Southern California

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Southern California International ReviewVolume 2, Number 2 Fall 2012Dedicated to the memory of a beloved teacher and respected leader:Robert L. FriedheimProfessor of International Relations, 1976-2001Director of the School of International Relations, 1992-1995The Southern California International Review (SCIR) is a bi-annual interdis-ciplinary print and online journal of scholarship in the field of international studies generously funded by the School of International Relations at the University of Southern California (USC). In particular, SCIR would like to thank the Robert L. Friedheim Fund and the USC SIR Alumni Fund. Founded in 2011, the journal seeks to foster and enhance discussion between theoretical and policy-oriented research regarding significant global issues. SCIR also serves as an opportunity for undergraduate students at USC to publish their work. SCIR is managed completely by students and also pro-vides undergraduates valuable experience in the fields of editing and graphic design.Copyright 2012 Southern California International Review.All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in anyform without the express written consent of the Southern California InternationalReview.Views expressed in this journal are solely those of the authors themselves and do not necessarilyrepresent those of the editorial board, faculty advisors, or the University of Southern California.Southern California International Reviewscinternationalreview.orgStaffEditor-in-ChiefSamir KumarAssistant Editor-in-Chief: Andrew JuEditors:Natalie TecimerMatthew PrusakTaline GettasRebecca BraunCover Design: Samir KumarLayout: Rebecca BraunContents1. The 16 Year CrisisSecurity, Geopolitics, and Conflict Management in the ArcticKelsey Bradshaw, Jason Finklestein, Nicholas Kosturos92. Expressions of NationalismExploring the Implications of Russian GemeinschaftTyler D. Tyburski293. The Ethnic Korean Population in JapanThe Last Frontier?Alyssa Min434. Genocide, Identity, and the StateThe Dire Potential for Conflict in Colonial IdentitiesErik Peterson57The capability and dedication of our authors and editors are what make this issue strong, but USCs faith in our abilities is just as valuable. SCIR would not exist without the generous funding provided by the Robert L. Freidheim Memorial Endowment, and the support of the School of International Relations. Significant appreciation goes to the Director, Dr. Robert English, and the wonderful faculty and staff that have assisted us over the past three years. I would particularly like to thank Linda Cole for her constant presence and her willingness to see us succeed at our current endeavors and lay the groundwork to aim higher.Finally, please do not underestimate our receptivity to your comments! We would love to hear your feedback on this issue. Please send us your comments, questions, and sugges-tions at scinternationalreview@gmail.com, and we will do our best to take these into account or offer a thoughtful reply.Sincerely,Samir KumarEditor-in-ChiefDear Reader,It is with great pleasure that I introduce the fourth issue of the Southern California International Review (SCIR). This bi-annual undergraduate journal based at the University of Southern California seeks to create a unique opportunity for students to publish their research and other academic work in order to spread their ideas to a wider audience. By fostering such dialogue between students of international relations and related fields both on campus and throughout the country, SCIR seeks to promote a better understanding of the global challenges facing our world today. As our world becomes increasingly intercon-nected through technology, trade, and diplomacy, it is evident that events occurring any-where on the globe have worldwide effects. The need to not only study, but also interrogate, international relations and related disciplines, has never been more important. Thus, this journal desires to contribute unique and innovative ideas to this fascinating and essential field of study.I am happy to write that this is the second issue in which SCIR accepted article submis-sions from students at universities other than USC. The pieces contained in the journal are written by undergraduate students and were chosen by our six member editorial board. The graphics, templates, and formatting was also designed by our editorial board. In an effort to not restrict students in their submissions, SCIR welcomed submissions on a wide variety of topics in the realm of international studies, thereby emphasizing our commitment to interdisciplinary learning. From a discussion of an emerging threat to international security in the Arctic to an examination of identity manipulation in Rwanda, the content of this issue should engage you and prompt further inquiry into these particular realms of study. As you read, ask your-self, Why is this article important? My hope is that your question is answered, and you find yourself with a host of more incisive questions that would incite enthralling answers. Additionally, in the future, please keep an eye out for the authors published herein, for they might soon be in a position to influence the very issues that they have examined!A letter from the editor:The 16 Years Crisis Security, Geopolitics, and Conflict in the ArcticKelsey Bradshaw, Jason Finklestein, Nicholas Kosturos We dont talk about conflict or else it might happenJyrki Terva, Finnish Consul General to St. Petersburg, Russian FederationDue to a changing global climate, the Arctic region of our globe is shifting from being ice-capped to ice-free. Though the Arctic region is not regularly on the forefront of most Ameri-cans minds, the untapped resources at the bottom of Arctic Ocean in conjunction with the potential for drastically cheaper shipping options makes the Arctic a region of utmost economic and geostrategic significance for many nations across the globe. Claims on critical natural resources and shipping routes are tenuous at best, which should lead diplomats and leaders to be wary of possible disputes. This research paper finds a startling dissonance between regional states behavior and state officials statements and positions with regards to the status quo of affairs in the Arctic. In addition to a telling denial by diplomats of any potential for conflict, a number of factors indicate a high risk of potential interstate conflict. These security risks in-clude an evident military buildup in the Arctic region; lack of effective governing institutions; post-Cold War tensions and the resulting realist-driven operational codes; internal domestic political pressures; and the uncertainty of the Artic Councils future leadership role. While this report does not seek to be alarmist about a looming world war, it suggests that Arctic conflict management has become increasingly critical to preventing the Arctic from transforming from a zone of peace into a zone of conflict. IntroductionThe Arctic is hot is the fashion in which Russian diplomat Aleksi Ivanov recently described the growing significance of the Arctic to the world.1 The depletion of worldwide 1 Aleksi Ivanov, interview held with University of Southern California researchers, Stockholm, Sweden, May 25, 2012.Kelsey Bradshaw is a senior at the University of Southern California majoring in International Relations.Jason Finklestein is a senior at the University of Southern California majoring in International Relations.Nicholas Kosturos is a junior at the University of Southern California majoring in International Relations.10Southern California International Review - Vol. 2 No. 211Southern California International Review - Vol. 2 No. 2The 16 Years CrisisKelsey Bradshaw, Jason Finklestein, Nicholas Kosturosoil and gas resources has caused many states around the world to pay increased attention to the Arctic region, which holds 25% of the worlds natural gas2, 13% of its oil3, and 20% of its technologically important rare-earth elements.4 In addition to containing critical natu-ral resources, the Arctics melting ice has allowed for new shipping routes to become more accessible, such as the Northwest and Northeast passages.5 The successful navigation of these passages could result in an up to 40% decrease in shipping costs when compared to conventional shipping routes.6 These new estimates of rich natural resource reserves and increased shipping efficiency possibilities in the Arctic have resulted in the applications of states including China, India, Italy, the European Union (EU), and South Korea to obtain Permanent Observer status in the Arctic Council. With high stakes and numerous states vying for position in the region, the Arctic certainly seems to be growing hot. In 1939, Edward Hallet Carr published The Twenty Years Crisis, a work central to the canon of modern day international relations theory. Carr advanced the argument that excessively idealistic thinking following the World War I acted as the primary cause for World War II. Carr postulated that world leaders of the period were subject to a crisis of idealism, where they fell prey to the dangerous and glaring defect of nearly all thinking: neglect of power. In Carrs eyes, these leaders placed excessive trust in liberal internation-alism and the role of international organizations, and therefore were victim to the classical realist motivations for human behavior. What some may term wishful thinking failed to prevent the rise of fascism and subsequently World War II.We see this could be considered analogous to the situation developing in both the of-ficial positions and the thought processes of the vast majority of Arctic diplomats. As will be shown in this paper, there is near universal denial among diplomatic officials of any pos-sibility of interstate conflict in the Arctic. While this paper does not intend to be alarmist about a looming World War III, diplomats and researchers who grapple with Arctic issues appear to dangerously disregard the prospect of interstate conflict. This research paper seeks to evaluate the significant security challenges that exist in the Arctic region, specifically the possibility of interstate conflict, and to identify problem areas that, if left unaddressed, could lead the Arctic to become a center of strife in this century. This paper will also propose recommendations to improve multilateral negotiation in the realm of security in order to prevent the possibility of a large-scale armed conflict. 2 Ekaterina Klimenko, Ambitious Plans and Domestic Policies for the Arctic in Russia, Stockholm International Peace Re-search Institute Meeting with University of Southern California researchers (Stockholm, Sweden), May 21, 2012.3 90 billion Barrels of Oil and 1670 Trillion Cubic Feet of Natural Gas Assessed in the Arctic, U.S. Geological Survey, ac-cessed June 6, 2012, http://www.usgs.gov/newsroom/article.asp?ID=1980#.T89KA-068UU.4 Matteo Rongione, Role of Resources in the Arctic- Rare Earth Elements, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (Stockholm, Sweden), May 21, 2012.5 Tom Arnbom, Arctic is Hot, World Wildlife Fund (Stockholm, Sweden) May 22, 2012.6 Alun Anderson, After the Ice, (Washington DC: Smithsonian, 2009).Background InformationBefore exploring current politics and security concerns in the region, it is prudent to discuss how the history of the region informs the present day. Many explorers have at-tempted to conquer the Arctic and the northern passages, most to no avail. In 1845, Sir John Franklin and two British Navy ships set out to explore the Northwest Passage and never returned. More than forty search expeditions were sent to look for the explorers, but it was not until 1981 that evidence, such as graves and bodies that explained the ships demise, were found near King Williams Island, 70 degrees latitude.7 On April 6th, 1909 another team of explorers, made up of Americans and Inuits, arrived at the North Pole. They had made the long journey from Cape Columbia on Ellesmere Island by dogsled.8 Cold-weather capabili-ties have expanded drastically since that time. Today, explorers investigate the Arctic via icebreaker ships and floating scientific stations and venture off the semi-permanent struc-tures using use aircraft, dog sleds, skis, and snowmobiles to learn more about the region.While there has been interest in the Arctic as an unexplored region for centuries, it was not until recently that ecological and environmental factors began to capture the awareness a broader audience than explorers. Sea ice coverage fluctuates throughout the year, with the high in March and the low in September. This trend has only increased in its intensity in recent times. Research shows that a sharp decline in summer sea ice occurred in September of 2007, shrinking the total ice-covered area down down to 4.28 million square kilometers, a record low.9 This dramatic decline in summer sea ice opened coastlines throughout north-ern Russia and the northern Canadian islands, making the possibility of using northern sea routes for shipping and tourism more plausible. Furthermore, New deposits for oil and natural gas drilling were discovered because of the shrinking sea ice, and many Arctic states, including Russia, the United States, and Norway, have began researching possible deposits and drilling sites.However, increased possibilities within the region have not been without their price. The nation-states with Arctic coastlines remain at odds over how to divide up the region, perhaps more so than ever before.10 Both Canada and Russia claim the territory connected to the Lomonosov ridge and have appealed to the Arctic Council with scientific evidence that purportedly shows the ridge extending from their shoreline. Although no decision has 7 Fitzpatrick, Kathleen, Franklin, Sir John (17861847), Australian Dictionary of Biography, National Centre of Biography, Australian National University, http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/franklin-sir-john-2066/text2575, accessed 20 October 2012.8 Robert Peary: To the Top of the World. PBS. PBS, 1999. Web. 20 Oct. 2012. .9 Renfrow, Stephanie. Arctic Sea Ice Shatters All Previous Record Lows. NSIDC Arctic Sea Ice News Fall 2007. National Snow and Ice Data Center, 1 Oct. 2007. Web. 20 Oct. 2012. 10 Bennett, Jody R. Vying for Power in the High North. International Relations Security Network. ISN Security Watch, 6 Sept. 2012. Web. 15 Oct. 2012. 12Southern California International Review - Vol. 2 No. 213Southern California International Review - Vol. 2 No. 2The 16 Years CrisisKelsey Bradshaw, Jason Finklestein, Nicholas Kosturosbeen made, and none will be made in the near future, both countries are scouring the ridge to find the natural resources required to bolster their cases for an extension of their Exclusive Economic Zone.Between other nation-states in the region, a renewal of historical antipathy has oc-curred. The United States and Russia, the two nation-states at the center of the Cold War,, both maintain a significant presence in the Artic and have considerable interest in project-ing power within the region. Russia has already sought to strengthen its Arctic presence by announcing plans to build naval infrastructure hubs along the Northern Sea Route to act as rescue centers and military bases.11 In turn, other states are also ramping up their Arctic military capabilities in order to protect borders, conduct training exercises, and provide search and rescue assistance. This military buildup appears bourn out of a desire to project power rather than to conduct routine patrolling or search and rescue operations. The nature of this arms race will be addressed further in the Security Concerns section of this paper. Since 2007, the Arctic has once again been identified as a new hot spot for exploration. A renewed effort to conduct scientific studies and to map the region has brought the worlds attention to the tantalizing prospects of a resource-rich Arctic. Arctic states are aware of the economic and geopolitical significance of the region and are putting forth a great effort to secure their national interests. National InterestsEach Arctic state has significant national interests in the region. As mentioned previ-ously, the economic factors including oil, natural gas, and fishing stock are major motiva-tions for Arctic states. In addition, strategic interests such as control of crucial shipping territory also play a prominent role. In addition to these incentives, other areas of interest fuel the behavior of the Arctic states. Each Arctic state has outlined their priorities for the Arctic as the region gains greater attention. By looking at these motivations, greater clarity about the overall situation can be attained.United States The United States defines itself as an Arctic state due to Alaskas location within the Artic. The United States has publicly identified its Arctic priorities as homeland secu-rity, economic security, international governance, extended continental shelf and boundary finalization, the promotion of international scientific cooperation, maritime transport, and environmental protection. The United States also has publicly stated its desire to strengthen cooperation among the eight Arctic states.1211 Ibid.12 Lassi Heininen, Arctic Strategies and Policies: Inventory and Comparative Study. The Northern Research Forum and the University of Lapland (2012) pp. 53-57, 68-69, 69, 70-71, 78.Russian Federation Russias self-proclaimed Arctic strategy revolves around maintaining their role as a leading power within the Arctic, as roughly half the coastal area of the Arctic Ocean lies within their territory. Besides Russias obvious energy interests in the region, the nation-state has ten strategic priorities relating to the Arctic: active interaction with sub-Arctic states to delimit maritime areas with international law, fostering the creation of Arctic search and rescue regimes, to strengthen bilateral relationships within regional organizations, assist in organization/management/use of cross polar air and sea routes, contribute to international arctic forums, delimit maritime spaces in the Arctic and maintain mutually advantageous presence in Spitsbergen Archipelago, improve state management of social and economic development, improve quality of life for indigenous peoples, develop arctic resource base through technological capabilities, modernize and develop the infrastructure of transpor-tation and fisheries. Russia plans to contribute to international cooperation by strength-ening bilateral relationships with regional organizations and participating in international forums.13 Norway Norway has various national interests in the Arctic, including state security, eco-nomic development, and regional cooperation. Its declared priorities are helping to pro-mote knowledge about climate change and environmental security, improving monitoring, emergency response, and maritime safety systems, promoting sustainable use of offshore petroleum and renewable resources, promoting onshore business development, further de-veloping infrastructure, continuing to strengthen cooperation with Russia, and safeguard-ing the cultures and livelihoods of the indigenous peoples. It should be noted, however, that Norways foremost diplomatic priority is to maintain stable diplomatic relations with Russia.14Denmark (Greenland) Denmarks stake in the Arctic and seat on the Arctic Council is driven by its na-tional interests in Greenland. Denmark and Greenlands joint arctic strategy identifies their priorities as supporting and strengthening Greenlands development toward autonomy and maintaining the commonwealths position as a major player in the arctic. Denmarks plan has four separate priorities: creating a peaceful, secure, and safe arctic; self-sustaining growth and development; developing with respect for the Arctics fragile climate, environment, and 13 Heininen, Arctic Strategies and Policies: Inventory and Comparative Study. The Northern Research Forum and the Univer-sity of Lapland (2012) pp. 42-49, 68, 69, 70, 78.14 Heininen, Arctic Strategies and Policies: Inventory and Comparative Study. The Northern Research Forum and the Univer-sity of Lapland (2012) pp. 35-42, 68, 69, 70, 77-78.14Southern California International Review - Vol. 2 No. 215Southern California International Review - Vol. 2 No. 2The 16 Years CrisisKelsey Bradshaw, Jason Finklestein, Nicholas Kosturosnature; and cooperating closely with international partners. Denmark and Greenland also believe that the role of the Arctic Council should be emphasized and extended, and inter-national organizations, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), should be included in international cooperation discussions.15Finland Finland asserts itself as a natural Arctic power with both a Northern and Arctic identity. The Finnish government seeks to emerge as a major power in Northern Europe as well. Its priorities in the Arctic are the environment, economic activities such as fishing, transportation and infrastructure advancements, and the protection indigenous peoples. They see international cooperation as a way to lay the groundwork for Finlands activities in the Arctic and promote intergovernmental organization.16Sweden Sweden emphasizes the historic, geopolitical, economic, environmental, scientific, and cultural ties connecting them to the Arctic. The priorities of their strategy are climate and environment protection, economic development. Sweden seeks well functioning mul-tilateral cooperation within the Arctic states.17Canada Canada asserts that being a Northern Country is central to the Canadian National Identity, and it declares itself a global leader in Arctic science. Exercising arctic sovereignty, promoting social and economic development, protecting the Norths environ-mental heritage, and improving and evolving northern governance are Canadas priorities. Canada places a strong emphasis on international cooperation at different levels and wants to cooperate with international organizations and partners.18IcelandIceland is the only country that claims to be located entirely within the Arctic. As a mar-itime nation, it depends on resources from the surrounding seas, including a large supply of fish. Iceland prioritizes international cooperation, security, resource development and 15 Heininen, Arctic Strategies and Policies: Inventory and Comparative Study. The Northern Research Forum and the Univer-sity of Lapland (2012) pp. 17-23, 68, 69, 77.16 Heininen, Arctic Strategies and Policies: Inventory and Comparative Study. The Northern Research Forum and the Univer-sity of Lapland (2012) pp. 23-28, 68, 69, 77.17 Heininen, Arctic Strategies and Policies: Inventory and Comparative Study. The Northern Research Forum and the Univer-sity of Lapland (2012) pp. 49-53, 68, 69, 70, 78.18 Lassi Heininen, Arctic Strategies and Policies: Inventory and Comparative Study. The Northern Research Forum and the University of Lapland (2012) pp. 13-17, 68, 69, 76-77.environmental protection, transportation, peoples and cultures, and research and moni-toring. International cooperation, specifically with Nordic states can be considered one of Icelands top Arctic priorities.19European Union The European Union also wants a stake in the energy-rich Arctic. It places a high priority on protecting/preserving the Arctic environment and population, promoting sustainable use of resources, and contributing to enhanced multilateral governance. The governing body promotes international cooperation and is seeking Permanent Observer status.20These Arctic states and regional bodies share similar priorities in the region. Each state declares a peaceful desire to foster environmental responsibility, multilateral governance, among other noble priorities. However, each state also has momentous economic and politi-cal interests in the region, such as the natural resource deposits and shipping routes available in the Arctic. An examination of current Arctic security issues reveals that the political and economic interests in the region seem to overshadow other appealing priorities, including the promotion of global governance and ecological security. Indeed, the actions of these states even seem to contradict their official priorities. Geopolitical and economic interests have driven states to sacrifice cooperation in favor of national interests, an shift that has led to serious security concerns in the region, including the possibility of heavy militarization. Security ConcernsThere exists strong evidence of a military build-up in the Arctic on part of every nation-state within the Arctic Circle. A report published by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) entitled Military Capabilities in the Arctic, reveals enlighten-ing information regarding this militarization.21 Canada is increasing Arctic troop levels and setting up new bases in the Arctic region facing Greenland. Denmark adopted a special Arctic strategy in 2011 and has since developed a military Arctic Response Force com-prised of aircraft and naval vessels adapted for the Arctic climate. Norway, a member of NATO, has directed its Arctic defense policy towards Russia, according to SIPRI. Norway seems more interested in maintaining formidable military presence in the Arctic Circle. It has completed 5 military training exercises with NATO in the Arctic since 2006 and moved 19 Heininen, Arctic Strategies and Policies: Inventory and Comparative Study. The Northern Research Forum and the Univer-sity of Lapland (2012) pp. 29-34, 68, 69, 70, 77.20 Lassi Heininen, Arctic Strategies and Policies: Inventory and Comparative Study. The Northern Research Forum and the University of Lapland (2012) pp. 57-64, 71, 78-79.21 Siemon Wezeman, Military Capabilities in the Arctic, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Background Papers 2012: 13-14.16Southern California International Review - Vol. 2 No. 217Southern California International Review - Vol. 2 No. 2The 16 Years CrisisKelsey Bradshaw, Jason Finklestein, Nicholas Kosturosits armed forces headquarters nearer to the Arctic Circle in 2009. Russia has also increased military presence in the Arctic region by regularly deploying bomber aircraft and reconnais-sance missions over the Arctic after a 15-year hiatus. In 2011, the U.S. also conducted in a submarine warfare exercise, and the U.S. Coast Guard has been deploying more National Security cutters to the Arctic region. According to an article published by the Center for Climate and Energy Solutions, Climate Change and International Security: The Arctic as a Bellwether, The[se] new military programs have been geared towards combat capabilities that exceed mere constabulary capacity.22 This information suggests Arctic states may be bolstering their militaries to prepare for conflict between state actors, not just for routine offshore patrolling purposes. This militarization brings about a security dilemma, where a perceived or actual mili-tary build-up in one state instills insecurity in another, causing an escalating arms race to ensue. There exists a high potential for this security dilemma to become a reality among Arctic states if high-intensity militarization continues. The build up itself seems contradic-tory to the hopes for a state of continued peace. If, no one thinks about Arctic as a mili-tary zone, such an emphasis on preparing national armed forces for an Arctic engagement would not be occurring. Militarization in conjunction with diplomats downplaying any security threats is certainly dangerous. These non-transparent and security maximizing at-titudes on behalf of states are a threat to peace- however natural this process may be.Despite the grim indications of the continued regional militarization, the possibility for armed interstate conflict is vigorously denied or downplayed by diplomats and researchers. Beyond cursory nods, Dr. Siemon T. Wezeman of SIPRI places little emphasis on the threat of interstate conflict despite a notable military build-up. Dr. Wezeman writes the changes have little or nothing to do with power projection, and may instead be aimed at the patrol-ling and protecting of recognized national territories that are becoming accessible, includ-ing for criminal activities, or towards supporting civilian research.23 When questioned further about his report, Dr. Wezeman stated, no one is planning to go to war.24 Kristopher Bergh, another SIPRI researcher, stated, Security is not a concern to the U.S. when it comes to the Arctic.25 On April 12th and 13th, a meeting of the Arctic Chiefs of Defense Staff- a grouping of Arctic nations military commanders for the region occurred at what is known as the Goose Bay Conference. However, this conference did not discuss issues of hard 22 Rob Huebert, et al., Climate Change and International Security: The Arctic as a Bellwether, Center for Climate and Energy Solutions, May 2012: 23. 23 Siemon Wezeman, Military Capabilities in the Arctic, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Background Papers 2012: 13-14.24 Siemon Wezeman, Discussion of Military Capabilities in the Arctic, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Meeting with University of Southern California researchers (Stockholm, Sweden), May 21, 2012.25 Kristopher Berg, Domestic Drivers for Canadian and U.S. Arctic Policy, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Meeting with University of Southern California researchers (Stockholm, Sweden), May 21, 2012.security, as defined by Professor Lomagin of St. Petersburg State University as security issues relating to defense against state actors.26 Instead, the discussed security issues focused solely on search and rescue, northern environmental challenges and military-aboriginal relations.27 Ambassador Gustav Lind, the Swedish chair of the Arctic Council, recently opened an informational presentation with a proclamation that any rumors of conflict were simply media exaggeration. In regards to a possible military build-up in the Arctic region, Ambassador Lind stated, Military resources are only being used to support civilians.28 Russian Ambassador to Sweden Igor Neverov was adamant about the impossibility of mili-tarization when he said, No one thinks about militarization of the Arctic.29 The Russian Ambassadors top political adviser, Aleksi Ivanov, added, The Arctic is a zone of peace, and, No one thinks about the Arctic as a military zone.30 When discussing a possible resurgence of a 20th century great power rivalry between the U.S. and Russia, Mr. Ivanov noted how the two nations are totally in sync and have aligned interests.31 Dr. Ekaterina Klimenko, a Russia expert at SIPRI, added that there is nothing to be scared of in the Arctic.32 These statements seem to suggest that there exists no possibility whatsoever of any interstate con-flict occurring in the Arctic. Perhaps, as the Finnish Consul General to St. Petersburg, Jyrki Terva suggested, simply talking about conflict is the first step to bringing it about.33 With this principle in mind, any talk regarding conflict is avoided and vigorously denied by official representatives of each Arctic state. Some scholars and diplomats, however, acknowledge that there is high tension in the region. Consul General Aasheim took a less optimistic view about current interstate rela-tions in the Arctic. He stated, in response to questioning on security and cooperation in the Arctic, There is a fight there is a battle.34 Especially prominent is a Cold War legacy re-sulting from the East-West divide that dominated the region for forty years. As Dr. Wezeman stated, The Cold War is not over.35 Tom Arnbom of the World Wildlife Fund Sweden is 26 Nikita Lomagin, Russias Perception of the Arctic and International Cooperation, Lecture with University of Southern California Researchers (St. Petersburg, Russia), May 28, 2012.27 Olin Strader, Arctic Chiefs of Defence Staff Conference- An Opportunity to Formalize Arctic Security, The Arctic Institute: Center for Circumpolar Security Studies, http://www.thearcticinstitute.org/2012/04/arctic-chiefs-of-defence-staff.html?m=1 (April 6, 2012).28 Gustav Lind, interview held during meeting with University of Southern California researchers, Stockholm, Sweden, May 23, 2012.29 Igor Neverov,, interview held during meeting with University of Southern California researchers, Stockholm, Sweden, May 25, 2012.30 Ivanov, Interview with University of Southern California Researchers, May 25, 2012.31 Ivanov, Interview with University of Southern California Researchers, May 25, 2012.32 Klimenko, Ambitious Plans and Domestic Policies for the Arctic in Russia.33 Jyrki Terva, Meeting with University of Southern California Researchers, St. Petersburg, Russia, May 28, 2012.34 Jyrki Terva, Meeting with University of Southern California Researchers, May 28, 2012.35 Wezeman, Discussion of Military Capabilities in the Arctic.18Southern California International Review - Vol. 2 No. 219Southern California International Review - Vol. 2 No. 2The 16 Years CrisisKelsey Bradshaw, Jason Finklestein, Nicholas Kosturoswary that, Canada is going to be very nationalistic when it takes the Chairmanship of the Arctic Council.36 SIPRI expert Dr. Neil Melvin believes that Greenland is one oil strike away from independence.37 These numerous pressures create stark divisions between Arctic states and heighten tensions that are continuously denied by diplomats. The acknowledge-ment of certain conflict potential and the denial of overall security challenges show a certain dissonance that deserves further exploration.The current militarization of the Arctic seems obvious, but many officials counter that the buildup is necessary for combating soft security issues such as illegal fishing. However, a closer look at the nature of the preparations show them to be more geared toward the possibility of interstate conflict rather than routine offshore patrolling. Indeed, no serious threat of transnational crime exists in the Arctic and there has been no evidence to suggest that transnational crime has increased in recent years in the region. While some states and researchers declare the Arctic to be an undisputed zone of peace, other researchers seem to doubt such an optimistic assessment and comment on the areas of tension. Though in-terstate-armed conflict on a grand scale does not seem likely, diplomatic rows and military skirmishes are possible, which could lead to increasingly volatile circumstances. These cir-cumstances could in turn cause these newly reinforced military forces to engage in conflict and turn the Arctic into a zone of instability.Cold War PoliticsA major obstacle to cooperation and coordination between Arctic states is the result of a post-Cold War tension that exists between North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member-states and the weakened Russian Federation. The conclusion of the Cold War has resulted in a great power rivalry between Russia and the United States. This rivalry is a major contributing factor to the lack of communication and mistrust on hard security issues in the region. Indeed, as Dr. Nikita Lomagin of St. Petersburg State University noted, We are still hostage to the Cold War.38 The recent developments of Russias general distrust of NATO forces, especially the United States, is driven by the presence of NATO forces in former Soviet territory. This already existing wariness of NATO was exacerbated when U.S. forces broke an agreement made with Russia over the reunification of East and West Germany by subsequently including former Soviet satellites in the NATO coalition.39 Because of the dis-mantling of the USSRs military forces at the conclusion of the Cold War, Russias apparent 36 Arnbom, Arctic is Hot.37 Neil Melvin, Conflict and Cooperation, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Meeting with University of Southern California Researchers (Stockholm, Sweden), May 22, 2012.38 Lomagin, Russias Perception of the Arctic and International Cooperation.39 Robert English, German Reunification, Meeting with University of Southern California researchers (Los Angeles, CA), May 16, 2012.top priority is showing to the world that it can match the United States in broadly defined power capabilities and projections. This Russian mindset, referred to as an inferiority com-plex by Dr. Lomagin hampers communication efforts between Russia and NATO states in regards to its behavior in the Arctic.40 The legacy of the Cold War is still very prevalent in the region and has led to a divide between Russia and Western states. The extant Cold War tensions continue to dominate foreign policy decisions made on behalf of NATO-affiliated states and Russia. Russian energy security researcher, Konstantin Leschenko of St. Petersburg State University, noted that this presence of NATO missiles and strategic commands in central Europe is a key factor in promoting distrust between Russia and NATO states.41 This lack of trust is reflected in Russias decision to bolster its military forces in the Arctic. As noted in SIPRIs report, Military Capabilities in the Arctic, Russias decision to increase its military presence is driven by a desire to balance the situation with NATO forces in the Arctic.42 Russian Diplomat Aleksi Ivanov called this military bolstering a natural response to protect Russian sovereignty.43 It is no surprise Russia would want to project power in the region since NATO forces have carried out military exercises in the region that have excluded Russia.44While this storied tension may seem obvious, it is important to recognize the inhibitory effect it is having on military coordination and cooperation in the Arctic region. If Russia continues to feel that it is marginalized or needs to prove its power, the Arctic could trans-form into an area of heightened tension and result in, at the very least, intense diplomatic conflict reminiscent of Soviet and American tensions during the Cold War.Structural Obstacles to Multilateral Security CooperationWhile many countries claim to be working multilaterally on all issues related to the Arctic, there remains no official forum for security cooperation. The only official forum, the Arctic Council, is ill-suited to mediating security concerns in the region. The institutional structure lacks the critical decision-making or communicative bodies pertaining to military action. The Ottawa Declaration, which established the Arctic Council, included a clause stating that the Arctic Council should not deal with matters related to military security.45 Therefore, no forum currently exists for the Arctic states to address these critical issues. As of now, the Arctic Council functions more as a chat shop rather than a decision making body; when it comes to producing diplomatic accords, it has passed only a single legally 40 Nikita Lomagin, interview with University of Southern California researchers, St. Petersburg, Russia, June 1, 2012.41 Konstantine Leschenko, interview with University of Southern California researchers, St. Petersburg, Russia, May 31, 2012.42 Wezeman, Military Capabilities in the Arctic, 9.43 Ivanov, interview with University of Southern California Researchers, May 25, 2012.44 Wezeman, Military Capabilities in the Arctic, 7.45 Declaration on Establishment of the Arctic Council: The Ottawa Declaration - 1996, (Ottawa: Arctic Council, 1996), 2.20Southern California International Review - Vol. 2 No. 221Southern California International Review - Vol. 2 No. 2The 16 Years CrisisKelsey Bradshaw, Jason Finklestein, Nicholas Kosturosbinding agreement.46 Indeed, because of the Ottawa Declarations footnote, this chat shop is prohibited from even discussing security matters. Even though Ambassador Lind has stated the Arctic Council is a decision shaper but is evolving into a decision-maker, the region still lacks a decision-making body and a forum for addressing security challenges.47 Dr. Neil Melvin explained that the Arctic states need to choose whether or not they are will-ing to have the Arctic Council as a union with decision-making power and legally binding agreements, if a decision is left unmade, the nation-states of the Arctic risk predicating se-curity challenges for decades to come.48Conflict of IdeologiesOne key determinant in shaping the future of the region rests in the philosophies of the involved nation-states: the dominant realist philosophy these countries follow may pose a threat to continued peace. The bolstering of armed forces occurring in the Arctic region is partly a result of a realist operation code that emphasizes military power projection as a means of protecting sovereignty. Though a potential security dilemma has already been mentioned, an examination of its underlying theoretical and philosophical issues is war-ranted in order to understand the motivations behind the status quo. As briefly mentioned, realism became the worlds dominant philosophy following World War II. Political theorists such as E.H. Carr, Hans J. Morgenthau, and Reinhold Niebuhr, pushed a renaissance of realism to the forefront of international relations theory. These writ-ers looked critically at the causes of the second World War, and settled largely on several fundamental mistakes made by thought-shapers and policy makers in the interlude follow-ing World War I. Concisely, this new strain of thought emphasized the ubiquity of power and the competitive nature of politics among nations49 E.H. Carr looked at institutions and diplomatic proclamations and saw that rather than ameliorating conflict, they were in fact impeding the goal of peace. These conditions were dangerous because they created a false belief that exceedingly complex interstate conflicts could be smoothly dealt with by the cre-ation of a community of states that held shared interests and goals.50 A solid realist identity is held by states such as the Russian Federation, United States, and Canada when it comes to Arctic policy. Through actions across the world, both recently and historically, the U.S. and Russia have repeatedly demonstrated these tendencies. There are few that would argue that the operational code of realism does not dominate U.S. or Russian decision makers. 46 Therese Jakobsen, Meeting with University of Southern California researchers (Stockholm, Sweden), May 24, 2012.47 Lind, interview held during meeting with University of Southern California researchers, May 23, 2012.48 Melvin, Conflict and Cooperation.49 John Baylis, Steve Smith and Patricia Owens The Globalization of World Politics, 81.50 Edward Hallet Carr, The Twenty Years Crisis.For Russia, their vast stake in the Arctic region fuels this realist mindset. Russia has the longest coastline of any Arctic state; in fact, this coastline encompasses nearly half of the land surrounding the Arctic Ocean. This heightens security concerns: a lack of ice provides easy access to Russias coastal borders. Since maintaining state security and sovereignty is a chief concern of Russia, potential access to its borders could open up a Pandoras box of security concerns. Russias stake in the Arctic is further motivated by its economic interests, which is severely dependent on natural resources. Russia is the worlds chief producer and exporter of oil, and ranks second in natural gas output. Despite government attempts to decrease dependence of the energy sector, Russias economy continues be held hostage to global energy prices. With a decreasing population, rampant corruption, poor infrastruc-ture, and lack of capital beyond the energy sector, Russias economic diversification attempts have not yielded significant results and the current economic outlook in this area appears bleak.51 According to estimates of Russias currently tapped oil and gas reserves, projections show that energy output is headed for a dramatic decrease over the next twenty years. In order to salvage its economy, Russia increasingly looks northwards to exploit new resources, where, as mentioned previously in this paper, a large portion of the worlds untapped oil and gas reserves lie. With such vital economic and security concerns in the Arctic, Russia is acting and is expected to act with a realist mindset. In comparison, Canada is generally thought of as a more moderate state, but under the leadership of Stephen Harper, it has chosen the Arctic as an area in which to heavily pursue its national interests. Harpers has proved himself capable of inducing people to rally round the flag, forcing a hardline policy towards the Arctic. Canadas realist operational code is illustrated through a territorial dispute over the Northwest Passage, a new potential ship-ping route along Canadas north rim. This route could dramatically reduce transcontinental shipping costs and be very profitable to the state that controls the waterway. The U.S. and Canada currently have an unresolved conflict over this passageway. The U.S. and Canada share one of the most amicable international borders in the world, and for the two states to publicly disagree about this issue reveals how important this waterway would serve each of their national interests. Canada believes its sovereignty is directly threatened by the current territorial disputes in the Arctic, and will therefore work to defend its perceived borders and retain as much territory as possible.The remaining littoral Arctic stakeholders of Sweden, Finland, Denmark (Greenland), Iceland, and Norway fall into somewhat more murky territory concerning their governing philosophies. Many consider these social democracies to be more in favor of liberal institu-tionalism. However, these states remain under the realist umbrella, albeit in a different form. Realism is primarily concerned with great powers -- after all, John Mearsheimer,one of the 51 The World Factbook, Economy ::: Russia, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/rs.html 22Southern California International Review - Vol. 2 No. 223Southern California International Review - Vol. 2 No. 2The 16 Years CrisisKelsey Bradshaw, Jason Finklestein, Nicholas Kosturoschief realist thinkers of the 20th century, entitled his seminal work on realism The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. Acts of power projection by minor states tend to be ignored, so they band together in order to have their positions heard on the international scale. In pursu-ing realist goals, these weaker states have no choice but to embrace liberal internationalist policies. These Nordic states have also shown themselves willing and able to pursue their nation-al interests through other means other than traditional realist power projection. Norway, for example, has a long-standing and historical dispute with Russia over fishing territory. With much to gain from a stake in Arctic oil, Norway is offering the technological expertise of its parastatal oil company Statoil (formerly StatoilHydro) to Russian Gazprom concerning the Shtokman drilling project. In this way, Norway advances its national interests without directly challenging a great military power. Another example of a non-great power using other sources of leverage besides military might is Greenland, Denmarks land within the region.. Greenland is endowed with the second largest amount of rare earth minerals in the world. Since these minerals are crucial to the functioning of technology and therefore the trappings of modern life, Greenlands deposits are extremely valuable commodities in the Arctic. These resources are not currently being tapped for several reasons, including a lack of technological expertise. According to rare earth minerals expert Dr. Matteo Rongione, the only way for Greenland, a 58,000-person state that lacks full independence from Denmark, to mine these minerals would re-quire enlisting outside help. One source it is currently considering is China; Reports indicate that Greenland may be reaching out to China to assist in the mining of these rare-earth ele-ments, a state eager to increase its stake in the Arctic region. By allowing great powers such as the EU and China to bid for its rare earth minerals, Greenland is increasing its relative power and wealth. Even if they bypass traditional realist tactics to reach their goals, smaller states continue to hold the same end goal of increasing power and influence in the Arctic. Despite the evidence that realist theory dominates decision-making among Arctic states, diplomats and leaders continue to make statements that imply otherwise. Arctic rhet-oric continues to tend toward a more liberal internationalist viewpoint. The chairman of the Arctic Council, Ambassador Gustav Lind, is documented to believe the efficacy of the Arctic Council is increasing. His belief that the Arctic Council will move towards more binding decisions, goes against the tenets of the dominant realist thought in the region and world. It is well known that states are very hesitant to sacrifice sovereignty, so his assertion seems to be overly optimistic under a realist paradigm. In addition to Ambassador Lind, diplomats including state officials of Russia, Finland and Norway say they would a more powerful Arctic Council. Indeed, many state priorities, as shown earlier in this paper, suggest a desire to increase cooperation with the Arctic Council. However, Arctic state actions show that the rhetoric may be more wishful thinking than serious policy changes. Despite the call for more binding agreements, only one has been passed regarding search and rescue. Though the argument can be made that such low politics issues can encourage more proper integration, the dominant realist mindsets that are apparent in these Arctic states, especially the U.S. and Russia, indicate that fruit-ful, legally binding agreements do not seem likely. To a realist, these agreements in very low politics areas- those that do not relate to security- represent a willful attempt to placate diplomats and liberal internationalist observers without sacrificing any state sovereignty. Perhaps the footnote in the Ottawa Declaration excluding military issues from the Arctic Councils agenda is the best indicator of a dominant, state-centric realist attitude towards security issues. In preventing security from being discussed at this regional institution, real-ist powers made sure that they would not sacrifice any state sovereignty. Based on this, the Arctic nation-states unwillingness to move beyond realist operational codes may in fact be doomed to repeat the same mistakes of their post-WWI counterparts. Domestic Factors and Diplomatic ChallengesInternational relations are not the only area running the risk of destabilizing the Arctic; domestic concerns also pose a threat to Arctic peace and stability. The connection between domestic factors and international politics comes to light when examining state behav-ior using two-level games theory, a concept coined by Dr. Robert Putnam of Harvard University. These two-level games occur when leaders bargain on one level with their own citizens and on the second with other foreign leaders.52 These are dangerous games to play when the fate of the Arctic Circle is at stake. In Canada, the issue is already at the forefront of the Canadian psyche. As Dr. Michael Byers suggests, the Arctic is dear to the Canadian people. Discussing the Arctic is a personal, even emotional experience, because the Arctic gets into [Canadians] hearts and minds and becomes part of who [they] are.53 Mr. Byers also remarks that, Conceptions of sovereignty are often wrapped up in national identities, and nowhere is this more true than with Canadas North, for even the national anthem emphasizes The True North Strong and Free.54 Byers introduces the concept of Harpers politicization of the Arctic, stating that Mr. Harper has made Arctic sovereignty part of his successful election campaigns.55 Harper told the National Post on May 16 that, nothing comes before [Arctic sovereignty].56 In 2010, Harper proclaimed to CBC that, The first 52 Robert Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games, International Organization 42(Sum-mer 1988):427-460.53 Michael Byers, Who Owns the Arctic, (Vancouver: Douglas and McIntyre 2010), 19.54 Byers, Who Owns the Arctic, 20.55 Byers, Who Owns the Arctic, 23.56 John Ivison, Stephen Harpers Arctic Sovereignty Legacy Starting to Cool Off, 24Southern California International Review - Vol. 2 No. 225Southern California International Review - Vol. 2 No. 2The 16 Years CrisisKelsey Bradshaw, Jason Finklestein, Nicholas Kosturosand highest priority of our northern strategy is the protection of our Arctic sovereignty. And as I have said many times before, the first principle of sovereignty is to use it or lose it.57 Harper seminally adds that Canadas Arctic sovereignty is non-negotiable. These and other statements by Mr. Harper show a dangerous politicization of Arctic security, in which the Canadian people could be clamoring for hardline solutions for the slightest of Arctic problems or territorial infringements. While Canada has an extremely strong Northern identity, Russia expert Dr. Robert English of the University of Southern California, raises the point that Russia may have a claim even more intrinsic to its national identity. With 18% of their territory, 20,000 kilo-meters of border, and 95% of their oil and gas reserves in the north, the Russian Federations fate is tied closely to that of the Arctic.58 Russian President Vladimir Putin has also taken a similar political tack. Harper and Putin have both put themselves in quite complicated positions when it comes to international bargaining. In the event that some small security issue does arise in the Arctic, we may see Canadian and Russian citizens pushing for more aggressive action, domestic pressures which could complicate multilateral cooperation at the international level. Indeed, when Canada assumes the chair of the Council in 2013, its nationalistic behavior and policy may reverse Swedens previous gains setting the stage for multilateral cooperation. Also, a change in U.S. leadership following the 2012 presidential election could have similar effects either immediately or when the U.S takes the helm of the Arctic Council in 2015. Without leadership advocating for cooperation, the Arctic will inevitably become a zone of increased tension.ConclusionIn analyzing the behavior of Arctic states, this report finds that the Arctic region has a high likelihood of future instability. Each Arctic state involved has strong economic and geopolitical interests in the region; to defend their interests, these states have contributed significant resources to building up their Arctic military forces and improving regional de-ployment capabilities only further compounding the issue. In spite of this clear military buildup, state officials have continuously denied any possibility for interstate conflict. The singular comprehensive governing body in the region, the Arctic Council, is insufficiently structured to mediate security disputes if a conflict should it arise. Moreover, The strong tensions and great power rivalry vestiges of Cold War, especially between Russia and NATO countries, also represents a threat to international cooperation. A dominant realist mindset seems to frame the decision making of leaders in all involved states, causing national inter-est to triumph over liberal institutionalism cooperation. Applying two-level games theory 57 Peter Sheldon and Terry Mileweski, Arctic Sovereignty a Priority: Harper, CBCNews, http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/story/2010/08/23/harper-north.html. (August 23, 2010).58 Klimenko, Ambitious Plans and Domestic Policies for the Arctic in Russia.to each Arctic state can reveal how harsh political rhetoric can hurt state officials ability to negotiate with each other and mitigate disputes. In addition, the Arctic Council is due for changes in leadership that will lead to greater uncertainty. A combination of these factors may result in diplomatic crises and small-scale armed disputes among involved states, which could potentially result in a large-scale armed conflict. Because of the core risk involved in ignoring these serious security risks, dialogue between Arctic states is critical. With this dire scenario in mind, it is critical to posit ways to reduce the prospect of future instability. The singular most important factor to avoiding conflict is that open com-munication and acknowledgement of risk. Since the Ottawa Declaration prohibits the Arctic Council from addressing any security issues, an additional forum for hard and soft security matters should be established. This forum must dedicate itself to addressing security con-cerns and must include representatives from the civilian and military leadership of each Arctic state. Since another semi-legislative regional organization seems implausible due to the realist philosophies dominating each states behavior, a conference or summit that in-cludes all Arctic states would be a more likely multilateral channel in which to open dialogue on security matters. The goal of this much-needed security summit would be to build posi-tive relations and lay the groundwork for further cooperation. This research paper does not assert that major interstate conflict will necessarily occur, however, it does suggest that small skirmishes and diplomatic tensions between state actors are possible. These, in turn, could spark Arctic nations to engage in armed and/or diplomatic conflict due to lack of coordination and communication. Arctic states need to increase their efforts in seeking consensus in the realm of hard and soft security matters in order to prevent tensions from rising in the region. If this recommendation is not met, an Arctic crisis of alarming magnitude could result, and the world may face a war that is very cold indeed.Works Cited 90 billion Barrels of Oil and 1670 Trillion Cubic Feet of Natural Gas Assessed in the Arc-tic, U.S. Geological Survey, accessed June 6, 2012, http://www.usgs.gov/newsroom/article.asp?ID=1980#.T89KA-068UU.Alun Anderson, After the Ice, (Washington DC: Smithsonian, 2009).Arnbom, Tom, Arctic is Hot, World Wildlife Fund (Stockholm, Sweden) May 22, 2012.Bennett, Jody R. Vying for Power in the High North. International Relations Security Net-work. ISN Security Watch, 6 Sept. 2012. Web. 15 Oct. 2012.26Southern California International Review - Vol. 2 No. 227Southern California International Review - Vol. 2 No. 2The 16 Years CrisisKelsey Bradshaw, Jason Finklestein, Nicholas KosturosBerg, Kristopher, Domestic Drivers for Canadian and U.S. Arctic Policy, Stockholm In-ternational Peace Research Institute Meeting with University of Southern California researchers (Stockholm, Sweden), May 21, 2012.Byers, Michael, Who Owns the Arctic, (Vancouver: Douglas and McIntyre 2010), 19.Carr, Edward Hallet, The Twenty Years CrisisDeclaration on Establishment of the Arctic Council: The Ottawa Declaration - 1996, (Ot-tawa: Arctic Council, 1996), 2.English, Robert, German Reunification, Meeting with University of Southern California researchers (Los Angeles, CA), May 16, 2012.Fitzpatrick, Kathleen, Franklin, Sir John (17861847), Australian Dictionary of Biography, National Centre of Biography, Australian National University, http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/franklin-sir-john-2066/text2575, accessed 20 October 2012.Heininen, Lassi, Arctic Strategies and Policies: Inventory and Comparative Study. The Northern Research Forum and the University of Lapland (2012)Huebert, Rob et al., Climate Change and International Security: The Arctic as a Bellweth-er, Center for Climate and Energy Solutions, May 2012: 23.Ivanov, Aleksi, interview held with University of Southern California researchers, Stock-holm, Sweden, May 25, 2012.Jakobsen, Therese, Meeting with University of Southern California researchers (Stockholm, Sweden), May 24, 2012.John Ivison, Stephen Harpers Arctic Sovereignty Legacy Starting to Cool Off, http://fullcom-ment.nationalpost.com/2012/05/17/john-ivison-stephen-harpers-arctic-sovereignty-legacy-starting-to-cool-off/ (May 17, 2012).Klimenko, Ekaterina, Ambitious Plans and Domestic Policies for the Arctic in Russia, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Meeting with University of Southern California researchers (Stockholm, Sweden), May 21, 2012.Leschenko, Konstantine, interview with University of Southern California researchers, St. Petersburg, Russia, May 31, 2012.Lind, Gustav, interview held during meeting with University of Southern California re-searchers, Stockholm, Sweden, May 23, 2012.Lomagin, Nikita, Russias Perception of the Arctic and International Cooperation, Lecture with University of Southern California Researchers (St. Petersburg, Russia), May 28, 2012.Lomagin, Nikita, interview with University of Southern California researchers, St. Peters-burg, Russia, June 1, 2012.Melvin, Neil, Conflict and Cooperation, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Meeting with University of Southern California Researchers (Stockholm, Sweden), May 22, 2012.Neverov, Igor, interview held during meeting with University of Southern California re-searchers, Stockholm, Sweden, May 25, 2012.Putnam, Robert Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games, Inter-national Organization 42(Summer 1988):427-460.Renfrow, Stephanie. Arctic Sea Ice Shatters All Previous Record Lows. NSIDC Arctic Sea Ice News Fall 2007. National Snow and Ice Data Center, 1 Oct. 2007. Web. 20 Oct. 2012. http://nsidc.org/news/press/2007_seaiceminimum/20071001_pressrelease.htmlRobert Peary: To the Top of the World. PBS. PBS, 1999. Web. 20 Oct. 2012. .Rongione, Matteo, Role of Resources in the Arctic- Rare Earth Elements, Stockholm In-ternational Peace Research Institute (Stockholm, Sweden), May 21, 2012.Sheldon, Peter and Mileweski, Terry, Arctic Sovereignty a Priority: Harper, CBCNews, http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/story/2010/08/23/harper-north.html. (August 23, 2010).Strader, Olin, Arctic Chiefs of Defence Staff Conference- An Opportunity to Formalize Arctic Security, The Arctic Institute: Center for Circumpolar Security Studies, http://www.thearcticinstitute.org/2012/04/arctic-chiefs-of-defence-staff.html?m=1 (April 6, 2012).Terva, Jyrki, Meeting with University of Southern California Researchers, St. Petersburg, Russia, May 28, 2012.The World Factbook, Economy ::: Russia, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/rs.htmlWezeman, Siemon, Military Capabilities in the Arctic, Stockholm International Peace Re-search Institute Background Papers 2012: 13-14.Wezeman, Siemon, Discussion of Military Capabilities in the Arctic, Stockholm Inter-national Peace Research Institute Meeting with University of Southern California re-searchers (Stockholm, Sweden), May 21, 2012.Expressions of Nationalism Exploring the Implications of Russian GemeinschaftTyler D. Tyburski Nations, nationalism and national identity are complex forces in the contemporary inter-national system. This study seeks to explore the phenomenon of nationalism as it has occurred within one of the most notoriously nationalist states of modernity: Russia. Toward this end, the first order of business will be to construct the conceptual edifice of nationalism that is necessary for pursing such process tracing. Following this introductory section, the paper will sketch the history of Russias primordial nationalism. This historical look at Russias utiliza-tion of nationalism as a tool will be cast over the broad sweep of time extending from the pre-communist period up to the yet unraveling years of the Putin era. The discussion will highlight what will be termed the critical periods of Russian nationalism. Interlocking these elements will bind tightly the theoretical principles of nationalism and their real-world implications for Russia. This will provide a conceptually durable basis for preliminary conclusions and future research. Ultimately, it will be contended that outbreaks of Russian nationalist fervor occur at times when the rule of strong, autocratic leaders intersect with a weak economy; and further, that in almost every such instance, an outside other is blamed to absorb populist backlash that would otherwise thrash the Russian state itself. The paper closes with a brief reflection on contemporary Russian nationalism, the significance of this study and what is at stake for those pursuing continued research.Conceptualizing the Notion of Nationalism: An Introduction The discourse of nations and nationalism is necessarily rooted in that of the modern state. In the flow of history following from the 1648 Peace of Westphalia, the state has come to assert itself as the most efficient organizer of power in the international system. Today, almost every inhabited area on earth is assigned to a state. But what, exactly, is the state? Max Weber, in his 1919 Politics as a Vocation, dubbed the state, in its most minimalist sense, the monopoly of legitimate physical violence within a particular territory1. This, definitionwhich has garnered great consensus across academia since its conceptionwill be employed hereafter. In accepting Webers conclusion, one comes to view nationalism as neither natural nor essential, but as a product manufactured by state authority. Often times, it is so skillfully produced that it ensures its continued reproduction by taking emotional 1 Max Weber, The Vocation Lectures. (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company, 2004), 33. Tyler Tyburski is a senior at the University of Southern California majoring in Political Science and International Relations. 30Southern California International Review - Vol. 2 No. 2Tyler D. Tyburski 31Southern California International Review - Vol. 2 No. 2Expressions of Nationalismpossession of the peoples to which it is peddled. As E.J. Hobsbawm argued, an esteemed pioneer of nationalist thought, it is almost always the case that a state will forge its nation2. A states ability to do so, however, is bound by its authoritative capacity. States that only achieve Webers definitional threshold might be thought of as weak states, whereas those well surpassing it can be called strong states. Some characteristics of state weakness include low tax revenues, [flagrant] corruption, and a lack of law and order3. Others, in-clude a weak military, a low gross domestic product, and high debt. The opposite qualities are perceived as natural indicators of state strength. This is not to say that strong states are entirely without any of the characteristics of weak ones; they simply counterbalance their weaknesses with other points of exceptional strength. Especially in strong states, the notion of the nation is a concept with which all peoplesthinkers and tinkerers alikefind themselves intimately familiar. This speaks to the underlying desire of state-based power structures to expand and deepen their influence. Indeed, leaders in weak states share this same goal, but are without comparable resources and influence. Therefore, It could, be sug-gested that an engrained sense of national identity ought to be counted among the qualities of a strong state, and vice versa for weak states. The concept of nationalism, however, remains in its relative infancy. In fact, Hobsbawm indicates that, the notion of gobierno (government) was not specifically united with the concept of the nacin (nation) until 1884, more than two centuries after the forging of the Westphalian Peace4. Moreover, this association did not develop similarly or simultaneously all throughout the international system. Nor has it since developed regularly even within the borders of particular states. To be sure, there is little consensus among Americans about what it means to be American. Nationalism, therefore, cannot be envisaged as a homog-enous construct. Rather, it must be considered a multifaceted abstraction. Indeed, it emerges differently in different places, and it has the ability to express itself in a variety of unique ways. Primarily, nationalism presents itself in two forms, both of which were first explored and explained in 1887 by the German sociologist Ferdinand Tnnies. Gemeinschaft. The base and primordial face of nationalism stems from the notion that every person within a nation carries with them attachments, which are both tangible and real. Blood bonds, shared linguistic roots, adherence to common cultural customs, hereditary territorialism and the defense of an essential community are the essence of this primal theory of nationalism. Contrarily, gesellschaft offers a more civic design of nationalismone that is constructed 2 E.J. Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism Since 1780. (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 44.3 Neil Englehart, State Capacity, State Failure, and Human Rights, in Journal of Peace Research, (2009), 163.4 Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism Since 1780, 15.though common education and is constituted by both legality and shared virtues5. Although united by common objectives, these two theories of nationalism are deeply divergent with regard to the means that they suggest to best achieve these objectives. This is to say that, while gemeinschaft and gesellschaft are similarly employed toward the authorship of a grand myth, intended to unite disparate peoples into a people, or the people, they approach this task with fundamentally different tactics. In his 1992 inquiry into French and German citizenship, Rogers Brubaker, a Professor of Sociology at the University of California, Los Angeles, characterized those of the former as strong-armed government policies and the im-plementation of programs for divisive ethno-national citizenship. Those of the latter, he said, are tied to state-based assimilation into in a philosophically-rooted political community6. Provided these understandings, one might come to better grasp the canonized defi-nition of nationalism that was first proposed by the late French philosopher, Ernst Gellner. In his Nations and Nationalism, a work that inspired the subsequent writings of Hobsbawm, it was offered that nationalism is primarily a principle which holds that the political and national units should be congruent7. This definition which, to be sure, is first and foremost a political definition, carries with it truly great implications. It insinuates that the political duty of a given people is, first and foremost, to its polity, and that this duty to the polity necessarily supersedes all other national obligations8. Indeed, it is this degree of intensity that distinguishes nationalism as an extreme form of group identity that is capable of com-manding the radical power of mass mobilization towards state-centric endgames. In harnessing the forces of social construction, strong states masterfully produce and manipulate the raw power of nationalism vis--vis goals relating to self-preservation, secu-rity, economy and international prowess. In doing so, they most usually come to rely on the existence ofor the invention ofa distinctive other. The sociological principle underly-ing this trend is the essential relativity inherent within every notion of the self. Indeed, as was famously noted by Benedict Anderson, Professor Emeritus of International Studies at Cornell University, the existence of an us is essentially contingent upon the notion of a them9. When conceptualizing this abstract notion, it can be useful to think of how people often define their associations to sports teams. In many cases, one will define their athletic allegiances by making reference to the teams they denounce rather than those that they sup-port. Love of the us thereby becomes conflated with hatred of the them. 5 Vladimir Tismaneau, Fantasies of Salvation: Varieties of Nationalism in Postcommunist Eastern Europe, in Envisioning Eastern Europe, (1994), 118. 6 Rogers Brubacker, Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992), 35. 7 Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983), 1. 8 Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism Since 1780, 9.9 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. (London, UK: Versa, 2006), 25. 32Southern California International Review - Vol. 2 No. 2Tyler D. Tyburski 33Southern California International Review - Vol. 2 No. 2Expressions of NationalismSome theorists, such as Henk Dekker, Darina Malov, and Sander Hoogendoorn, be-lieve that there exists a particular set of variables that can be examined to explain broader trends of nationalism within particular states and individuals10. This claim is contentious because it attempts to model a complex relationship by applying a single, simple formula. Such a broad attempt to understand nationalism makes use of too wide a scope. As Brubaker suggests, nationalism in France is not at all analogous to nationalism in Germany nor is nationalism in the United States an analog for nationalism in Iraq. This being the case, it is sensible to a refine this broad-based approach by tracing the historical development of nationalism within the context of only a single state. Cross-examination between such case studies could then provide a truly durable basis for comparative analysis. Abiding by this logic, from here onward, Russia11 will become this papers sole frame of study. The Russian state has fluctuated in its authoritative capacity over time, reaching its height as a Great Power during the Cold War years (roughly 1947-1991). Having since de-clined in stature following the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, there is today an ongoing debate about whether Russias status as is that of either a strong or weak state. However, when it comes to Russias its ambitions of self-strengthening, there is no debate. This aspect of the Russian identity has remained a constant since the Russo-Turkish War (1787-1792) to win control over Ottoman-controlled, warm-water ports in the Black Sea. Indeed, Russia has developed into one of historys most uniquely nationalist states, and, as such, has long been subjected to a great degree of truly transformative politi-cal processes. Nevertheless, Russian nationalism has not been painted in even coats; rather, layers of varying thicknesses and composition have colored the national identity differently over time. Certain critical periods, however, do seem to stand out as clear checkpoints in the development of Russian nationalism. The following will examine the forces at play during three such time periods: (1) the Tsarist Era (1721-1917), (2) the Stalinist Era (1924-1953) and (3) the Putinist Era (2000-present). Considering the Russian Context However, despite its fractures, in many ways, the development of Russian national-ism can be viewed as a single, coherent phenomenon. Trends from the distant past seem to be echoed in both recent times as well as the present. Therefore, to understand the contem-porary dynamics of Russias identity-driven politics, one must first indulge in an examina-tion of the historical development of Russian nationalism. This rhetorical framework neces-sitates that special attention be paid to the role of ideology. Often conceived of as secular 10 Henk Dekker, Darina Malov, Sander Hoogendoorn. Nationalism and Its Explanations, in Political Psychology, (2003), 349. 11 For the purposes of this essay, Russian will refer to whatever lands fell under the central authority of the Kremlin during the particular time that is being discussed.religion, and famously referred to by Karl Marx as false consciousness, ideology has always been a central tool of the state in manufacturing the formal constructs implemented towards the mass production of Russian identity12. To be sure, historically, it has always been a well-bred faith in, and of, the stateeven more so than the doctrines of Orthodox Christianitythat controls Russian culture. It is no coincidence, therefore, that Russia has branded its own denomination of orthodoxy that is headed by the Church in Moscow: Russian Orthodoxy. Channeling Hobsbawm, one is compelled to conceive of Russians as true inventions of the Russian state. Historically, there was never a definite and recognized Russian homeland, culture, or essence. Rather, Russia began as collection of cities, belonging to various king-doms, which gradually coalesced into something like a state around the time of Ivan the Terrible13. Russian history was imbued with an abbreviated and fractured nature due to its turbulent experiences with regime changes, revolutions and invasions. This unstable politi-cal environment only exacerbated preexisting societal splintering which had already spelled difficulty for the cohesion of a unified people. Considering the intense forces of discontinuity that have been so long at work, stand-ing governments were led to pursue more overt and deliberate methods of social unification to overcome them. Especially in the early phases of Russificationthe process by which Russian identity was (and is) createdthe tactics of gesellschaft were simply not viable. Given the lack of a binding social contract, a strong civil society and stable borders, these more civic approaches would have been difficult to implement and unlikely to succeed. The realities of Russian political history, combined with the centralizing tendencies of fluctuat-ing governments, prompted the adoption of the more primordial methods of gemeinschaft-based nationalism. Once steadily in place, and proven to be effective (at some point roughly between 1868-1873), these programs began to propagate themselves, even across shifting regimes14. In fact, although these rotating governments were different structurally as well as ideologically, the precedent of gemeinschaft-based nationalism received their universal adherence. Gemeinshaft Begins: The Tsarist Era The two centuries preceding the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 were dominated by the rule of the Russian Tsars. These autocrats, seeking to expand their influence and unify their peoples, began the tradition of Russian gemeinschaft. In so doing, their primary goal was to differentiate between those groups which they thought could and could not be easily 12 Robert Tucker, The Marx-Engels Reader. (New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Company, 1978), 111. 13 Vilhelm Thomsen, The Relations Between Ancient Russia and Scandonavia And the Origin of the Russian State. (New York, NY: Burt Franklin, 1877), 12. 14 Richard Pipes, The Formation of the Soviet Union. (Boston, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997), 4. 34Southern California International Review - Vol. 2 No. 2Tyler D. Tyburski 35Southern California International Review - Vol. 2 No. 2Expressions of NationalismRussified. Thus, they set themselves to the task of developing a certain pan-Russian identity that these groups would then be given the opportunity to either accept or reject. By doing so, the autocrats hoped to be able to differentiate members of the Russian us from those who would be relegated to association with the contemptible them. The rationale behind creating this stark divide was twofold: (1) it provided a baseline population for the Russian nation and (2) it satisfied the us-them that dynamic that is critical to identity formation. Indeed, had the Tsars simply pursued a totalistic policy of forced Russification, the resulting national identitydevoid of a clear other with which to contrast itselfwould have likely collapsed under the weight of its own ambiguity. The identity that the Tsars chose to create was designed to unite the Russian people (the us) under two overarching criteria: (1) an unqualified submission to the [Orthodox] Church and (2) the same devotion and obedience to the ruler [(the Tsar)].15 By anchoring Russian identity to an already formalized and well- respected institutionthe Churchthe Tsars endowed it with a certain degree of intrinsic legitimacy. Moreover, this divine con-nection provided a sort of moral imperative for individuals to associate themselves with the Russian identity. This group-based system of identification established the process of Russification and a means for induction into an imagined community that has been emu-latedin Russia and elsewhereacross the generations. Interestingly, this system of social sorting seemed to accelerate itself as Russia pro-gressed into the later phases of Tsarist rule16. In fact, by the time that Russia transitioned from Tsarist domination to Bolshevik domination, the formulation of the us-them di-chotomy had reached a crescendo. This is almost certainly linked to the fact that, at that very time, the country found itself plunging into relative chaos. In fact, in 1917, Russia was in the throes of not only World War I, but also a severe economic downturn and a bloody revolution. These troubles were all interconnected, and, when mixed, spelled out the perfect recipe for intensified Russification. The Tsar spun the situation as a national hardship that required a national solution. In so doing, Nicholas II (1868-1918)the last Tsar of the Russian Empirekept with the imperial traditions of his 18th Century predecessors by labeling his great war, World War I, an expansionist conflict17. The Tzar expressed his unyielding determination to fight on, at all costs, toward the goal of expanding Russian territory, population and regional influ-ence. Stalwart commitment to the same quickly became the hallmark of a good Russian. Thus, the nation was mobilized under the idea of the state, carrying with it some religious undertones, dictated directly by the ruler. This theme was to be echoed in generations to 15 Nicholas Riasanovsky, Nationality in the State Ideology During the Reign of Nicholas I, in The Russian Review, (1960), 39. 16 Andrey Sinyavsky, and Dale Peterson. Russian Nationalism, in The Massachusetts Review, (1990), 477. 17 Peter Gatrell, Russias First World War: A Social and Economic History. (New York, NY: Pearson Longman, 2005), 2. come. Indeed, the very forces that came to replace the Russian Tsars later employed similar directives to produce still greater centripetal forces of nationalism. Moreover, their wars of conquest would continue to organize themselves around the notion of the nation combating others under the banners of state leaders and the Russian Orthodox Church. In fact, these patterns would only come to strengthen themselves as the states powers and capabilities evolved. The Tsars, although they were the founders of Russian gemeinschaft, never expe-rienced the power of their invention to the same extent that later generations of Russian leaders would. Indeed, the Tsars were, in a sense, bound by an inability to reject their own traditions. The Soviets, having had ousted the Tsars, were not.Gemeinschaft in Action: An Examination of Stalinist Era Nationalism Joseph Stalin replaced Vladimir Lenin (1870-1924)the famed leader of the Bolshevik Revolutionin 1924. A native Georgian, he ruled the Russia-based Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R.) between 1924 and his death in 1953. His tenure was one marked by bitter brutality. To mask and soften the violence, Stalin relied on the forces of primordial nationalism, Soviet Great Power status and the popular effects of substantial economic advancements. Assuming power in the wake of Bolshevik rule, Stalin sought to rebrand Russians in his own image. To do so, he made use of a variety of classic tools and tactics. For instance, as noted in David Rowleys Russian Nationalism and the Cold War, Stalin masterfully leveraged the idea of the other by repeatedly portraying the West,18 spe-cifically the United States, as an enemy to be feared and hated.19 Undeniably, his onslaughts of rhetoric and paraphernalia were effective hypnotizers for a society already inundated by fear flowing from the Kremlins oppressive and sadistic policies. However, beyond simply drawing on the politics of fear, he relied heavily upon bold ideological claims and promises of economic growth to further his nationalist program. Thus, the Soviet people were met with an impossible choice: work toward Soviet success, either out of love or fear. Death was the only alternative. Moreover, if opting to work, their personal motive had always to appear genuine and trustworthy. Indeed, these tacticsalthough reprehensible and corruptwere well tailored to the contexts in which Stalin was operating. For instance, the interbellum period between 1918 and 1939 was ripe for the extreme exploitation of emotion and the practice of intense othering. Just as Hitler in Germany was condemning the Jews, Stalin in Russia cursed the capitalists of the West. Moreover, being that the Soviet economy had significantly retract-ed in the post-World War I years, Stalins radical collectivization plans came across not as frightening, but as hopeful. Indeed, at least immediately, his infamous five-year plans were 18 For the purposes of this essay, the West will be limited to the United States and the democracies of Western Europe.19 David Rowley, Russian Nationalism and the Cold War, in The American Historical Review, (1994), 156. 36Southern California International Review - Vol. 2 No. 2Tyler D. Tyburski 37Southern California International Review - Vol. 2 No. 2Expressions of Nationalismgazed upon with great appeal as retail prices in Moscow [had] doubled in the first two years of the war and then accelerated dramatically in 1916 and early 1917.20 Indeed, Stalins scare tactics seized upon the melancholy zeitgeist of interwar Russia. Later, he adapted them to inspire mobilization during the Second World War. In the throes of World War II, Joseph Stalin, an atheist, invigorated a campaign of anti-German gemeinschaft by allowing a resurgence of the Russian Orthodox Church. This ma-neuver, however, was not a move towards liberalism. Rather, it was a coy political ploy aimed at exploiting the nationalist feelings of the religious Russian peasantryand it worked.21 What one sees here is an impressive display of state power. Indeed, the Kremlin, a body that had ruthlessly pushed a program of non-religion, was able to forcibly shape Orthodoxy, a holy faith, into a facet of the secular ideology of nationalism. Ultimately, this resulted not in a Russian religious revival, but in a spike of nationalist sentiments, rooted in a shared reli-gious affiliation, and a dramatic increase in the enlistment rate of the Russian Red Army. A testament to the power of the states gemeinschaft, in Russia, World War II came to be known as The Great Patriotic War. In fact, Daniel Chirot, an esteemed sociologist and Professor of International Studies at the University of Washington, has suggested that, even until 1975, the only remaining old-fashioned European empirewas the Russian one.22 The term old-fashioned, it seems, is quite apt when describing the character of Russian nationalism. Indeed, the complexities of gesellschaft, which were not viable at the outset of the Russian experiment with statehood, never developed parallel to the Russian stategemeinschaft was always reinforced. Stalins tactics of gemeinschaft were exceptionally base. They might well be conceived of more simply as the ruthless promotion of a particularly volatile cult of personality. Stalin was far more than merely a powerful autocrat; he was, in fact, what Dr. Richard Hrair Dekmejian, of the University of Southern Californias Political Science Department, calls a malignant narcissist. This form of narcissism, Dekmejian says, is an extreme pathology by which one is convinced that they had been specially selected, by some providence, to impose their rightly-guided will upon those less perfect than themselves23. True to form, Stalinthe self-titled Man of Steelconceived of himself as more than the just the Soviet General Secretary, but as the very embodiment of the Russian nation. Rather skillfully, he combined conflicting messages of fear and hope to bind tightly the idea of collective progress with that of individual punishment. The ultimate result was the formation of a society shocked into 20 Gatrell, Russias First World War: A Social and Economic History, 25.21 Phillip Walters, Religion and the State: The Struggle for Legitimacy and Power, in Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, (1986), 135. 22 David Chirot, National Liberations and Nationalist Nightmares: The Consequences of the End of Empires in the Twenti-eth Century, in Markets States and Democracy, (1995), 44. 23 Hrair Dekmejian, Spectrum of Terror. (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2007), 161. productivity, toward a single end, and against a common other, not out of true devotion to the Soviet interest, but out of the human interest of self-preservation. To a large extent, it is this same instinct toward self-preservationthe struggle to remain relevantthat has guided the politics of the post-Soviet Russian state. Gemeinschaft in Action: An Examination of Putinist Era Russian NationalismMost of the history of post-Soviet Russia has been a continued narrative of the late-Soviet decline. The nations gross domestic product contracted steadily up to the late 1990s and the state itself splintered as its various republics and regions took as much sovereignty as they could swallow.24 These deteriorated conditions, analogous to those that were pres-ent at the outset of Stalins reign, seemed to have induced conditions that were favorable to the rise of Vladimir Putin, an ex-Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti (KGB) nationalist. This is no insignificant coincidence. To be sure, Putins current power play is colored with shades of Stalinism. Putin appealed to the yearning of the Russian people to restore lost Soviet prowess and has subsumed factional identities under that of an overarching nation-alist vision. The people have responded favorably. Indeed, despite whatever election frauds might be contended, Putin has certainly proven himself to be the peoples choice with a support base that [is] remarkably close to a cross-section of the entire society.25 Spurred by his reinsertion of Russian national interests into its dealings with the international commu-nity, talk of unilateral action and a reinvigorated military, the Russian people have clung to the hope he has provided for an upswing in national esteem. The face of contemporary Russian nationalism bears striking resemblance to that of yesteryear. Undoubtedly, the tactics employed under Putin have been much the same as those put forth under Stalin. Shifting the national dialogue away from that of the early 1990s, a time when the discourse of Russia rejoining Western civilization was paramount, Putin has adopted a traditional style of gemeinschaft-based nationalism to reign in the disparate elements of the Russian geopolitical spectrum.26 This task, although weighty, has been made more manageable through Putins skillful application of the other as a fulcrum in gaining leverage over the opinions of the Russian masses. Not surprisingly, Putin has targeted the United States Russias Cold War nemesis as the object of contempt in popular Russian culture. Indeed it is trueand most especially in Russias case that there is a definite dif-ference between history and the past. History, in fact, is often no more than a distorted version of the past that is offered, through education, as truth. Historical interpretations, 24 Stephen White, and Ian McAllister. Putin and His Supporters, in Europe-Asia Studies, (2003), 383. 25 Ibid., 384. 26 John OLaughlin, Gerald Toal, and Vladimir Kolossovt. Russian Geopolitical Culture and Public Opinion: the Masks of Proteus Revisited, in Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, (2005), 322. 38Southern California International Review - Vol. 2 No. 2Tyler D. Tyburski 39Southern California International Review - Vol. 2 No. 2Expressions of Nationalismwhich are intended to be taken as facts about the past, are integral in supporting the myth of the state: nationalism. Putin, to be sure, has construed significant events of the recent past through a fundamentally anti-American lens. Thereby, he has masterfully transferred blame for the failures of post-Soviet Russia away from the Russian state and has placed it squarely on the shoulders of the United States. This strong-armed tactic of power politics offers a clear demonstration the totality of forces encapsulated within the political capabili-ties of modern states.To Russians, this message is rather reassuring. Indeed, it is this aspect of Putins program that allows the Russian people to experience the program not as the raw power of the state being exercised on or through them, but as a collective buildup of hope within society writ large. . Thus, one finds truth in Chirots 1995 contention that Nationalism, which has been a force of liberalization in the west will not necessarily be such a force in the east.27 Putins programs central mission is to reinforce traditional cycles of nation-building toward the ends of furthering his own personality and restoring Russia to its past place of prominence as a leading actor on the global stage. The envisioned end state driving these objectives is hardly the quality of life of the Russian people, but simply the pure material benefit of an ever-centralizing, and perhaps re-Sovietizing Russia.The end of the Cold War was truly the end of an era. The early 1990s were characterized by great uncertainty about what was to become of the faded Soviet state in the new, unipo-lar world. Nevertheless, there were grand expectationsin both the West and the Eastfor the reincarnation of the Soviet command economy in the form of a Westernized, privatized market economy. Great uncertainty remains as to why the West held such great hopes for the prospects of economic restructuring and growth in post-Soviet Russia. Indeed, this discrepancy has become a weapon against the West in Putins arsenal of nationalistic rheto-ric. Where there is no consensus, Putin has claimed clarity in his knowledge of the truth. In Russia, Putin says, expectations for Post-Soviet growth had been fueled by a sense of rejuvenation associated with the emergence from the political brutality of communism and the economic instability of socialism. More substantially, though, he claims that they were furthered by optimistic estimates for potential growth that had been confidently floated by Western organizations like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF)28. Indeed, these organizations had proposed ambitious plans designed to bring about mass liberalization virtually overnight. Putin says that these numbers, which had emerged from the West, had been deviously fabricated to induce Russian participation in plans that had been engineered to crush its economy. 27 David Chirot, National Liberations and Nationalist Nightmares: The Consequences of the End of Empires in the Twentieth Century, 44.28 Janine Wedle, Collision and Collusion: The Strange Case of Western Aid to Eastern Europe. (New York, NY: Palgrave, 2001), 45. Many economists, including the famed American economist and Professor of econom-ics at Columbia University, Joseph Stiglitz, have stated that these predictions are as impos-sible as pipe dreams. Stiglitz contends that these shock-therapy approaches, which were fundamentally weak to begin with, were also predisposed to fail on the basis that they simply did not allow for any sort of transitional period to occur. This is to say that the IMF recom-mendations demanded too great of a rollover in too brief of a time period.29 The World Bank and the IMF, however, never reported these concerns in their pitches to the Russian govern-ment. Not recognizing the hazards themselves, the Russians bought in. When implemented, however, the stresses of the World Bank and IMF programs overwhelmed the system they were acting on and plunged the state into dire economic straits. Perhaps this failure resulted as an unintended consequence of a well-meaning plan, but perhaps it came about because it was engineered to do so. Nevertheless, as Stiglitz says, the ultimate irony lies in the fact that many of the states who opted for gradual approaches to economic restructuring (i.e. Poland and China) ended up reforming more rapidly than those that followed the prescribed pro-gram of shock-therapy.30 Indeed, the mere presence of this unexplained fact has created the political space necessary for Putin to spin a convincing tale of American betrayal. In this instance it is not the truth (the past) that is of paramount significance, only what is perceived to be the truth (history). Whether the yet unresolved source of enthusiasm in the West was the result of sheer benevolence or of veiled deviance, it does not matter. All that is of importance is the manner in which Putin has painted history. His colorful commentary on the matter has rendered Russians more likely to become believers in this well-crafted myth of the state. Many Russians believed that the United States had willfully destroyed the Russian economy through the advice that it administered and so absolved the Russian state of any blame for the creation of the problems they now face. They have instead been trained to loathe, and to mobilize against, the contemptible other. As part of Putins plans for Russian reemergence, this energy is now being channeled not only into the economy, but alsoin sizeable amountsinto the Russian military. Substantiating Claims & Expanding Frames: A ConclusionHistorically, up-ticks in Russian nationalism seem to be positively correlated with the presence of three key variables: (1) the presence of an easily identifiable other, (2) a com-manding political cadre and (3) a destabilized economy. These conditions existed during all three critical periods, and they are readily apparent in Russia today. Perhaps then, these factors could be used as central variables in some sort of predictive model for forecasting upswings in this abstract phenomenon that has been tied to so much conflict and loss of life.29 Joseph Stiglitz, Globalization and its Discontents. (New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Company, 2002), 181. 30 Ibid., 185. 40Southern California International Review - Vol. 2 No. 2Tyler D. Tyburski 41Southern California International Review - Vol. 2 No. 2Expressions of NationalismWithout a true national history, or historically sense of self, Russia seems to have always needed a strong other, usually in the form of an enemy, to sustain Russias constructed identity. Taken from this perspective, Russias wars of conquest and Cold War enlargements seem natural. By constantly pitting the nation against clearly defined others, especially in the context of pitched battle or stark ideological struggle, she greatly reinforced her own self-image. Indeed, Russia has always sought others, and, in their absence, she has tried to create them. This is because they complete her; Russia requires the presence of an other to sustain herself. Yet, the mere presence of an othereven a hated otheris not enough to forge a uni-fied self-identity out of such an incoherent mosaic. Strong, often ruthless, leaders often had to apply the full force of the Russian state to make this fusion possible. Brutal campaigns of terror, rigid cults of personality and omnipresent propaganda campaigns have been staples in the regimes of such rulers. Furthermore, it seems as if there may be a certain regenerative cycle at play, whereby the reign of one dictator legitimizes the rise of another. So goes the creation of tradition in a state so ardently adherent to the principles of gemeinschaft-based nationalism. However, not all of Russias rulers have fit this autocratic mold. Therefore, while it is arguable that, to some extent, Russian leaders have always tried to expand and project Russias regional and global influence, it is only extreme leadersthose whom might be con-sidered malignant narcissiststhat seem to indulge in the truly gross campaigns of nation-alism that characterize the three critical periods. Indeed, one will surely recall, that amidst all of the economic troubles plaguing Mikhail Gorbachevs 1989 Soviet Union, he refrained from such a brutal program of gemeinschaft.This phenomenon, however, speaks to more than just the importance of strong, auto-cratic leaders in spurring Russian nationalism. It also suggests something about the relative value of the third variable, a destabilized economy. Specifically, it unequivocally strips it of its potentiality of causality. Nevertheless, one is still compelled to include it as a primary factor contributing to spikes in Russian nationalism because of the clear correlation that can be found in each of the three critical periods. Although not a necessary condition, a down-turned economic climate has proven conducive to brutal campaigns of Russian ge-meinschaft. To be sure, a poor economy is a path of low resistance to implementing an ef-fective program of nationalism. By exploiting the fact that the economy impacts the entire nation, leaders bolster nationalism by rhetorically linking national solidarity to universal economic gain. Therefore, while this might be the least significant of the three aforemen-tioned variables, it ought not to be disregarded. Indeed, in Russia, no such variable deserves to be completely abandoned. Toward the end of continually reinforcing and reasserting the myth of the nation, one should assume that the state will exploit any means available. With an eye toward the future, the true value of this study lies in what new informa-tion might be mined from continued research. To be sure, the above conclusions are strictly preliminary. They are the products of a relatively limited investigation and would certainly benefit from deeper academic inquiry. The stakes, however, seem to be quite high for those willing to take on this task of continued research. Indeed, to trace nationalism is, in some ways at least, to trace the likelihood of conflict. Especially in the context of Putins exception-ally military-minded programs of gemeinschaft, the correlation between nationalism and the potentiality for international conflict seems uncomfortably high. Thus, those progress-ing with this study should be warned that nations and nationalism are not static conceptsdiligent researchers must be ready to take aim at moving targets. The necessity of hitting these targets, however, is absolutely paramount. Understanding the extent to which nationalism permeates all levels of the modern statenot just in Russia, but in all state it is important to truly understand nationalism itself. The central hope is that improved knowledge of this obscure abstraction could help states create an international climate of mutual respect and political benefit. Such an environment might foster peaceful increases in every nations sense of self-esteem. In the event of a less-than-ideal future, this knowledge could be repurposed and used to aid in developing tacti-cal and strategic countermeasures to be taken against states moving towards more violent expressions of nationalism. Regardless of what may come, however, one thing seems clear: it will come of nations, and through nationalism. Works CitedAnderson, Benedict. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nation-alism. London: Versa, 2006. Print.Brubacker, Rogers. Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany. Cambridge: Har-vard University Press, 1992. PrintChirot, David. National Liberations and Nationalist Nightmares: The Consequences of the End of Empires in the Twentieth Century, in Markets States and Democracy, (1995), pp. 43-68. Dekmejian, Hrair. Spectrum of Terror. Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2007. Print.Dekker, Henk, Darina Malov, Sander Hoogendoorn. Nationalism and Its Explanations, in Political Psychology, (2003), pp. 345-376.Englehart, Neil. State Capacity, State Failure, and Human Rights, in Journal of Peace Re-search, (2009), pp. 163-180.Gatrell, Peter. Russias First World War: A Social and Economic History. New York: Pearson Longman, 2005. Print.Gellner, Ernest. Nations and Nationalism. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983. Print.42Southern California International Review - Vol. 2 No. 2Tyler D. TyburskiHobsbawm, E.J. Nations and Nationalism Since 1780. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990. Print.OLaughlin, John, Gerald Toal, and Vladimir Kolossovt. Russian Geopolitical Culture and Public Opinion: the Masks of Proteus Revisited, in Transactions of the Institute of Brit-ish Geographers, (2005), pp. 322-335.Pipes, Richard. The Formation of the Soviet Union. Boston: Harvard University Press, 1997. Print.Riasanovsky, Nicholas. Nationality in the State Ideology During the Reign of Nicholas I, in The Russian Review, (1960), pp.38-46.Rowley, David. Russian Nationalism and the Cold War, in The American Historical Re-view, (1994), pp. 155-171.Stiglitz, Joseph. Globalization and its Discontents. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2002. Print.Sinyavsky, Andrey, and Dale Peterson. Russian Nationalism, in The Massachusetts, Re-view, (1990), pp. 475-494.Thomsen, Vilhelm. The Relations Between Ancient Russia and Scandonavia And the Origin of the Russian State. New York: Burt Franklin, 1877. Print.Tismaneanu, Vladimir. Fantasies of Salvation: Varieties of Nationalism in Postcommunist Eastern Europe, in Envisioning Eastern Europe, (1994), pp. 102-125.Tucker, Robert. The Marx-Engels Reader. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1978. Print. Walters, Phillip. Religion and the State: The Struggle for Legitimacy and Power, in Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, (1986), pp. 135-145.Weber, Max. The Vocation Lectures. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 2004. Print.Wedle, Janine. Collision and Collusion: The Strange Case of Western Aid to Eastern Europe. New York: Palgrave, 2001. Print.White, Stephen, and Ian McAllister. Putin and His Supporters, in Europe-Asia Studies, (2003), pp. 338-399.The Ethnic Korean Population in JapanThe Last Frontier? Alyssa MinThe sustained maintenance of the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea and the Republic of Korea, more commonly known as North Korea and South Korea, respectively, is the last remaining remnant of the Cold War struggle. While direct interaction between the two states has been subject to much scrutiny and analysis, this paper examines how political contestation between North and South Korea has played a role in the formation of identity and loyalties of the Zainichi ethnic Korean population in Japan, who trace their roots to the period of Japa-nese colonialism in Korea. I argue that the opportunity to influence this small but significant population has been utilized as an alternative channel through which both states can vie for its own modern diaspora community and advance its own version of the Korean identity. This paper also highlights the complexities of modern identity for the Zainichi Koreans, who live in tight-knit communities and have retained a strong sense of Korean nationality, despite their acclimation to Japanese society. To embrace their Korean heritage and identity, they have largely aligned themselves with one of two prominent alliance organizations: the pro-North Chongryon or the South-affiliated Mindan. Through their representative groups, each state has sought to create a nostalgic memory for itself, one that has been deliberately constructed through various movements and campaigns, which I outline in my paper. Yet in the last de-cade, South and North involvement in the Zainichi population has waned since the two states have begun engaging in formal, inter-Korean dialogue; the creation of a new, evolving identity, straddling the Korean duality of Mindan and Chongryon and the Japanese features of societal upbringing, is also explored in the conclusion. The Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea (DPRK), more commonly known as North Korea, made headlines all around the world this past summer when it qualified for the 2010 FIFA World Cup in South Africa for the first time since 1966. North Koreas first game was against five-time champion Brazil and the teams performance impressed even the most doubtful of soccer insiders. Its 1-2 loss was characterized as an impressive loss and regarded as one of the big surprises early on in the tournament. The star of the team was undoubt-edly Jong Tae Se, hailed in the football circle as the Peoples Rooney.1 Born and raised in an ethnic Korean enclave in Japan, Jong was educated in North Korean state-sponsored schools 1 Duerden, John, Jong Tae-se Is North Koreas Answer to Wayne Rooney, The Guardian (London), May 30, 2010. http://www.guardian.co.uk/football/2010/may/30/jong-tae-se-north-korea-wayne-rooney (accessed April 16, 2011).Alyssa Min is a senior at the University of Southern California majoring in International Relations. 44Southern California International Review - Vol. 2 No. 245Southern California International Review - Vol. 2 No. 2The Ethnic Korean Population in JapanAlyssa Minthat fostered a pro-North Korean mentality, one that ultimately prevailed over the technical South Korean citizenship that he inherited from his parents in his decision to represent the North in the World Cup. North Korea, seizing the opportunity to acquire one of the up-and-coming footballers in Asia, provided Jong with a North Korean passport. According to FIFA dual-citizenship rules, Jong was deemed eligible to participate on the side of the North2. Jong is an example of the complexities in modern Korean identity, muddled by the technicalities of citizenship and sharp distinctions between a North and South Korean identity. Aligning oneself with one state or another has very distinct significance not only in terms of separate nationalities, but also in terms of ideology and values nowhere else in the world is that more visible than with the Zainichis Koreans, the ethnic Korean popula-tion in Japan who trace their roots back to the period of Japanese colonialism in Korea. In light of this population, it is important to answer the question: how has political contestation between North and South Korea played a role in the formation of identity and loyalties of the Zainichi Koreans in Japan? In addressing this question, the historical backdrop of the political contestation in the Korean peninsula will first be established to provide an overview of the origins of the ethnic Korean population in Japan. This paper argues that the oppor-tunity to influence this small but significant population has been utilized as an alternative channel through which both states can vie for a modern diasporic community and advance its own version of the Korean identity, a by-product of the political contestation between the two states. This paper will also evaluate the response of the Zainichis, especially within the context of their social standing and circumstances in Japan. The concluding remarks will briefly discuss the future prospects of the Zainichi population. The identity issue of the Zainichi Korean population can best be viewed through the lens that academic C. Davis provides. C. Davis provides a comprehensive look at na-tional identity. Traditional definitions rely on the concept of imagined communities or binding socio-historical features such as dress, language or customs, but Davis argues that the individual-group identification is central to the concept of national identity: the essence of national identity [...] is the self view of ones group, rather than the tangible characteris-tics, that is of essence in determining the existence or non-existence of a nation3. Rather than characteristics that contribute to the construction of a particular identity, elements such as belonging and self view have a greater role in determining the concept of nation-al identity. Such is the case for the Zainichi Korean population, whose latter generations speak fluent Japanese, celebrate Japanese holidays, and pursue higher education and work in the Japanese system. Yet, despite their cultural acclimation, Zainichi populations live in extremely tight-knit communities and have retained a strong sense of Korean nationality, 2 Duerden, Jong Tae-se Is North Koreas Answer to Wayne Rooney, The Guardian, May 30, 2010.3 Davis, Thomas, Revisiting Group Attachment: Ethnic and National Identity, Political Psychology 20.1 (1999): 25-47. http://www.jstor.org/ (accessed November 23, 2011).which has contributed to the tension with Japanese ethnics in the region. While existing ethnic divisions [between the Zainichi Koreans and ethnic Japanese] are built upon visible biological differences among populations or rest upon invisible cultural and ideological distinctions, Davis points out that the boundaries around the meanings attached to ethnic groups are pure social constructions4. Accordingly, it is necessary to examine the historical backdrop and the social con-structions in which the Zainichi Korean population exists in Japanese society. In particular, the mass diaspora of Korean ethnics to Japan began during the Japanese colonization of the Korean peninsula in the early 1900s. As Japans dominance in the Pacific Rim materialized with its victory over China in the Sino-Japanese war, it colonized the Korean peninsula in the early 1900s. Among the implemented measures was the forced immigration of as many as 2.3 million Koreans to Japan, many of whom had no choice but to relocate as cheap labor. While most Koreans chose to return to their homeland at the end of World War II, postwar political and economic circumstances discouraged an estimated 600,000 Koreans from returning5. The delay of Korean independence, as determined by the Allied Powers, complicated the issue of repatriation further, as many did not want to return to a land that would not offer a semblance of the lives they had built since crossing over. Many [...] who returned to the Korean peninsula arrived with little, if any, economic, social, or even cultural foundation upon which to start new lives6. The lack of a domestic governmental authority to handle such issues thoroughly in the Korean peninsula solidified the presence of a per-manent diaspora community in Japan. The ensuing conflicts in the Korean peninsula which resulted in the Korean War in 1953 complicated the technical and legal status of the Korean residents in Japan. The by-product was the creation of two separate states, the Republic of Korea (ROK) in the south and Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea (DPRK) in the north. The Korean War ended in an armistice agreement in 1953, which called for a cessation of violence and the establish-ment of a border at the 38th parallel; much else, however, has been left up to the judgment of the two sides. The political contestation referred to throughout this paper is the result of the open-ended, unclear agreement that has been left to the devices of the two vastly differ-ent states. Accordingly, the legal status of Korean residents in Japan has changed over the years to reflect the establishment and development of the two separate Koreas. While they were effectively considered Japanese nationals during the period of colonization, they lost this Japanese nationality with Japans defeat in World War II. In 1965, the Zainichi Koreans who identified themselves as South Korean nationals qualified for permanent residency 4 Davis, Revisiting Group Attachment: Ethnic and National Identity, Political Psychology. 5 World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples - Japan : Koreans, Minority Rights Group International. 6 Ryang, Sonia, and John Lie. Diaspora without Homeland: Being Korean in Japan, Berkeley: Berkeley, 2009.46Southern California International Review - Vol. 2 No. 247Southern California International Review - Vol. 2 No. 2The Ethnic Korean Population in JapanAlyssa Minstatus after Japan normalized relations with South Korea. The legal status for those who identified with North Korea remained ambiguous until 1982, when they were finally granted permanent residency by the Japanese Ministry of Justice7. Because Japans concept of nation-ality is based on the principal of ancestry rather than territoriality, subsequent generations of Zainichi Koreans have not been automatically naturalized. In fact, the number of foreign nationals that are granted Japanese citizenship is very small. By the 1980s, there was an es-timated two million people of Korean heritage living in Japan; only about 100,000 of them had been naturalized as Japanese citizens.8 Legal status and technicalities aside, more important to the formation of the Zainichi identity is the social context and circumstances under which ethnic Koreans live in Japan. According to Watts and Ofer, there is a sense of Japanese nativism that is preva-lent within the culture, meaning that however well a non-native is adjusted to the society, speaks the language, and understands the culture, he or she can never be fully assimilated into the Japanese people9. This is clearly the case with ethnic Koreans in Japan. A CIA report entitled Aliens in Japan, presented an assessment of Japans foreign population. The relationship between the ethnic Korean population and ethnic Japanese nationals was char-acterized as such:The Koreans, with few exceptions, are a distinct minority group, with a low social posi-tion . . . . Those who go to Japan are, in the main, very poor, uneducated, and unskilled, even by low Korean standards. Koreans do not possess the Japanese fever for hard work, and to the energetic Japanese Koreans appear to be slow moving and lazy . . . . It is also said that Koreans are not as conscious of cleanliness as the Japanese and that the Koreans live under miserable conditions in Japan because they know nothing better in Korea.10 With this background, perhaps it is not surprising that despite their assimilation into Japanese society, Zainichi Koreans have been discriminated against in employment in national and local public service, as well as in large corporations and news media. They have been excluded from receiving basic benefits, such as social welfare, national health 7 Motani, Yoko, Towards a More Just Educational Policy for Minorities in Japan: the Case of Korean Ethnic Schools, Com-parative Education 38, no. 2 (2002): 225-237. www.jstor.org (accessed November 23, 2011).8 Shipper, Apichia W., Nationalisms of and Against Zainichi Koreans in Japan, Asian Politics and Policy: 55-75. 9 Watts, Meredith W., and Ofer Feldman, Are Nativists Different Kind of Democrat? Democratic Values and Outsiders in Japan, Political Psychology 22.4 (2001): 639-663. 10 Watts and Feldman, Are Nativists Different Kind of Democrat? Democratic Values and Outsiders in Japan, Political Psychology.insurance, pension programs and unemployment benefits.11 The Japanese Constitution bans institutionalized racial discrimination yet, because of the perpetual outsider status that has carried over from generation to generation, Zainichi Koreans have faced discrimination within Japanese society. This conflict between formal democratization and xenophobic tendencies12 has created an environment generally hostile to those deemed foreigners and has consequently put the Zainichi Koreans in a disadvantaged position within society. However, it is important to recognize that many Zainichi Koreans themselves do not want to become naturalized, especially because the process can be quite oppressive for non-Japanese.13 The granting of citizenship is a symbol of total assimilation and acceptance of Japanese culture and customs, and is difficult when marginalization and discrimination are central components of living in Japan. The director of the Japanese National Department of Civil Affairs of the Ministry of Justice expressed that naturalization would be permit-ted for those who have acquired the Japanese lifestyle and who have succeeded in reducing their original traits, as it is a matter of course that naturalization requires assimilation of the applicant.14 As perpetual outsiders who have often been shunned in Japanese society, Zainichi Koreans have taken to affirm their Korean heritage in the few opportunities and ways that is available to them. Thus, when taking the social context of the Zainichi Koreans into account, they have retained a rather compelling sense of Korean identity that has sepa-rated them, not necessarily by choice, from the rest of Japanese society. The backlash to the limits of naturalization has been a resistance to assimilation, and in turn, an embrace of the Korean identity. As academic Shipper writes: Living in a country with no active policies to fully incorporate foreigners into its society, Koreans [...] inevitably feel vulnerable as outsid-ers and turn to building closer ties with their co-ethnics and their own countries. Therefore, they focus their activities mainly around the politics of long-distance nationalism15. Thus if the concept of identity is revisited, the social construct of the Japanese na-tivism coupled with the perpetual outsider status has advanced a strong Korean national-ism within the Zainichi Korean population, despite a way of life and behavior that might reflect Japanese tendencies. At issue are feelings of membership, inclusion and commit-ment, where the bonds between individuals and nations are rightly regarded as essential 11 Tsutsi, Kiyoteru, and Hwa Ji Shin, Global Norms, Local Activism, and Social Movement Outcomes: Global Human Rights and Resident Koreans in Japan, Social Problems empty (2008): 291-418. www.jstor.org (accessed November 23, 2011).12 Watts, Meredith W. , and Ofer Feldman, Are Nativists Different Kind of Democrat? Democratic Values and Outsiders in Japan, Political Psychology 22.4 (2001): 639-663.13 Motani, Yoko, Towards a More Just Educational Policy for Minorities in Japan: the Case of Korean Ethnic Schools, Comparative Education 38, no. 2 (2002): 225-237. www.jstor.org (accessed November 23, 2011).14 Motani, Yoko, Towards a More Just Educational Policy for Minorities in Japan: the Case of Korean Ethnic Schools, Comparative Education 38, no. 2 (2002): 225-237. 15 Shipper, Apichia W., Nationalisms of and Against Zainichi Koreans in Japan, Asian Politics and Policy, 55-75.48Southern California International Review - Vol. 2 No. 249Southern California International Review - Vol. 2 No. 2The Ethnic Korean Population in JapanAlyssa Mincomponents in the development and maintenance of ethnic and national communities16; increasingly the Zainichi Koean population has looked toward the two states in the Korean peninsula to provide this sense of membership, inclusion, and commitment. The sense of inclusion and membership can be found through two organizations for Zainichi Koreans: Chongryon and Mindan. Although ethnic Koreans in Japan are not situated physically in either of the two Koreas, the ability to form an identity around one or the other has led to the emergence of the two starkly different alliance groups. Formed in the aftermath of World War II, these expatriate organizations make their allegiances clear. Approximately 25 percent of Zainichi Koreans belong to the pro-North Chongryon, which was established in 1955 amidst North Korean leader Kim Il Sungs calls for closer ties with the ethnic Korean population in Japan. So close are the ties, in fact, that the current Chongryon leader Seo Man Sul, as well as other senior officials, are members of North Koreas parliament, the Supreme Peoples Assembly. Because there are no formal diplomatic ties between Japan and North Korea, it has functioned as North Koreas de facto embassy in Japan17. Chongryon members primarily consist of those who identify their nationality as Chosun, a nationality developed by the Japanese government in the aftermath of World War II when the Korean peninsula was in an undetermined state. They profess a love of the Kim Jong Il regime and accept the ideologies of the Communist state. Although politically affiliated, the organization is also associated with numerous business enterprises in Japan and operates about 60 Korean schools and a University18. Mindan, the South Korean-affiliated organization, claims another 65 percent of the Zainichi Koreans as members. It was established in 1946 to foster close ties between the Zainichi population and South Korea, much like Chongryon. Normalization of diplomatic relations between Japan and South Korea in 1965 allowed Mindan to become more active by acting as an overseas agency for South Korea19. Today, it has a vast network, with 23 local headquarters and 356 branches in total. The rivalry that has resulted from the polarity of the two groups has produced bouts of hostility and clashes in the Zainichi Korean population. Each group accuses the other of being a puppet organization with the sole agenda of advancing the objectives of the 16 Davis, Thomas, Revisiting Group Attachment: Ethnic and National Identity, Political Psychology 20.1 (1999): 25-47.17 Agence France-Presse, Stage Set for Japan to Seize North Koreas embassy, The Inquirer (Manila), June 18, 2007. http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/breakingnews/world/view/20070618-71942/Stage_set_for_Japan_to_seize_North_Koreas_embassy (ac-cessed April 14, 2011).18 Ryang, Sonia, and John Lie, Diaspora without Homeland: Being Korean in Japan, Berkeley: Berkeley, 2009.19 Ember, Melvin, Carol R. Ember, and Ian A. Skoggard, Encyclopedia of Diasporas: Immigrant and Refugee Cultures around the World, New York: Springer, 2005.home government20. Ironically, the very fact that both organizations were established with such agendas make them guilty of the accusations of the other. It is understandable that inclusion in either one of these groups would be attractive to the Zainichi Koreans and would rouse a strong sense of loyalty, especially within the social context examined previously in the paper. However, the question arises as to why South and North Korea direct so much attention to the formation of nationalism in this diaspora com-munity; more simply, why do they care so much? A strictly realist approach would disre-gard this population altogether, because engaging with, much less winning over, a minority population will not do much in the power game that the two states are perpetually locked in. The money and effort spent on this population, deemed unremarkable by the eyes of the Japanese, could very well be channeled into another avenue to gain a competitive advantage over the other. There are no economic or military benefits to be had, and investment in this population may not be the wisest. Yet, historical evidence illustrates that both states have steadily maintained close contact with the Zainichi community, insofar as developing and implementing campaigns directed at this group. In a report entitled Engaging Diaspora Communities in Peace Processes, the Public International Law & Policy Group explores the role of states in engaging with a di-aspora community. The report conveys that many states participate in these communities in order to build internal and external political support for a peace process, but that the opposite can also be true: post-conflict political and economic development endeavors are a useful tool to engage the diaspora when the conflict is too contentious [...] to directly address its root causes21. In the case of South and North Korea, the political contestations on the peninsula are too sensitive to address directly, if the military security dilemmas and reliance on foreign alliances are any indication of the shaky relations. In fact, inter-Korean dialogue only formally began with the 1991 Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression and Exchanges and Cooperation between the South and the North, otherwise known as the Basic Agreement, which acknowledged that reunification was the goal of both govern-ments, and the 1992 Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula22. Before then, communication was indirect; the phrase actions speak louder than words rang quite literally in South-North Korea relations. The opportunity to influence this small but significant population, then, has been utilized as an alternative channel through which both states can vie for a modern diaspora community and advance its own version of the Korean identity. 20 Ember, Ember, and Skoggard, Encyclopedia of Diasporas: Immigrant and Refugee Cultures around the World. New York: Springer, 2005.21 Public International Law & Policy Group. Engaging Diaspora Communities in Peace Processes. PILPG: Global Pro Bono Law Firm 1 (2009): 3.22 South Korea. U.S. Department of State. http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2800.htm (accessed November 23, 2012).50Southern California International Review - Vol. 2 No. 251Southern California International Review - Vol. 2 No. 2The Ethnic Korean Population in JapanAlyssa Min The competition between the two states in vying for the loyalties of a modern dia-sporic community, though not as risky or consequential as issues on the peninsula, can be a source of competition that validates one over the other. Though Zainichi Koreans may not adhere to the traditional standards of identity, memory is something constructed, and the homeland can become more real in the construction of imagined communities of memory by nostalgic [...] communal identities23. Each state has sought to create a nostalgic memory for itself, one that is deliberately constructed. From Chongryons inception, North Korea has promoted itself as the authentic national government, typecasting South Korea as a puppet government of the US. As a result, Chongryon was very successful initially; a 1955 Japanese intelligence report claimed that 90% of Koreans in Japan support the North Korean regime. This aura of nostalgia sparked the Chongryon movement, which heralded the joys of re-turning to North Korea 24. North Korean propaganda encouraged Zainichi Koreans to relo-cate, hailing the homeland as a workers paradise. Some 90,000 heeded the call, only to real-ize upon arrival that North Korea was starkly different than as painted in propaganda reels. In response to this movement, Mindan launched efforts to hinder the Chongryon movement. In August 1959, Mindan members in Nigata attempted to forcibly obstruct the train that would shuttle Zainichi Koreans to the harbor, where they would board ships to North Korea. To this day, the organization claims that had the death-defying strug-gle of Mindan not taken place, the number of compatriots forced to live in North Korean living hell [would] have further increased25. In 1975, Mindan carried out its own Visit the Motherland project, aimed at the Zainichi population. The trip consisted of visits to major South Korean landmarks and ancestral graves and granted them the chance to meet their relatives in the South. The project was a huge success. Many visitors, previously entrenched in Chongryon propaganda, were astonished to see that South Korea was not as poverty-stricken and barren as they had been told. Between 1975 and 2005, more than 50,000 Zainichi Koreans trav-eled to South Korea as the project grew in popularity. Through this initiative, the organi-zation was able to monitor Koreans who traveled to South Korea and ensure that anyone who traveled there would become a member of Mindan26. Thus, the Korean Zainichi com-munity, previously dominated by Chongryon, started leaning heavily towards Mindan. A former Chongryon official told The Daily NK in a telephone conversation: Before that Mindan project, people believed the propaganda released by Chongryon; that South Korea 23 Delanty, Gerard, Cosmopolitan Community, Community (London), November 23, 2010.24 Bend It Like Jong, 101 East, Al Jazeera video, 23:19, August 19, 2010, http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/101east/2010/08/2010817124710245411.html.25 Mindan: Korean Residents Union in Japan, Mindan, http://www.mindan.org/eng/about/history.php (accessed November 23, 2012).26 Ember, Ember, and Skoggard, Encyclopedia of Diasporas: Immigrant and Refugee Cultures around the World. New York: Springer, 2005.is a colony of the U.S. and the South Korean people live in a real hell. However, after visiting South Korea, they were shocked at South Koreas economic development, and those facts circulated rapidly among other Korean residents27. As Mindan grew rapidly in number, North Korean dictator Kim Il Sung reacted by instructing Chongryon to strengthen its organization28. In the 1970s, Chongryon began to focus on the educational system as a new venue to win the loyalties of the people. Today, Chongryon runs about 60 schools across Japan, many of which are funded by the North Korean government. Kang Hwa Jong, the principal of a Chongryon-run middle school, said: You teach them he is the highest leader of modern North Korea. At the same time, for common residents who live in Japan, we teach that he sends scholarship money and financial aid to our educational system 29. Education occurs on two levels: first is the edu-cation of the students on North Korean ideology and the cult of Kim Jong Il; the second, perhaps more subtle yet just as powerful, is the reminder to the community that Kim Jong Il is the perennial father figure, one who is supporting their childrens education and taking care of their needs despite discrimination and hardships in Japan. Many parents who send their children to Chongryon-run schools are grateful that the Great Leader supports their childrens education. Clearly, targeting education, a field in which Zainichi Koreans are dis-criminated, has been a strategy of the North to gain favor with the community. The relationship works both ways, especially for Chongryon, which faces added difficulties for being communist sympathizers30. Chongryons maintenance [...] is linked to the continued existence of the nation. Thus, individual efforts are directed toward the national interest, thereby serving to reinforce both the nation and its associated social groups, institutions, and organizations31. North Koreas financial support has been dwin-dling in recent years, however, and the organization is facing difficulties in sustaining do-mestic activity. On February 26, 2011, the Chongryon headquarter in Tokyo was seized by the government-backed Resolution and Collection Corporation (RCC) over a loan repay-ment case. Financial troubles have plagued the organization since 2007, when it was ordered by the Japanese courts to pay back 62.7 billion yen to the RCC. A testament to the difficulties they face today, the legal battle came to an end on June 27, 2012 when the Supreme Court rejected Chongryons request to prevent the auction of the building by the RCC32.27 Kim, Yong Hun, South Korea Visits Weakened Chongryon, The DailyNK (New York), December 10, 2009. http://www.dailynk.com/english/read.php?cataId=nk00400&num=5761 (accessed November 23, 2011).28 Kim, Yong Hun, South Korea Visits Weakened Chongryon, The DailyNK (New York), December 10, 2009. http://www.dailynk.com/english/read.php?cataId=nk00400&num=5761 (accessed November 23, 2011).29 Bend It Like Jong, 101 East, Al Jazeera video, 23:19, August 19, 2010, http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/101east/2010/08/2010817124710245411.html.30 Ryang, Sonia, and John Lie, Diaspora without Homeland: Being Korean in Japan, Berkeley: Berkeley, 2009.31 Shipper, Apichia W., Nationalisms of and Against Zainichi Koreans in Japan, Asian Politics and Policy: 75. 32 Aokie, Manabu, Court OKs auction of Chongryon Tokyo head office, The Asahi Shimbun (Seoul), June 29, 2012.52Southern California International Review - Vol. 2 No. 253Southern California International Review - Vol. 2 No. 2The Ethnic Korean Population in JapanAlyssa Min Without much financial support, the Chongryon-run school system also continues to struggle. Because the schools were founded upon the notion of cultivating loyalty toward North Korea and its leadership, the Japanese Ministry of Education does not provide any sort of financial support, although other foreign schools, such as international schools, are given aid. Thus, the lack of funds from either government has hit the schools hard and many students have begun attending regular Japanese schools. In addition, graduates of Chongryon-run schools are not allowed to take the entrance exam for Japanese public uni-versities which has added to the difficulties of pursuing higher education. Though private schools do accept them on the basis of their performance, discrimination and higher stan-dards often restrict their opportunities for education. This situation has led to an increas-ing distrust and loss of faith in Chongryon and its leadership among people who relied on Chongryon as a center of unity for ethnic pride33. With its deepening financial troubles and limited resources, Chongryon is less effective in rousing North Korean allegiance. On the other side of the spectrum, Mindan has also come under fire for monopo-lizing the access to South Korea for Koreans in Japan. It has been criticized for capitaliz-ing on the emotional trauma of national partition for first-generation Koreans, exploiting their nostalgic sentiments for their long unseen home and turning it into political gain by forcing them to join Mindan34. Such sentiments have caused distrust among the Zainichi population about Mindan, and its recent movement to identify with the term Kankoku, the Japanese word for South Korea, has been met with chilly reception35. Chongryons troubles with the Japanese state may be affecting Mindans pivot toward this new movement to iden-tify with Kankoku, but for the younger generation whose identities are increasingly defined by the interaction between South and North Korea instead of Mindan and Chongryon, this shift can be deemed inconsistent. While Mindan and Chongryon may not have as firm of a grip as they have had in the past, the presence of both organizations and the respective governments behind them can still be felt. In light of the earthquake and tsunami in Japan on March 11, 2011, North Korea donated $500,000 USD to Chongryon members to help them recover from the crisis36. For a state that is in dire need of aid itself, the gesture was an extremely generous one. Mindan has also been utilized by the South Korean government to do goodwill activi-ties in Japan, such as providing Korean food for the victims of the disasters37. Thus, both 33 Ember, Ember, and Skoggard, 2005.34 Ember, Ember, and Skoggard, 2005.35 Tsutsi, Kiyoteru, and Hwa Ji Shin, Global Norms, Local Activism, and Social Movement Outcomes: Global Human Rights and Resident Koreans in Japan, Social Problems, (2008): 291-418.36 Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), N.K. Leader Donates US$500,000 to Pro-Pyongyang Residents in Japan, March 24, 2011.37 Yonhap News Agency, ( . ), Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), April 4, 2011organizations may be shifting from serving political roles to more subtle social roles for the South and North Korean states. In the last two decades, South and North Korean involvement in the Zainichi popu-lation has waned since the two states have started engaging in meaningful, formal inter-Ko-rean dialogue, a relatively new approach. Direct contact began with the 1991 Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression and Exchanges and Cooperation between the South and the North, otherwise known as the Basic Agreement, which acknowledged that reunification was the goal of both governments, and the 1992 Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula38. However, differences on the process of reunification, issues re-garding North Korean nuclear weapons programs, unstable South Korean domestic politics, and the 1994 death of North Korean leader Kim Il-sung contributed to the warming and cooling of relations. When Kim Dae-Jung assumed the South Korean presidency in 1998, at the top of his agenda was a different approach of engagement toward the North. He intro-duced the Sunshine Policy, a foreign policy initiative that proposed greater political contact and advocated for more collaborative efforts with the North. The Sunshine Policy brought about three terms of understanding and a subsequent decrease in competition between North and South Korea over the Zainichi population. First, both sides agreed that unification should be a process and not an immediate goal. That is, it must be achieved peacefully without force or violence. Secondly, a loose form of federation was proposed, and the vision for one people, two systems, two independent governments was used as a point of convergence for further cooperation. Lastly, the two sides agreed that continued US military presence is critical in stabilizing the peninsula and Northeast Asia39. With these three points of understanding, a historical summit meeting between president Kim Dae Jung and North Korean dictator Kim Jong Il in June 2000 signaled the beginning of a series of collaborative projects between the two states: railroads were built to connect the two states; a tourist site, Mt. Kumgang, was established in North Korea which allowed for a flow of South Korean visitors to the North; South Korean companies were allowed into Kaesong Industrial Complex, north of the demilitarized zone, to employ as many as 10,000 North Korean workers to make a wide variety of products. Such a relation-ship was regarded as mutually beneficial, as South Korean companies were satisfied by the cheap labor and the goodwill of the relocation of labor while North Korea gained economic assistance on its own terms. Other initiatives included economic and humanitarian aid as well as reunification between long-divided family members. Kim Dae Jung was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2000 for his efforts, but was criticized heavily when it was revealed that South Korea had paid the North $500 million dollars immediately before the summit 38 South Korea, U.S. Department of State39 Kim Dae-jung - Nobel Lecture, Nobelprize.org. 54Southern California International Review - Vol. 2 No. 255Southern California International Review - Vol. 2 No. 2The Ethnic Korean Population in JapanAlyssa Minthrough secret dealings with one of its biggest conglomerates, Hyundai. Whether this was money paid to persuade Kim Jong Il to agree to the summit in the first place has been a topic of contestation. Despite this, the succeeding South Korean president Roh Moo Hyun has continued to engage the North through the initiatives of the Sunshine Policy40. While its effectiveness can be debated, the policies have opened up the peninsula as an arena in which to discuss and negotiate real issues. Thus, the need to utilize the Zainichi population as a means of competing with one another is no longer necessary. Meanwhile, later generations are becoming more indifferent to the bickering be-tween Mindan and Chongryon, and see their identities more fluidly than past generations. According to Oh Kong Don of the Institute for Defense Analysis, The younger generation [in Japan] sees North Korea as a hopeless case, even though they are indoctrinated and raised in the North Korean system.41 The irrelevance of Mindan and Chongryon is inform-ing their decision to distance themselves from the institutions. Jong Tae Se, the heralded soccer star and North Korean supporter, belongs to such a generation: I respect Kim Jong Il absolutely. I would like to believe and follow him whatever happens. Yet, asked if his love is great enough to one day permanently settle in the North, Jong shook his head, remarking: My friends and family are all in Japan; I wouldnt know anyone. I would not like to live in North Korea.42 A far cry from the absolute brainwashed, cant-live-without-the-Chairman mentality of other North Koreans, Jongs attitude clearly demonstrates that a North Korean passport and an upbringing in North Korean sponsored schools do not make him a typical North Korean. Perhaps this is the lesson that North Korea has learned itself: that a modern dias-pora community cannot fully absorb its own version of the Korean identity. For the Zainichi Korean population, a new and evolving identity, straddling the Korean duality of Mindan and Chongryon and the features of Japanese societal upbringing, should be interesting to watch in the years to come. As the purpose of both Mindan and Chongryon begin to shift within the Korean diaspora community, it will be important to observe what factors and considerations influence the next generations of Zainichi Koreans. The findings could very well prove valuable if the Sunshine Policy succeeds in bringing the two nations together back as one Korean peninsula: though states and institutions may fail, identity is a fluid concept that can greatly enhance or deter the hold of a nation on its people, and conversely, the peoples faith in its nation. Whether South and North Korea can continue to engage in identity construction with the Zainichi Koreans remains to be seen. 40 Xiang, Zhang, China Hopes for Early, Fruitful Inter-Korean Talks, English Xinhua News (Beijing), April 27, 2011.41 Rosen.42 Bend It Like Jong, 101 East, Al Jazeera video, 23:19, August 19, 2010, http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/101east/2010/08/2010817124710245411.html.Works CitedBend It Like Jong. 101 East. Al Jazeera video, 23:19. August 19, 2010. http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/101east/2010/08/2010817124710245411.htmlAokie, Manabu. Court OKs auction of Chongryon Tokyo head office. 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New York: Springer, 2005.France-Presse, Agence. Stage Set for Japan to Seize North Koreas embassy . The In-quirer (Manila), June 18, 2007. http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/breakingnews/world/view/20070618-71942/Stage_set_for_Japan_to_seize_North_Koreas_embassy (ac-cessed April 14, 2011).Kim Dae-jung - Nobel Lecture. Nobelprize.org. http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2000/dae-jung-lecture.html (accessed November 23, 2012).Kim, Yong Hun. South Korea Visits Weakened Chongryon. The DailyNK (New York ), December 10, 2009. http://www.dailynk.com/english/read.php? cataId=nk00400&num=5761 (accessed November 23, 2011).Mindan: Korean Residents Union in Japan. Mindan. http://www.mindan.org/eng/about/history.php (accessed November 23, 2012).Motani, Yoko. Towards a More Just Educational Policy for Minorities in Japan: the Case of Korean Ethnic Schools. Comparative Education 38, no. 2 (2002): 225-237. www.jstor.org (accessed November 23, 2011).Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), N.K. Leader Donates US$500,000 to Pro-Pyongyang Resi-dents in Japan, March 24, 2011. http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/northkorea/2011/03/24/63/0401000000AEN20110324005100315F.HTML (accessed November 23, 2011).56Southern California International Review - Vol. 2 No. 2Alyssa MinOffice of Strategic Services. Aliens in Japan. In Occupation of Japan United States Planning Documents Volume III. Washington DC: Office of Strategic Services, 1945. 1942-1945.Public International Law & Policy Group. Engaging Diaspora Communities in Peace Pro-cesses. PILPG: Global Pro Bono Law Firm 1 (2009): 3.Ryang, Sonia, and John Lie. Diaspora without Homeland: Being Korean in Japan. Berkeley: Berkeley, 2009.Shipper, Apichia W.. Nationalisms of and Against Zainichi Koreans in Japan. Asian Politics and Policy empty (0): 55-75. www.jstor.org (accessed November 23, 2011).South Korea. U.S. Department of State. http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2800.htm (ac-cessed November 23, 2012).Tsutsi, Kiyoteru, and Hwa Ji Shin. 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( . ) Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), April 4, 2011. http://www.yonhapnews.co.kr/bulletin/2011/04/07/0200000000AKR20110407128700073.HTML (accessed April 15, 2011).Genocide, Identity and the StateThe Dire Potential for Conflict in Colonial IdentitiesErik PetersonColonial relationships create and propagate identities as a means of governance, resulting in unstable societies and eventual conflict. The Rwandan Genocide represents one of the most horrific instances of the purposeful corruption of a states society and culture via the colonial powers that reigned over the state. The genocide was rooted in the historical background of Rwandas colonization and the effects of the states aim to maintain power through societal ma-nipulation. This article seeks to examine the development of identity conflict through colonial relationships through the lens of the Rwandan genocide. This paper will explore the hypothesis that the colonial subordination of one state to the control of another leaves the dominated society vulnerable to a corruption that permanently alters the socio-cultural landscape and function of the state through augmented identities.In just four weeks, eleven percent of the Rwandan population was murdered. In just four weeks, the world witnessed Rwanda demonstrate the true horrors of human potential as neighbor beheaded neighbor and a nations people slaughtered its own. The Rwandan Genocide of 1994 was a conflict rooted in the ethnic division between the Hutus and Tutsis and took the form of dispersed but highly organized mass killings across the nations lands. The subjugated majority Hutu group massacred the historically elite Tutsi group, leaving an estimated 800,000 dead1. However, attribution to a solely ethnic basis for the conflict is an oversimplification, one that does not adequately address the multifactorial development of the genocide itself. The imperialist motivations of Belgian colonial powers sought control through the utilization of structural and institutional tools that manipulated the cultural, psychological, and ethnic framework of the Rwandan population. Colonial powers, with the intent of increased ease of governance, attempted to categorize and quantify Rwanda and thereby formed ethnic divides based on arbitrary distinctions. This manipulation of the sentiments of the Rwandan people laid the foundation for the post-colonial authoritar-ian regime to dehumanize its victims by strengthening tensions between fabricated ethnic groups. Ultimately, these sentiments sparked the violence that was seen as necessary to maintain state control, culminating in the genocide of 1994. The Rwandan Genocide thus represents the corruption of a society by the external influence of a colonial relationship and the horrific consequences that can result. Belgian 1 Paul Magnarella, Explaining Rwandas 1994 Genocide, in vol. 21 of Human Rights and Human Welfare (2002), 25.Erik Peterson is a senior at the University of Southern California majoring in International Relations. 58Southern California International Review - Vol. 2 No. 259Southern California International Review - Vol. 2 No. 2Genocide, Identity and the State Erik Petersoncolonialism in Rwanda created the structural basis for the subsequent Rwandan regime and thereby demonstrates the immense power of the colonial state to shape and influence society through the conscious creation and promotion of disparate identities. Colonial relationships denote broad implications for the impetus and propagation of identity-based conflicts. In 1974, tensions between Greek and Turkish Cypriots led to a Turkish invasion that resulted in thousands of refugees, raped women, and aftermath consequences that continue to haunt Cypriots to this day 2 (Georgiades, p575, 2007). The decades of civil war between the ter-rorist group Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam and Sri Lankan government forces sparked myriad deaths, massacres, and widespread devastation. And, of course, in 1994, hundreds of thousands deaths resulted from the Rwandan Genocide. Each of these conflicts evidences the potential ramifications of colonial influence. Colonial powers seek control through utilization of structural and institutional tools that manipulate the cultural, psychological, political, social, and ethnic frameworks of each pop-ulation. The British colonial authority in Cyprus exacerbated the tensions between Turkish minorities and resentful Greek Cypriots seeking enosis. Likewise, British segregation of po-litical representation on an ethnic basis built a structural foundation for the divide between Sinhalese and Tamil ethnic groups that would serve as justification for future violence in Sri Lanka. In Rwanda, Belgian colonial authorities categorized and quantified the states popu-lation and thereby formed ethnic divides based on arbitrary distinctions. This perversion of the cohesive identity of the Rwandan people laid the foundation for the post-colonial authoritarian regime to dehumanize its victims by strengthening tensions between fabri-cated ethnic groups. Ultimately, the nature of each of these conflicts is rooted in clashes of disparate identities. Analysis of the creation and propagation of identity is crucial to under-standing the nature of the conflict. This paper will seek to examine the foundations and development of colonial influence and identity formation through the lens of the Rwandan genocide. This paper will explore the hypothesis that the subordination of one state to the dominance and control of a colonial relationship leaves the society vulnerable to corruption that permanently alters the socio-cultural landscape and function of the state.The Creation and Propagation of Disparate IdentitiesConflicts such as those in Sri Lanka, Cyprus, and Rwanda are built upon historical foundations. Colonialism creates a relationship in which the subordination of one state to the control of another leaves the dominated society vulnerable to the effects of the colonial powers influence. This can permanently alter the socio-cultural landscape of a state and build ethnic divides and tension where there was previously coexistence and stable peace. 2 no citation for thisColonial authorities seek to coerce subordinate groups into participating in a paradigm in which their subordination is inexorable. This is accomplished by operating within preexist-ing structural power differences of race and class, resulting in a reification and reaffirmation of the subordinates position within society. Furthermore, the colonial authority seeks to shape the dominated society toward progress, an idea that was a central part of the ideo-logical framework that supported European imperial projects and explained the hegemony of European civilizations 3. The colonial powers primary means of shaping society is the creation and propagation of disparate identities within a state, which can be wielded to or-ganize its area of governance. Often, in colonial relationships, this injection of a colonial ideology takes the form of an attempt to modernize and transform the colony with Western and European ideals. This is accomplished via the interplay between disparate identities and the resulting ideologies that become embedded within society. Strong, structurally rooted identities can supersede individual thoughts and beliefs, forming a collective identity. Yet, when such disparate iden-tities are based off of hatred of the other, they result in dehumanization and conflict that arises through the aegis of these populations themselves. The role of identity in conflict is exemplified by one of John Cockells six basic categories of preconditions for protracted social conflict: the polarization of social divisions around communal identity (ethnic, religious, tribal) 4. As divisions of identity are reaffirmed in successive generations, they gain severity and significance. Tensions escalate and ultimately lead to protracted conflict that is structurally rooted in the populations identity. Colonial powers produce and embed these identities within a society for a variety of purposes. Yet regardless of their intent, this process permanently changes the face of a society and constitutively reinforces the impor-tance of identity itself.Rwandas Path to GenocideGenocide is defined as a form of one-sided mass killing in which the state or other authority intends to destroy a group, as that group and membership in it are defined by the perpetrator5. The 1994 Rwandan Genocide falls precisely within these lines in its specific planning, organized orchestration, and clear designation of the targeted group. Furthermore, the genocide was by no means spontaneous, nor was it a sudden conflagration of ethnic tensions. Rather, the Rwandan Genocide is rooted in the historical background of Rwandas colonization and the effects of the states aim to maintain power through societal 3 Yiannis Papadakis, Divided Cyprus: Modernity, History, and an Island in Conflict in New Anthropologies of Europe, (Indi-ana University Press, 2006), 60.4 Sarah Holt, Aid, Peacebuilding, and the Resurgence of War: Buying Time in Sri Lanka, (Palgrave Macmillan Publishers, 1977), 75. 5 D. Mirkovic, Ethnic conflict and genocide: reflections on ethnic cleansing in the former Yugoslavia in Annals, (1996), 197. 60Southern California International Review - Vol. 2 No. 261Southern California International Review - Vol. 2 No. 2Genocide, Identity and the State Erik Petersonmanipulation. Certainly, the genocide by this logic, had its deepest roots in a pre-colonial system based on the premise of inequality and the manipulation of these structures toward ease of governance6. Beginning in 1894, Rwanda belonged to German East Africa. Yet after Germanys defeat in World War I, the League of Nations Mandate of 1916 appointed Belgium to become the nations administrative authority, lasting from 1924 to 19627. The Belgian colonial power exercised control through the established Tutsi monarchs and chiefs that had historically ruled Rwanda. In its desire to organize Rwanda and further its indirect power in the Tutsi monarchy, Belgium developed and promoted the concept of Tutsi superiority over the Hutu majority. To a significant effect, prejudicial fabrications inflated Tutsi egos inordinately and crushed Hutu feelings, which coalesced into an aggressively resentful inferiority complex8. This development of a power divide was a Belgian manifestation of the Hamitic Hypothesis, designating that the Tutsi superiority was grounded in their relation to the Hamites and their creation of the first civilization and technology in Africa9. This divide was further exacerbated by the 1933-1934 Belgian census and introduction of an identity card system to mark each Rwandan individual as belonging to the Tutsi, Hutu or Twa ethnic categoriza-tions. Qualifications for membership to any ethnicity were arbitrary in nature. Ethnic iden-tification was determined on a patrilineal basis, regardless of the ethnicity of ones mother. Furthermore, the Hutu-Tutsi designation was also determined by the Belgian 10 cow rule: any male who owned 10 cows was classified as a Tutsi; those with fewer than 10 cows were classified as Hutu 10. Thus, ethnic designations closely followed existing sociopolitical and economic structures, furthering the establishment of Tutsis as superior on an economic basis as well. Likewise, colonial policy intensified this differentiation by relegating the vast majority of Hutus to particularly onerous forms of forced cultivationand by actively fa-voring Tutsi in access to administrative posts, education, and jobs in the modern sector 11. Belgiums direct involvement in Rwandan government ended in 1962 with Rwandan in-dependence following the UN supervised national election of the Hutu President Gregoire Kayibanda. However, Belgiums colonial legacy would ultimately continue to color Rwandas landscape a bloody red. 6 Neil Kressel, Mass Hate: The Global Rise of Genocide and Terror, (Westview Press, 2002), 97.7 Magnarella, Explaining Rwandas 1994 Genocide, 25.8 Ibid.9 Sanders, Edith R, The hamitic hyopthesis; its origin and functions in time perspecive, in The Journal of African History, (1969), 521. 10 Mahmood Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in Rwanda, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001), 99.11 Catharine Newbury, Background to Genocide: Rwanda, Issue: A Journal of Opinion, vol. 23, no. 2, (African Studies Association, 1995), 15.Tensions sparked shortly after independence, and by 1963, the Hutu violently over-threw the King Kigri V and expelled about 130,000 Tutsi to the neighboring countries of Burundi, Zaire, and Uganda. Tutsi attempts to reenter Rwanda and regain control were used as justification for the Hutu slaughtering of thousands of Tutsis living within Rwanda between December 1963 and January 1964. July of 1973 marked the new, radical Hutu dictator regime of Major Juvnal Habyarimana, whose supporters soon filled all-impor-tant governing positions. Most importantly, Habyarimana maintained and strengthened the use of ethnic identity card systems, rejected the return of half a million Rwandan refu-gees, and stirred ultra-nationalist sentiments within Rwanda. The displaced Tutsi refugees formed the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) and eventually, backed by European pressure, the Habyarimana government signed a series of agreements, called the Accords, which reintegrated Tutsis into Rwanda and infuriated radical Hutu groups. This sparked a fer-vent campaign by Hutu extremists of anti-Tutsi propaganda in both print and radio broad-casts, exemplified by Radio Milles Collines, a station that broadcasted from the capital of Kigali. Such broadcasts were particularly effective based on the abysmally low literacy rate of Rwandas rural populations. Furthermore, the RPFs return to Rwanda stirred the estab-lishment of the Interahamwe, a Hutu militia that was dispersed across the nation. The culmination of the tensions between the radical Hutu groups and the Tutsi popu-lations began on April 6, 1994 when President Habyarimanas plane was shot down near the Kigali airport, killing the president and everyone on board. Although many scholars attribute the assassination to pro-Hutu extremists within Habyarimanas military, the Radio Milles Collines blamed the RPF and UN soldiers for the attack. With such justification, the Interahamwe quickly established roadblocks and brutally killed any Tutsis they found via the state-sponsored identity cards. Exploiting radio and print propaganda campaigns, national-ist extremists and the Interahamwe incited Hutus across the nation to arm themselves with machetes and slaughter any Tutsis they encountered. The opportunity to loot the economi-cally superior Tutsis and overcome the Hutus sense of inferiority was a strong motivator for neighbor to turn on neighbor. Thus began the genocide and one of the most concentrated instances of state-supported murder since Nazi Germany. The genocide continued until July 18th, when the RPF successfully defeated the Interahamwe and declared cease-fire12. Shortly after, the RPF and moderate Hutu groups reestablished control through the formation of a new government that committed itself to building a multiparty democracy and to discon-tinuing the ethnic classification system utilized by the previous regime13. Rwanda reeled in the aftermath of the genocide. Every established structure and facet of society was demol-ished and rebuilt with the intent to wipe clean Rwandas history and begin anew. Although the horrors of the genocide would never be forgotten, Rwandas culture quickly bent itself 12 Magnarella, Explaining Rwandas 1994 Genocide, 27.13 Ibid., 28.62Southern California International Review - Vol. 2 No. 263Southern California International Review - Vol. 2 No. 2Genocide, Identity and the State Erik Petersontoward a rejection of previous ethnic classifications and popular sentiments widely ignored the Hutu or Tutsi status. Ethnic labels are now outlawed by the Rwandan Government of National Unity, yet their legacy of differentiation in morality, class, and status still perme-ates the framework of Rwandan social relationships and yields an unspoken, yet powerful, hierarchy14.The Dominant Perpetrator The historical context and development of the Rwandan Genocide provides a unique perspective into the power of states to shape and influence society. When the dominant power exploits the subjugation of a society, it creates an opportunity to radically influence its cultural, social, and political framework. The dominant powers tool is the creation and propagation of disparate identities within a society, which the state can wield to organize its area of governance. These identities are produced and embedded within a society by a variety of techniques and for a variety of purposes. Yet regardless of their intent, this process permanently changes the face of a society and constitutively reinforces the importance of identity itself. And as exemplified by Rwandas genocide, this embedding may present un-intended consequences and directions for a society when such disparate identities become malicious in nature.Colonial states possess the ability to change the society of another, but require a domi-nant position. Accomplished through the establishment of a power divide between the dom-inant state and the subordinate, the colonial state can effectively exercise control and thereby wield tools to influence the subordinate states society. The Belgian, and earlier German, control in Rwanda filtered through structures of tribal rule and Tutsi monarchies. Belgian officials, clergy, and soldiers implemented their directives with the voice of the Tutsi elite, exploiting the preexisting concept of pre-colonial premise of inequality which justified and legitimated the Tutsi aristocracys power through a notion of inherited and immutable interracial differences in ability and make-up15. In this way, the Belgian authority instated a dominant-subordinate relationship between itself and Rwanda through the reification of existing dominant-subordinate class structures between the Tutsi and Hutu. In its promo-tion of the premise of inequality, Belgium linked itself to forms of domination based on a premise or claim to inherent superiority by ruling elites16. Therein, Belgium garnered power through the re-appropriation and strengthening of Rwandas historical structures of 14 Laura Eramian, Situating ethnic difference: Personhood, power, and the 1994 genocide in Butare, Rwanda, (York University, Canada, 2011), ProQuest Dissertations and Theses, 337.15 J. J. Maquet, The Premise of Inequality in Rwanda: a study of political relations in a Central African Kingdom, (London: Oxford University Press, 1961), 18. 16 James C Scott, Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts of Moorestown Friends School, (Yale University, 1990), 12. dominance. Use of such structures enabled a subversive means of control and thus bolstered the efficacy of Belgian policies and strategies of governance: The Belgian colonial period saw significantly more cooperation across the institutions comprising the colonial state system17. Belgian authority similarly gained dominion over and compliance from the Tutsi ruling elite through adherence to traditional power structures, reinforcing the legitimacy of Tutsi superiority. The historical and scientifically based superiority of the Tutsi people became a tool for Belgium: Mytho-historical imaginings often underpin state efforts tomandate their support for the state18. Tutsi cooperation was assured by the structural, cul-tural, social, political, and economical benefits they received during the colonial era and the Rwandan nationalistic sentiments promoted by Belgium. Compounded with the League of Nations Mandate of 1916 that gave international legitimacy to the colonization of Rwanda and the subjugation of its people, Belgium asserted and secured its authority in Rwanda by solidifying its dominant-subordinate relationship.The Power of Identity as a Tool The primary means of control and influence of a state to society lies in the states ability to generate and shape the formation of identity. The dominant nature of the state permits the influencing of the structural framework to create identity and inject the states version of truth and reality into the collective thought of a society. The dominant ideology, represented by the state, operates to conceal or misrepresent aspects of social relations that, if apprehended directly, would be damaging to the interests of dominant elites19. The states ideology seeks to deceive and coerce populations into cooperation with its ideals. This is accomplished in two fashions: the establishment of thick and thin versions of false consciousness. The state influences the dominant elite within a society (who are subordi-nate to the state) through thick false consciousness by persuading the subordinate groups to believe actively in the values that explain and justify their own subordination20. This process results from the elites cooperation with the state, promoted by their own increase in power and control. The colonial state likewise exercises ideological power in the form of thin versions of consciousness via the subordinates within society. It seeks to achieve com-pliance by convincing subordinate groups that the social order in which they live is natural and inevitable21. The state can do so by abiding by preexisting structural power differen-tials, reifying and reaffirming the subordinates position within society. These reifications 17 Eramian, Situating ethnic difference, 86. 18 Barry Sautman, Peking Man and the Politics of Paleoanthropoligical Nationalism in China, in The Journal of Asian Studies vol. 60, no. 1, (Association for Asian Studies, 2001), 110.19 Scott, Domination and the Arts of Resistance, 71. 20 Ibid.21 Ibid.64Southern California International Review - Vol. 2 No. 265Southern California International Review - Vol. 2 No. 2Genocide, Identity and the State Erik Petersoncan become embedded and pervasive, and highly detrimental to the stability of the society. Often, states wield the arousal of nationalist and patriotic sentiments as a powerful tool in mobilizing public support and thereby bolster belief in the power of a colonial state, fur-thering its cause through the strengthening of state-created identities22. Thus, the process and consequence of colonial interference marks a foundational aspect of the development of the Rwandan Genocide in the Hutu extremists projection of their identity and anti-Tutsi ideals to the larger Hutu majority. The Fabrication of Identity in Rwanda The colonial authority of Belgium sought to shape identities in Rwanda in order to reinforce Belgian authority, increase ease of governance, and eventually bring Rwanda to the modern era with an elite that could put Rwanda among the ranks of modern nation-states in the absence of European guidance23. With a basis in the existing tribal Tutsi elite, this production of a modernized ruling elite for Rwanda invariably forged power differentials between rival ethnic groups. Thus, colonial ruling practices resulted in the establishment of disparate identities between the Tutsi and Hutu, and were manifested in a variety of ways. First, the Belgian census of 1933-34 introduced an identity card system that categorized and quantified arbitrary distinctions into racial separations. The creation of previously un-realized categories gave Rwandans distinct identities that weakened the concept of a uni-fied Rwandan national identity: colonial authorities were using increasingly sophisticated administrative meansbuilding on the principle of ethno-racial hierarchies24. The census had the ultimate effect of naming and defining racial categorizations and uniquely distin-guished between Hutu and Tutsi. These disparate Hutu and Tutsi identities were further strengthened in by the promotion of a modernized Tutsi ruling class. The colonial power set up boarding schools, producing an educated elite who quite literally had one foot in the world of the Rwandans and one in the world of the Europeans25. Such schools gave access only to an elite few, favoring and educating the historically powerful Tutsi. Furthermore, in-stitutionalized language training beyond Kinyarwanda conferred power almost exclusively to the Tutsi as virtually no Hutu were educated in French. Thus, only Tutsi were capable of communicating with the Belgian colonizers, relying on the colonial language rather than the common Swahili. Access to the French language quickly became synonymous with 22 William I. Zartman, Peacemaking In International Conflict: Methods and Techniques, Rev. ed., (United States Institute of Peace, 2007), 85. 23 Eramian, Situating Ethnic Difference, 81.24 Benedict Anderson, Census, Map and Museum in Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nation-alism, Revised edition, (London, 1991), 247. 25 Eramian, Situating Ethnic Difference, 79.power in Rwanda because of the differential access to the modern and to colonial routines of governance26. To a similar effect, colonial rule organized education, religion, administration and the military around the accepted racial superiority of the Tutsi. With education, Tutsi were enabled to fulfill roles of governance and administrative positions as well as to shape the framework of Rwandas politics. Belgian placement of Tutsi in the leadership of the imposed Christian religion conferred the ideological power of religion to the Tutsi people. And final-ly, Tutsi military leadership gave Tutsi control over the states means of direct coercion and violence. Ultimately, the Belgian administration between 1916 and 1925 produced struc-tural transformations that contributed extensively to the consolidation of colonial power and Tutsi-Hutu opposition, demonstrating that the overall effect of the Belgians and Tutsi elite was the wholesale support and elevation of the Batutsi over the Bahutu27. The Consequences of a Division in Identity This establishment of a modernized elite essentially portrayed the Tutsi in Rwandan society as foreign and more European than a true Rwandan. Therein, colonial institutions based on Tutsi ethnic superiority proved subversive of Batutsi and monarchial hegemony28. The elevated status of Tutsi legitimated Hutu displeasure and resentment of their societal standing. The newly emergent Hutu elite sought an expression of societal subjugation in racial terms, and Catholicism gave added impetus to this crystallization of a sense of group oppression and resentment against the Batutsi en masse29. As traditional tribal religious structures had been replaced by the colonial insertion of Catholicism, the pre-colonial and historical component of Tutsi rule was lost. This occurred when colonial power weakened religious belief systems and clan structures, creating a monolithic division between Hutu and Tutsi identities, and starting to dissolve the ideological glue of Rwandan monarchial society30. Economically disadvantaged and societally inferior, the Hutu em-phasized the Tutsi relationship with the Belgian colonization and rejected the superiority of their modernization. The Tutsi elite was constructed as the alien invader unworthy of status as Rwandan. The void of an accepted elite in Rwandan society facilitated the intensification of the Hutu hidden transcript,a privileged site for nonhegemonic, contrapuntual, dissident, 26 Eramian, Situating Ethnic Difference, 80.27 Eramian, 87. 28 Helen M Hintjens, Explaining the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda, in The Journal of Modern African Studies, vol. 37, no. 2 (1999), 253.29 Hintjens, Explaining the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda, 253. 30 Hintjens, 254. 66Southern California International Review - Vol. 2 No. 267Southern California International Review - Vol. 2 No. 2Genocide, Identity and the State Erik Petersonsubversive discourse31. A subversive discourse enabled the Hutu to solidify and define their resentment of the dominant power and their frustration with their subordinate position. The consequence of this Tutsi alienation and Hutu frustration was expressed in the Hutu Revolution of 1959, wherein power was wrested from the Tutsi elite and the Hutu ascended to rule. In response to the rise of Hutu rule, Belgian authorities quickly changed allegiances, supporting the Hutu ethnic group that could maintain its power. The same principles co-lonial authority had applied to the historically superior Tutsi class, now transferred to the Hutu. Led by Abbe Kagame and Gregoire Kayibanda, the Hutu leadership created The Bahutu Manifesto of 1957, which expressed the Hutu desire to end Tutsi dominance once and for all [and] defended the need for racial markers on identity cards32. Clearly, racial categorizations were now firmly established and grounded in the social and cultural frame-work of Rwanda. The disparate nature of the Hutu and Tutsi identities stigmatized the other and created significant tension that would lead to widespread violence: The origin of the violence is connected to how Hutu and Tutsi were constructed as political identities by the colonial state, Hutu as indigenous and Tutsi as alien33.The Foundation for Genocide by Dominant Influence An analysis of the rise and fall of Tutsi elites via the policies of colonial powers evidences the unique ability of states to influence society and impose ideology. The creation of identities through categorization and quantification with the intent of increased ease of governance effectively transformed pre and post-colonial Rwandan society. Although schol-arship disputes the specific terms used to describe the pre-colonial Hutu and Tutsi relation-ship, it is evident that the Hutus and the Tutsis were probably two distinct ethnic groups that time has culturally homogenizedand biologically mingled34. Yet the aftermath of Belgium colonialism demonstrates the ability of the state to erase cultural and biological factors in a society. A previously cohesive population of Rwandans was stratified by spe-cific techniques of governance and the creation of identities, regardless of the established cultural homogenization and biological similarities. A unified Rwanda was broken in two. Ultimately, this rift in Rwandan society laid the groundwork for the genocide that was to 31 Scott, Domination and the Arts of Resistance, 25. 32 Hintjens, Explaining the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda, 255. 33 Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers, 99. 34 John A Berry and Carol Pott Berry, editors, Genocide in Rwanda: A Collective Memory, (Washington, DC: Howard Univer-sity Press, 1999), 28. come. The pluralized Rwandan society impacted the relations between Hutu and Tutsi and constrain[ed] the ability of these groups to respond to one another in a constructive way35. After Rwandan independence from Belgian rule in 1962 and the creation of The Hutu Manifesto, tensions between the two groups continued to escalate and violence began. The Rwandan state, now controlled by the Hutu regime of Major Juvnal Habyarimana, em-ployed a variety of tactics to further popular sentiments against the alien Tutsi and justify state-sponsored violence. By redirecting the populations strong sense of social solidarity and cultural cohesion toward a common racial enemy within the country, the political architects of the I994 genocide were to destroy almost totally any sense of social cohesion within Rwanda36. Fresh from their oppressive and subjugated position within Rwandan society, Hutus fought tooth and nail to maintain their power and prevent any possibility of losing it. Radio and print propaganda campaigns projected the extremist Hutu identity throughout Rwanda, often fabricating stories of Tutsi violence and greed, convincing many of the illiterate Hutu that the Tutsi were Rwandas enemy. Hutu leadership also re-appropri-ated the tenets of the Hamitic Hypothesis, declaring that the superior and foreign origins of the Tutsi mandated their expulsion from Rwanda. Likewise, Tutsis were subjected to similar limitations that the Hutus had experienced during the colonial era: strict quotas on higher education and public employment. Violence that was entirely ignored by the state was like-wise justified by the economic crisis that plagued Rwanda. The Hutu, adamant of their right to prosperity and power, perpetrated violence against the Tutsi, evidencing how minority groups, particularly those excluded from dominant society, become an easy scapegoat for the deprivation felt on the part of the major society and a visible target for those who wish to plunder37. Violence and societal subordination jarred harshly with the Tutsi superiority complex. Infuriated by their social standing and fearful of the Hutu attacks that were increasing in frequency and severity, many Tutsi fled to the neighboring states of Uganda and Burundi and created the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), which took its power from its officials high statuses in the Ugandan political structure. The RPF and newly established Interahamwe clashed violently over years following Rwandan independence. The RPF invasion into Rwanda was the final justification needed for the Hutu regime to begin an orchestrated and widespread removal of Tutsi within Rwanda. Its clear that the ideology of the hierarchy of races instituted by colonial powers had far more devastating effects in Rwandathan could ever have been imagined by theEuropean ethnographers who first propounded 35 Stacey Gibson, The Role of Structures and Institutions in the genocide of the Rwandan Tutsi and the Armenians of the Ottoman Empire, in Journal of Genocidal Research, (Routledge Publishing, 2010), 508. 36 Hintjens, Explaining the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda, 249.37 W. P Zenner, Middlemen minorities and genocide, in, Genocide and the Modern Age: Case Studies of Mass Death, editors, I. Wallimann and M. N. Dobkowski (New York: Greenwood Press, 1991), 23.68Southern California International Review - Vol. 2 No. 269Southern California International Review - Vol. 2 No. 2Genocide, Identity and the State Erik Petersonsuch theories38. Indeed, in a fantasy Africa without European intervention, the exploit-ative Tutsi monarchy might have persisted, and, in this manner, genocide would have been avoided39.The Resolution of Disparate Identities The significance of identity in protracted conflicts evidences the necessity for a means for societies to restructure societies against the influence of colonial powers. Disparate identities present a challenging obstacle to such interaction because structurally rooted sen-timents of hatred, fear, and distrust create divisions between communities and individuals, constraining the ability of these groups to respond to one another in a constructive way40. Therefore, disparate identities must be overcome and clashing communities unified into a cohesive society capable of coexistence. Overcoming identity conflicts can be accomplished, not necessarily through a rejection of ethnic or historical differences or a denial of diver-sity in ideology, but rather through building a unifying peacemaking identity, facilitating negotiations, and peace building. Such an attempt does not imply that past grievances and historical traumas have been forgotten it simply implies that a process has been set into motion that addresses the central needs and fears of the societies and establishes continuing mechanisms to confront them41. These continuing mechanisms serve to establish a shared hybrid identity between two groups, representing the most effective means of producing a structurally enforced environ-ment conducive to successful negotiation and peacemaking. Identity conflicts are embed-ded within societal frameworks and perpetuated through narratives. If historical memory and memory entrepreneurship can be channeled to influence perception of a shared iden-tity, the root cause of conflict can be changed and the influence of colonialisms societal interference can be shaken. Through the acceptance of a mutually agreed upon historical narrative, disparate communities can reconcile past grievances and undermine the consti-tutive effect of their clashes of identity. Such narratives enforce the formation of a hybrid identity, which can be forged through a variety of techniques and strategies.42 The formation of hybrid identities must combat of the effects of attribution theory and mirror imaging between groups. Attribution theory describes how, when observing the behavior of others, people have a strong tendency to make dispositional attributions to 38 Hintjens, Explaining the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda, 255. 39 Kressel, Mass Hate: The Global Rise of Genocide and Terror, 98. 40 Gibson, The Role of Structures and Institutions in the genocide of the Rwandan Tutsi and the Armenians of the Ottoman Empire, 508. 41 Zartman, Peacemaking In International Conflict, 67. 42 D. Becker, Memory Entrepreneurship and the Reagan Legacy Project: Partisanship, Misinterpretation, Manipulation, in Global Governance: Political Authority in Transition, (International Studies Association, 2011), 1-45.commit what has been called the fundamental attribution error when explaining the causes of their own behavior, people are much more likely to make situational attributions43. Negative attribution of blame to anothers identity simply reinforces the division between disparate identities, providing seemingly sound reasons for individuals and communities to loathe and fear. Likewise, disparate identity groups tend to exhibit a mirroring process in which both parties tend to develop parallel images of self and other, except with the sign reversed; that is, the two parties have similarly positive self-images and similarly negative enemy images44. Differing groups within society must not see each other as polar opposites that only recognize the positive aspects in themselves and focus exclusively on the negative aspects of the adversary. Hybridity within a new overarching identity can be encouraged by creating structural and psychological commitments to a peaceful, cooperative relationship, breaking the conflict spirals initiated by mirror images and developing communication pat-terns to allow new information to challenge old assumptions45. Such a process mandates a reevaluation of a states education systems to build the foun-dation for a new unified peacemaking identity in future generations. The sentiments of hatred and fear have become embedded within the framework and paradigm of older gener-ations and can prove difficult to change. Though this remains the case, younger generations provide a valuable opportunity to alter the pervasiveness of negative historical memory and use memory entrepreneurship to reshape traditional negative perceptions and focus on similarities between identity groups. Education systems are one of the most powerful ways in which disparate identities are transmitted and propagated: An education system can act as a repository for a conflict, keeping alive memories and interpretations of history that sup-port one side of a conflict and denigrate the other. Because education shapes and transmits values, it can serve as a battleground where different communities compete over history and the societys narratives46. Yet, since education shapes and transmits values it can likewise instill a unifying identity in future generations. Historical memory and memory entrepre-neurship paint history in accordance with specific viewpoints and paradigms. Education that addresses historical memory undermines disparate identities in favor of hybrid ones and therefore can also provide a means out of the war, fostering attitudes of openness, toler-ance, and responsibility and creating the skills necessary for a lasting peace47. Furthermore, education systems emphasizing conflict resolution can prepare generations to bring about 43 Zartman, Peacemaking In International Conflict, 97.44 Zartman, 92. 45 Zartman, Peacemaking In International Conflict , 101.46 Zartman, 328.47 Zartman, 339. 70Southern California International Review - Vol. 2 No. 271Southern California International Review - Vol. 2 No. 2Genocide, Identity and the State Erik Petersonpeace by enabling an understanding of the dynamics of conflict in the world and the role of democratic international institutions in building a more peaceful global society.48Unifying hybrid identities can also be established by addressing how identity conflict is a process driven by collective needs and fears, rather than entirely a product of ra-tional calculation of objective national interests49. Identities often coalesce around col-lective needs and fears. Perceived threats of the other cause individuals to band together around mutually shared concerns. These fears vary; they can be economic concerns, fears of physical safety, or institutionally and generationally instilled misconceptions regarding the other. Rwanda evidences the importance of addressing collective needs and fears as the Hutu majority, perceiving the Tutsi as a biological and social threat, moved to exterminate them and committed genocide. This genocide emphasizes the influence of economic and political disparities between communities and the resentment that they can foster in the af-termath of a colonial power disparity. Rwandas future thus requires a combination of long-term economic and political development goals, as well as through the transformation of hatred through reflection and forgiveness, which could be encouraged by political leadersThis perspective moves beyond the structural dimensionsand recognizes the inherently human aspect of wars50. By undermining the remnants of colonial societal interference, the supporting foundations that enable identities to rationalize and justify their disparities can be altered and the root cause of an identity-based conflict can be addressed. Understanding identity provides a framework for analyzing the interactions of clashing groups and, more importantly, illuminates the path toward effectively counteracting the det-rimental consequences of a states subordinate position to a colonial power. The promotion of a hybrid identity to be adopted by future generations represents the most effective means of resolving an identity-based conflict. Reification of a new identity must encourage the parties to penetrate each others perspectives, to differentiate their image of the enemyand to generate ideas for resolving the conflict that are responsive to the fundamental needs and fears of both sides51. The creation of hybrid identities does not advocate pure homoge-neity, but rather mutual understanding and respect. Refusing to acknowledge ethnicity or difference, whether fabricated or natural, does not remove the underlying framework nor does it change how strongly the ideologies of ethnic difference are still embedded within society. Thus, hybrid identities must seek to preserve the sanctity of each separate group while focusing the similarities that can serve to join them. The power of addressing identity and undermining colonial influence lies in its efficacy in changing the structural, ideologi-48 Campbell.49 Zartman, Peacemaking In International Conflict , 64. 50 Holt, Aid, Peacebuilding, and the Resurgence of War, 33. 51 Zartman, Peacemaking In International Conflict , 102.cal, and foundational barriers to negotiations and peace building. Historical memory and memory entrepreneurship, trauma and forgiveness, can all serve to unite a people through a hybrid identity to be reified and affirmed through future generations. Conclusions on the Power of the Dominant The development of the genocide in Rwanda evidences the ability of a state to ex-ploit the disparate identities within a society to achieve its own ends. Furthermore, it dem-onstrates the unpredictable potential of such fervent identity formation in a society at the hands of a colonial state. The very tools used by colonial powers for increased governance changed the structure of Rwandan society and thereby made possible the massive violence that resulted once European governance was removed. This is exemplified in the process of the vilification of one identity in opposition to state interests, which is used to stir hatred and eliminate any threat to the states stability. The Hutu majority, perceiving the Tutsi as a biological and social threat, moved to exterminate them and genocide began. This vilifica-tion became the majority opinion and was integral to Hutu identity and the justification for individual murder: any murder of the Tutsi came to be perceived as constituting an act of self-defense, because evil incarnate was now threatening to destroy the peaceful agrarian democratic Hutu republicit was a matter of survival52. In this way, the true power of the state is revealed. By inserting its own ideology into the social framework of another state, the dominant state creates disparate identities that can be used to exercise control and establish power differentials. By working within the frame the dominant state has created, it is enabled to govern efficiently. However, crisis can arise once the original dominant-subordinate relationship is deconstructed, leaving behind a fabri-cated and unnatural system of interaction between imagined identities. This process, while exacerbated by economic crisis or political turmoil, can take place in fully functioning and stable states. The most necessary condition for a clash or crisis of identities is simply the fab-rication of those identities themselves. Their artificial nature and their existence as a creation of a powerful dominant state give such identities incredible persistence and pervasiveness. They become so deeply embedded within society that the framework and capacity of the society itself is constitutively altered by the interplay of the identities. Thus, when analyz-ing the Rwandan genocide and its development via the creation of inauthentic and artificial ethnic identities, it becomes clear that any pre-colonial foundations for violence never could have escalated to genocide without the influence of an external state. States garner control via the revivification of ethnic identities, placing ethnically defined categories in opposition against each otherthe intensification of ethnic conflict was not the result of a collapsed 52 G. Prunier, The Rwandan Crisis: History of a Genocide, (London: Hurst, 1998), 226. 72Southern California International Review - Vol. 2 No. 273Southern California International Review - Vol. 2 No. 2Genocide, Identity and the State Erik Petersonstatein this case ethnic conflict served to illustrate state power in action; in Rwanda, the ethnic conflict of 1994 was simply state sponsored terrorism against its own citizens53. Yet it can be argued that the decisions of individuals within the Rwandan Genocide reveal a deviation from this concept. Many rural Hutus strove to hide and protect their neighboring Tutsi from the rampaging Interahamwe and the roaming mobs of machete-armed Hutu extremists. Such Hutus were murdered next to Tutsi when directly confronted by the Interahamwe and refused to commit genocide. However, the power of identity to stir conflict is maintained. These Hutu, who deviated from the violence of their socially estab-lished identity, are simply those who escaped or rejected the adoption of an anti-Tutsi ide-ology. In refusing to acknowledge the Tutsi as inhuman and worthy of extermination, these Hutu deviants linked their identity to that of the subordinate Tutsi. In the eyes of the Hutu majority, this was a betrayal of the prevailing Hutu identity and thus these Tutsi sympathiz-ers represented a similar threat worthy of extermination. After the successful intervention of the RPF, the defeat of the Interahamwe and the end of the 1994 genocide, Rwanda entered a period of reconstruction. The modern regime is officially opposed to ethnic identification of groups of peoples and individuals, and has removed ethnic labels from identity cards54. Such a rejection of ethnically based identi-ties may be seen as progressing away from the divisive social framework of pre-genocide Rwanda. However, this notion is flawed. While the power of these identities may diminish over time as future generations become further and further removed from the genocide, modern Rwanda still reels from their effects. The state-mandated and culturally supported ignoring of all ethnic classifications actually reifies the power of these classifications and marks ethnicity as hugely significant. Refusing to overtly acknowledge ethnicity does not remove the underlying framework nor does it change how strongly the ideologies of ethnic difference are still embedded within Rwandan society. By tracing the progression of genocide through colonial Rwanda to the modern era, the ultimate power of the states influence over society can be analyzed. The injection of ideology via the formation of identity incites permanent structural changes that become embedded within a culture and the minds of a nations people. The subordination of one state to another enables the dominant power to inflict its will upon the subordinates society via the fabrica-tion of artificial identity. Their permanence and pervasiveness emphasizes that identity is one of the most powerful tools a state can wield, yet its effects can wreak devastating and unpredictable consequences. Although the genocide occurred under the aegis of Rwandans themselves, the external influence of colonial powers and their resulting effects must be 53 Newbury, Background to Genocide: Rwanda, 13. 54 Hintjens, Explaining the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda, 279.addressed to adequately understand how, in such a small period of time, the foundations could be laid for neighbor to murder neighbor and a nation to slaughter its children. Works CitedAnderson, Benedict. Census, Map and Museum. 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